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The B-21 Raider at a public unveiling ceremony on December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, California. (US Air Force photo)
This week Russia suspended its participation in the New START nuclear treaty. In a recent Hudson policy memo, Senior Fellows Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea explain what this means and how the United States should respond. Below are their policy recommendations.
Key Insights
1. Increase America’s credibility.
The United States should get to work on increasing the credibility of US extended deterrence in Europe as well as in Asia to raise the nuclear threshold. The Biden administration should immediately begin consulting with NATO allies regarding Russia’s abandonment of the treaty.
2. Field a nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missile.
The Biden administration needs to respond forcefully and support an expedited fielding of a nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missile. The Trump Nuclear Posture Review called for this to raise the nuclear threshold. Senior military leaders support the program, as does Congress. The Biden administration should cease its efforts to cancel the program and instead wholeheartedly support it.
3. Acquire more B-21 stealth bombers.
The United States recently unveiled the next-generation B-21 stealth bomber. While the system is in the early stages of production, the US needs to adapt and acquire additional B-21 bombers. The US would also be wise to ensure there are ample nuclear and conventional weapons for the B-21 at the scale necessary to meet deterrence requirements.
4. Build more Columbia-class submarines.
The United States should also move with urgency to build 16 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines instead of the 12 currently planned. This new class of SSBNs is designed to replace the 14 aging Navy Ohio-class SSBNs.
5. Reverse the Air Force and Navy’s conversions.
Given that Russia cannot be trusted to abide by treaty limits, the Air Force and Navy need to immediately begin the lengthy process of reversing the conversions made to our bombers, submarines, and ICBMs that restrict the number of deployed US warheads.
Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.
Go Deeper
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How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use, his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against supporting Ukraine’s defense. In a Hudson policy memo, Senior Fellow Rebeccah L. Heinrichs describes how the US should weaken adversaries’ nuclear coercion. |
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The Biden NPR: Embracing Foundations, Rejecting Improvements Writing for the National Institute for Public Policy, Senior Fellow Rebeccah L. Heinrichs analyzes the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. |
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Thinking About the Unthinkable in Ukraine: Could Putin Use Weapons of Mass Destruction? In this Hudson event, Senior Fellows David Asher, Bryan Clark, Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, and William Schneider, along with Walter P. Stern Distinguished Fellow Ken Weinstein, examined the possible scenarios of Russia using weapons of mass destruction. |
