Following is the January to February 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.
Following a series of major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul targeting the foreign ministry, the military airport, the Pakistani embassy, and a hotel housing Chinese guests at the end of 2022 and January 2023, propaganda outlets linked to ISIS-K have not focused on claiming responsibility for attacks in Afghanistan from the middle of January until the end of February. Although several pro-ISIS-K posts mention attacks in Afghanistan during that time, ISIS-K did not claim responsibility. This drop in claimed and actual terror attacks was very likely due to very adverse weather conditions, with Afghanistan experiencing the coldest winter in 15 years, hampering the mobility of terrorist operatives. In addition, Taliban security forces seem to have achieved some successes against ISIS-K in recent weeks, including a reportedly successful raid on an ISIS-K hideout in Kabul on February 14. A pro-ISIS-K post on February 22 also announced the death of Ejaz Ahmad Ahangar in Afghanistan, described by this post and in Indian media reports as a key ISIS functionary focused on Kashmir.
Although ISIS-K did not take responsibility for this action, staff of the embassy of Saudi Arabia was airlifted out of the country at the beginning of February, reportedly responding to the threat of a potential vehicle bombing within the diplomatic quarter. This corresponds to an uptick of criticism directed at Saudi Arabia through pro-ISIS-K social media channels. For example, the pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan Web Magazine on February 2, dedicated an article strongly criticizing Qatar and Saudi Arabia for violating religious standards. Interestingly, both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also reportedly downgraded their diplomatic presence in Afghanistan in February. With the Pakistani ambassador not yet having returned to Kabul following the attack on his embassy in December, this sparked a discussion in media reports about whether the Taliban are beginning to lose some of their more accommodating diplomatic relationships and whether Iran was gaining influence in the country.
This discussion is also reflected in pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets. While anti-Shiite propaganda and criticisms of the alleged Taliban religious tolerance towards Shiites and other faiths in Afghanistan have been a central point of ISIS-K rhetoric, January and February saw a marked increase in posts criticizing the actions of Iran in Afghanistan and its cooperation with the Taliban. As a sign of the developing Iran-Taliban relationship, Iran decided to hand over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to representatives of the Taliban on February 26. However, on a strategic level, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yet decided on a unified policy approach toward the Taliban. Some factions in Iran continue to argue that the Taliban are a threat, including ideologically, while others favor a more accommodating approach to the new regime in Kabul.
During 2022, pro-ISIS-K propaganda regularly highlighted factional differences within the Taliban movement. During January and February, ISIS-K-linked messaging attempted to describe what it called an internal coup attempt, pitting Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Taliban defense minister Mohammad Yaqoob on the one side against Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and the Kandahar faction of the Taliban on the other side. Pro-ISIS-K propaganda claims that the issue of contention was the approach of the Taliban toward education for women. Allegedly, Haqqani and Yaqoob opposed the ban on secondary education for women to ensure the continuous flow of international aid to the country.
Similar disagreements have also been discussed in current media reports. The potential split mirrors discussions during the first Taliban regime in the 1990s, where reports about the loss of power of more “moderate” voices within the Taliban were a common narrative in expert discussions. During the first Taliban regime until 2001, these supposedly “moderate” Taliban leaders were not able to alter the extremist policies of the movement. Currently, during the second Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there are no indications that the situation will be different. The Taliban have not changed their internal functionality, which affords Haibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, ultimate decision-making power. Therefore, even the influence of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network, and Mohammad Yaqoob, the son of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, will always be inferior to the power of the Taliban leader. Given that both Haqqani as well as Yaqoob must be aware of this, it is likely that their critical public statements against the restrictions on women’s education are aimed more at maintaining their relationship with international donors than at Haibatullah Akhundzada’s decision on that matter.
One of the most concerning aspects of pro-ISIS-K messaging in January and February is the shifting rhetoric concerning humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While in previous months, pro-ISIS-K propaganda messaging criticized the Taliban for mishandling international funds, during January and February, the rhetoric sharpened. Several pro-ISIS-K posts accused international aid workers of being spies. This mirrors the situation in the Pakistani tribal areas and North Waziristan Province, where humanitarian and civil society organizations have been threatened and attacked by militant groups for a number of years. Therefore, this shift in pro-ISIS-K propaganda in recent weeks increases the risk of direct attacks against humanitarian operations and their staff in Afghanistan.
Pro-ISIS-K propaganda against Pakistan also increased in January and February. In several posts, the Pakistani government is labeled an “apostate” entity, and the Taliban are criticized for their cooperation with Pakistan. For example, the attack against a mosque in Peshawar by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on January 30, which killed at least 100 individuals, features in pro-ISIS-K propaganda messages. These messages primarily criticize the Taliban for condemning the attack. In several posts on January 30 and February 1, ISIS-K-linked propaganda channels seem to justify the attacks. Again, on February 17, referring to an attack by terrorists on a police station in Karachi, which killed two individuals, a pro-ISIS-K post decries the Taliban condemning any terrorist attack in Pakistan “whatever the affiliation” of the perpetrator. This noticeable increase in propaganda against Pakistan could indicate that ISIS-K intends to intensify its operations there in the coming months.
