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The B-21 Raider at a public unveiling ceremony on December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, California. (US Air Force photo)
This week Russia suspended its participation in the New START nuclear treaty. In a recent Hudson policy memo [[link removed]], Senior Fellows Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]] and Marshall Billingslea [[link removed]] explain what this means and how the United States should respond. Below are their policy recommendations.
Read the Policy Brief [[link removed]]
Key Insights
1. Increase America’s credibility.
The United States should get to work on increasing the credibility of US extended deterrence in Europe as well as in Asia to raise the nuclear threshold. The Biden administration should immediately begin consulting with NATO allies regarding Russia’s abandonment of the treaty.
2. Field a nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missile.
The Biden administration needs to respond forcefully and support an expedited fielding of a nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missile. The Trump Nuclear Posture Review called for this to raise the nuclear threshold. Senior military leaders support the program, as does Congress. The Biden administration should cease its efforts to cancel the program and instead wholeheartedly support it.
3. Acquire more B-21 stealth bombers.
The United States recently unveiled the next-generation B-21 stealth bomber. While the system is in the early stages of production, the US needs to adapt and acquire additional B-21 bombers. The US would also be wise to ensure there are ample nuclear and conventional weapons for the B-21 at the scale necessary to meet deterrence requirements.
4. Build more Columbia-class submarines.
The United States should also move with urgency to build 16 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines instead of the 12 currently planned [[link removed]]. This new class of SSBNs is designed to replace the 14 aging Navy Ohio-class SSBNs.
5. Reverse the Air Force and Navy’s conversions.
Given that Russia cannot be trusted to abide by treaty limits, the Air Force and Navy need to immediately begin the lengthy process of reversing the conversions made to our bombers, submarines, and ICBMs that restrict the number of deployed US warheads.
Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.
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How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion [[link removed]]
Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use, his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against supporting Ukraine’s defense. In a Hudson policy memo [[link removed]], Senior Fellow Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]] describes how the US should weaken adversaries’ nuclear coercion.
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The Biden NPR: Embracing Foundations, Rejecting Improvements [[link removed]]
Writing for the National Institute for Public Policy [[link removed]], Senior Fellow Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]] analyzes the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review.
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Thinking About the Unthinkable in Ukraine: Could Putin Use Weapons of Mass Destruction? [[link removed]]
In this Hudson event [[link removed]], Senior Fellows David Asher [[link removed]], Bryan Clark [[link removed]], Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]], and William Schneider [[link removed]], along with Walter P. Stern Distinguished Fellow Ken Weinstein [[link removed]], examined the possible scenarios of Russia using weapons of mass destruction.
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