Following is the January to February 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism
Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing
terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that
month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: January 2023 To February 2023



Afghanistan Terrorism Report: December 2022 To January 2023
By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the January to February 2023 installment of “Afghanistan
Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the
developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview
of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.



Following a series of major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul
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targeting the foreign ministry, the military airport, the Pakistani embassy,
and a hotel housing Chinese guests at the end of 2022 and January 2023,
propaganda outlets linked to ISIS-K have not focused on claiming responsibility
for attacks in Afghanistan from the middle of January until the end of
February. Although several pro-ISIS-K posts mention attacks in Afghanistan
during that time, ISIS-K did not claim responsibility. This drop in claimed and
actual terror attacks was very likely due to very adverse weather conditions,
with Afghanistan experiencing thecoldest winter in 15 years
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, hampering the mobility of terrorist operatives. In addition, Taliban security
forces seem to have achieved some successes against ISIS-K in recent weeks,
including areportedly successful raid
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on an ISIS-K hideout in Kabul on February 14. A pro-ISIS-K post on February 22
also announced the death of Ejaz Ahmad Ahangar in Afghanistan, described by
this post and inIndian media reports
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as a key ISIS functionary focused on Kashmir.



Although ISIS-K did not take responsibility for this action, staff of the
embassy of Saudi Arabia was airlifted out of the country at the beginning of
February, reportedly responding to the threat of a potentialvehicle bombing
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within the diplomatic quarter. This corresponds to an uptick of criticism
directed at Saudi Arabia through pro-ISIS-K social media channels. For example,
the pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan Web Magazine on February 2, dedicated an article
strongly criticizing Qatar and Saudi Arabia for violating religious standards.
Interestingly, both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also reportedly
downgraded their diplomatic presence in Afghanistan in February. With the
Pakistani ambassador not yet having returned to Kabul following the attack on
his embassy in December, thissparked a discussion
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in media reports about whether the Taliban are beginning to lose some of their
more accommodating diplomatic relationships and whether Iran was gaining
influence in the country.



This discussion is also reflected in pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets. While
anti-Shiite propaganda and criticisms of the alleged Taliban religious
tolerance towards Shiites and other faiths in Afghanistan have been a central
point of ISIS-K rhetoric, January and February saw a marked increase in posts
criticizing the actions of Iran in Afghanistan and its cooperation with the
Taliban. As a sign of the developing Iran-Taliban relationship, Iran decided to
hand over
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the Afghan embassy in Tehran to representatives of the Taliban on February 26.
However, on a strategic level, the Islamic Republic of Iran hasnot yet decided
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on a unified policy approach toward the Taliban. Some factions in Iran
continue to argue that the Taliban are a threat, including ideologically, while
others favor a more accommodating approach to the new regime in Kabul.



During 2022, pro-ISIS-K propaganda regularly highlighted factional differences
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within the Taliban movement. During January and February, ISIS-K-linked
messaging attempted to describe what it called an internal coup attempt,
pitting Taliban interior ministerSirajuddin Haqqani
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defense ministerMohammad Yaqoob
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against Taliban leaderHaibatullah Akhundzada
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and the Kandahar faction of the Taliban on the other side. Pro-ISIS-K
propaganda claims that the issue of contention was the approach of the Taliban
toward education for women. Allegedly, Haqqani and Yaqoob opposed the ban on
secondary education for women to ensure the continuous flow of international
aid to the country.



Similar disagreements have also been discussed in current media reports
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. The potential split mirrors discussions during the first Taliban regime in
the 1990s, where reports about the loss of power ofmore “moderate” voices
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within the Taliban were a common narrative in expert discussions. During the
first Taliban regime until 2001, these supposedly “moderate” Taliban leaders
were not able to alter the extremist policies of the movement. Currently,
during the second Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there are no indications that
the situation will be different. The Taliban have not changed their internal
functionality, which affords Haibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban,
ultimate decision-making power
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. Therefore, even the influence of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of theHaqqani
Network <[link removed]>, and Mohammad
Yaqoob, the son of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, will always be inferior
to the power of the Taliban leader. Given that both Haqqani as well as Yaqoob
must be aware of this, it is likely that their critical public statements
against the restrictions on women’s education are aimed more at maintaining
their relationship with international donors than at Haibatullah Akhundzada’s
decision on that matter.



One of the most concerning aspects of pro-ISIS-K messaging in January and
February is the shifting rhetoric concerning humanitarian organizations,
including the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). While in previous months, pro-ISIS-K propaganda messaging criticized
the Taliban formishandling international funds
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, during January and February, the rhetoric sharpened. Several pro-ISIS-K posts
accused international aid workers of being spies. This mirrors the situation in
the Pakistani tribal areas and North Waziristan Province, where humanitarian
and civil society organizations have beenthreatened and attacked
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by militant groups for a number of years. Therefore, this shift in pro-ISIS-K
propaganda in recent weeks increases the risk of direct attacks against
humanitarian operations and their staff in Afghanistan.



Pro-ISIS-K propaganda against Pakistan also increased in January and February.
In several posts, the Pakistani government is labeled an “apostate” entity, and
the Taliban are criticized for their cooperation with Pakistan. For example,
the attack against a mosque in Peshawar by theTehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
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January 30, whichkilled at least 100 individuals
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, features in pro-ISIS-K propaganda messages. These messages primarily
criticize the Taliban for condemning the attack. In several posts on January 30
and February 1, ISIS-K-linked propaganda channels seem to justify the attacks.
Again, on February 17, referring to an attack by terrorists on apolice station
in Karachi
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, which killed two individuals, a pro-ISIS-K post decries the Taliban
condemning any terrorist attack in Pakistan “whatever the affiliation” of the
perpetrator. This noticeable increase in propaganda against Pakistan could
indicate that ISIS-K intends to intensify its operations there in the coming
months.

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