During the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023, attacks by ISIS-K continued
at a reduced level. A pattern of reduced violence during winter months is
typical for Afghanistan. Harsh weather conditions hamper the ability of
perpetrators to relocate to prepare and execute attacks. Nevertheless, during
the reporting period, ISIS-K conducted four high-profile attacks in Kabul in
quick succession.





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: December 2022 To January 2023



Afghanistan Terrorism Report: December 2022 To January 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the December 2022 to January 2023 installment of “Afghanistan
Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the
developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview
of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.



During the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023, attacks by ISIS-K continued
at a reduced level. A pattern of reduced violence during winter months is
typical for Afghanistan. Harsh weather conditions hamper the ability of
perpetrators to relocate to prepare and execute attacks. Nevertheless, during
the reporting period, ISIS-K conducted four high-profile attacks in Kabul in
quick succession. At the beginning of December, an attack targeted the Charge
d’Affairs of thePakistani embassy in Kabul
<[link removed]>
. During the second week of December, ISIS-K attacked ahotel in Kabul
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, injuring several Chinese nationals. On January 1, 2023, ISIS-K targeted the
entrance of themilitary section of Kabul airport
<[link removed]>
, killing nearly two dozen individuals and injuring around 30. Finally, an
ISIS-K attack on theentrance to the foreign ministry
<[link removed]> in Kabul on January 11, 2023,
killed many people.



Therefore, while the overall number of ISIS-K-claimed attacks decreased at the
end of 2022, with these four high-profile operations in Kabul in the span of
fewer than six weeks, the group was able to target several key interests of the
Taliban regime successfully. On the one hand, it demonstrated to nations
friendly to the Taliban regime, such as Pakistan and China, that the Taliban
will continue to face significant challenges in providing security. On the
other hand, with the attacks on the entrances of the military airport and the
foreign ministry, ISIS-K signaled that even hardened targets in the capital can
be hit, albeit at their weakest point, the entrances, where employees often
line up to present identification. ISIS-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets
highlighted these attacks with several posts, especially the Kabul hotel
attack, since it was portrayed as taking action to fight the Chinese
government, while the Taliban welcomed their investment, despite the
persecution of the Uyghurs. The propaganda messages also highlighted the Tajik
origin of two of the perpetrators in an apparent effort to signal that it is an
ethnically broad-based entity in contrast to the Taliban regime, which is
Pashtun dominated.



Finally, on January 4, 2023, the propaganda news outlet Amaq published an
overview of all ISIS-claimed attacks in Afghanistan in 2022. The infographic
claimed that the group conducted 181 attacks with 1188 victims. While it is
difficult to verify these figures in detail, it is clear that ISIS-K remains a
significant security threat in Afghanistan, albeit currently without the
ability tostrategically destabilize
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the Taliban regime.



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On the ideological front, ISIS-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda continued to
attack the Taliban, highlighting factional infighting, corruption, and
mismanagement, such as the current frequentpower outages in Afghanistan
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and crimes allegedly committed by Taliban officials. One particularly gruesome
example is ISIS propaganda reports at the beginning of January 2023,
highlighting the attempted abduction of children by Taliban officials in
Panjshir province, apparently resulting in the death of two young boys.



Interestingly, pro-ISIS propaganda took up the story of Taliban figures
purchasing Twitter checkmarks
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in January 2023. Pro-ISIS users argued that this is not only an example of the
Taliban’s wasteful use of scarce resources but also an indication that the
movement remains beholden to the U.S. Although this incident only involved
small sums of money being forwarded by these Taliban figures to Twitter and
despite these checkmarks being removed shortly afterward, this incident does
display a shocking laissez-faire attitude of Twitter, a U.S. company, towards
the implementation of U.S. and international sanctions, designed to constrain
the Taliban regime. Allowing the receipt of what can only have been electronic
transfers of money from prominent members of a U.S.-sanctioned entity on the
Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN)
<[link removed]> by Twitter
demonstrates either a severe failure of internal controls or the near complete
lack of these.



Pro-ISIS propaganda also emphasized the Taliban’s decision in December to ban
women from universities <[link removed]>,
stressing that this will lead to a lack of female teachers, doctors, and
nurses. Despite ISIS committinghorrific violations
<[link removed]> of the basic
rights of women, both during their so-called caliphate as well as in
territories currently under the control of ISIS affiliates, such as theIslamic
State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)
<[link removed]>,
pro-ISIS propaganda claimed that women have a central role in society and that
the group maintained specific female educational institutions during the time
of its so-called caliphate. Despite highlighting the issue of female education
in several posts, unsurprisingly, pro-ISIS propaganda ignored the Taliban
decree that banned Afghan women from working forinternational non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) <[link removed]>. ISIS
defines international humanitarian organizations as enemies and theirstaff as
legitimate targets
<[link removed]>
. This new Taliban measure endangered the delivery of humanitarian aid to the
Afghan population in the middle of winter. U.N. Secretary-General António
Guterres immediately issued astatement criticizing this decision
<[link removed]> by the Taliban, which had forced
several international humanitarian organizationsto suspend their activities
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in the country. In January, some movement on this issue seems to have been
achieved, with some international organizationsresuming their humanitarian work
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in the country. It remains to be seen which concessions the Taliban received
in exchange for allowing Afghan women to continue working for these
international organizations.



Pro-ISIS propaganda rhetoric criticizing al-Qaeda and its affiliates seems to
have become increasingly aggressive. While in early 2022, pro-ISIS propaganda
criticized al-Qaeda
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and the al-Qaeda leadership for their support for the Taliban, in more recent
posts, pro-ISIS propaganda defines al-Qaeda as apostates and highlights the
parallels between the group and the Taliban regime. For example, the pro-ISIS
Voice of Khorasan web magazine published a lengthy article highlighting what it
calls the betrayal ofAbu Muhammad al-Golani
<[link removed]>, the
leader ofHayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
<[link removed]>,
theal-Qaeda affiliate in Syria
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. So far, no reports have emerged that indicate that ISIS-K has begun targeting
theseveral al-Qaeda affiliated entities
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that currently operate in Afghanistan or members of the leadership of al-Qaeda
core residing in the country. However, the increasingly sharp ISIS-linked
rhetoric against al-Qaeda may be an early indication that such attacks might
become a possibility.



Finally, al-Qaeda’s ambitions to strike Western targets remain undiminished.
On December 26, 2022, the new al-Qaeda-linked web magazine One Ummah
highlighted the current situation in Somalia, where al-Shabaab, the local
al-Qaeda affiliate, isincreasingly aggressive
<[link removed]> in its operations. Comparing
the situation there with the withdrawal of international forces from
Afghanistan, the magazine ominously declared that “the war is not over,”
highlighting the continuing threat emanating from al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Click Here For More CEP Analysis
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