Afghanistan Terrorism Report: December 2022 To January 2023

Afghanistan Terrorism Report: December 2022 To January 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Following is the December 2022 to January 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

During the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023, attacks by ISIS-K continued at a reduced level. A pattern of reduced violence during winter months is typical for Afghanistan. Harsh weather conditions hamper the ability of perpetrators to relocate to prepare and execute attacks. Nevertheless, during the reporting period, ISIS-K conducted four high-profile attacks in Kabul in quick succession. At the beginning of December, an attack targeted the Charge d’Affairs of the Pakistani embassy in Kabul. During the second week of December, ISIS-K attacked a hotel in Kabul, injuring several Chinese nationals. On January 1, 2023, ISIS-K targeted the entrance of the military section of Kabul airport, killing nearly two dozen individuals and injuring around 30. Finally, an ISIS-K attack on the entrance to the foreign ministry in Kabul on January 11, 2023, killed many people.

Therefore, while the overall number of ISIS-K-claimed attacks decreased at the end of 2022, with these four high-profile operations in Kabul in the span of fewer than six weeks, the group was able to target several key interests of the Taliban regime successfully. On the one hand, it demonstrated to nations friendly to the Taliban regime, such as Pakistan and China, that the Taliban will continue to face significant challenges in providing security. On the other hand, with the attacks on the entrances of the military airport and the foreign ministry, ISIS-K signaled that even hardened targets in the capital can be hit, albeit at their weakest point, the entrances, where employees often line up to present identification. ISIS-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets highlighted these attacks with several posts, especially the Kabul hotel attack, since it was portrayed as taking action to fight the Chinese government, while the Taliban welcomed their investment, despite the persecution of the Uyghurs. The propaganda messages also highlighted the Tajik origin of two of the perpetrators in an apparent effort to signal that it is an ethnically broad-based entity in contrast to the Taliban regime, which is Pashtun dominated.

Finally, on January 4, 2023, the propaganda news outlet Amaq published an overview of all ISIS-claimed attacks in Afghanistan in 2022. The infographic claimed that the group conducted 181 attacks with 1188 victims. While it is difficult to verify these figures in detail, it is clear that ISIS-K remains a significant security threat in Afghanistan, albeit currently without the ability to strategically destabilize the Taliban regime.

https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/afghanistan-provinces-map/

On the ideological front, ISIS-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda continued to attack the Taliban, highlighting factional infighting, corruption, and mismanagement, such as the current frequent power outages in Afghanistan and crimes allegedly committed by Taliban officials. One particularly gruesome example is ISIS propaganda reports at the beginning of January 2023, highlighting the attempted abduction of children by Taliban officials in Panjshir province, apparently resulting in the death of two young boys.

Interestingly, pro-ISIS propaganda took up the story of Taliban figures purchasing Twitter checkmarks in January 2023. Pro-ISIS users argued that this is not only an example of the Taliban’s wasteful use of scarce resources but also an indication that the movement remains beholden to the U.S. Although this incident only involved small sums of money being forwarded by these Taliban figures to Twitter and despite these checkmarks being removed shortly afterward, this incident does display a shocking laissez-faire attitude of Twitter, a U.S. company, towards the implementation of U.S. and international sanctions, designed to constrain the Taliban regime. Allowing the receipt of what can only have been electronic transfers of money from prominent members of a U.S.-sanctioned entity on the Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN) by Twitter demonstrates either a severe failure of internal controls or the near complete lack of these.

Pro-ISIS propaganda also emphasized the Taliban’s decision in December to ban women from universities, stressing that this will lead to a lack of female teachers, doctors, and nurses. Despite ISIS committing horrific violations of the basic rights of women, both during their so-called caliphate as well as in territories currently under the control of ISIS affiliates, such as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), pro-ISIS propaganda claimed that women have a central role in society and that the group maintained specific female educational institutions during the time of its so-called caliphate. Despite highlighting the issue of female education in several posts, unsurprisingly, pro-ISIS propaganda ignored the Taliban decree that banned Afghan women from working for international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). ISIS defines international humanitarian organizations as enemies and their staff as legitimate targets. This new Taliban measure endangered the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Afghan population in the middle of winter. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres immediately issued a statement criticizing this decision by the Taliban, which had forced several international humanitarian organizations to suspend their activities in the country. In January, some movement on this issue seems to have been achieved, with some international organizations resuming their humanitarian work in the country. It remains to be seen which concessions the Taliban received in exchange for allowing Afghan women to continue working for these international organizations.

Pro-ISIS propaganda rhetoric criticizing al-Qaeda and its affiliates seems to have become increasingly aggressive. While in early 2022, pro-ISIS propaganda criticized al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda leadership for their support for the Taliban, in more recent posts, pro-ISIS propaganda defines al-Qaeda as apostates and highlights the parallels between the group and the Taliban regime. For example, the pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan web magazine published a lengthy article highlighting what it calls the betrayal of Abu Muhammad al-Golani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. So far, no reports have emerged that indicate that ISIS-K has begun targeting the several al-Qaeda affiliated entities that currently operate in Afghanistan or members of the leadership of al-Qaeda core residing in the country. However, the increasingly sharp ISIS-linked rhetoric against al-Qaeda may be an early indication that such attacks might become a possibility.

Finally, al-Qaeda’s ambitions to strike Western targets remain undiminished. On December 26, 2022, the new al-Qaeda-linked web magazine One Ummah highlighted the current situation in Somalia, where al-Shabaab, the local al-Qaeda affiliate, is increasingly aggressive in its operations. Comparing the situation there with the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, the magazine ominously declared that “the war is not over,” highlighting the continuing threat emanating from al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

###

Unsubscribe