Following is the July 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist t





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: July 2022



Afghanistan Terrorism Report July 2022

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the July 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.



Due to the death
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ofAyman al-Zawahiri
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at the end of July 2022, this report covers July and relevant items from the
first week of August 2022 to outline ISIS-K’s initial reactions to the death of
the leader of al-Qaeda. It is noteworthy that at the time of publication,
al-Qaeda propaganda outlets have yet to comment on this incident.



Following the death of Zawahiri, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets reacted
immediately, speculating that the Taliban must have invited him to stay in
Kabul and that they must have cooperated with the United States to enable his
killing. Pro-ISIS-K propaganda claims that this was the Taliban fulfilling
their commitments under theDoha Agreement
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, including by pointing to the fact that the Taliban have not released a
statement of condolences for the death of Zawahiri.



Rather than the Taliban cooperating with the U.S., all available information
indicates that the Taliban sheltered Zawahiri in Kabul. He was killed by a U.S.
drone while staying in a house in the Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul, which
prior to the takeover of power by the Taliban, used to be the home of
high-ranking officials of theformer Afghan government
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. According to media reports, thehouse
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in which Zawahiri was killed belonged to the acting minister of interior of
the Taliban regime,Sirajuddin Haqqani
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. The U.S. governmentofficially confirmed
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that it was aware of Zawahiri’s location at this house for several months.
Therefore, rather thanbeing unaware
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of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, as the Taliban claim, all evidence indicates
that theHaqqani network
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, which has historically been the link between theTaliban and al-Qaeda
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, activelysheltered
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this top global terrorist inside one of themost secure neighborhoods
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in the capital of Afghanistan.



While speculating about the Taliban’s involvement in the death of the al-Qaeda
leader, several ISIS-K- linked propaganda posts also criticized Zawahiri,
claiming that he had become a puppet of foreign intelligence services and was
no longer involved in operational decision-making. Furthermore, pro-ISIS-K
propaganda listed Zawahiri’s failures, such as opposing the creation of the
so-called caliphate and issuingpositive statements
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about former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi and therefore, betraying the
legacy ofOsama bin Laden
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. For some time, pro-ISIS-K propagandacriticized Zawahiri
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for his closeness to the Taliban.



Interestingly, on July 14, shortly before his death, Zawahiri released a
public message criticizing the concept of the nation-state and the
international system, indirectly attacking the Taliban. This occurred after a
meeting in Kabul at the beginning of July, where religious and tribal leaders
called for the international community torecognize the Taliban
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as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. This meeting was alsoattended
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by the leader of the Taliban,Haibatullah Akhundzada
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, demonstrating the importance the regime afforded to this gathering. ISIS-K
propaganda strongly criticized the declaration issued at the conclusion of the
meeting. In a lengthy document released on July 11, ISIS-K-linked outlet
Al-Azaim refuted each of the eleven points of the meeting’s declaration,
arguing that these demands amount to apostasy.



Pro-ISIS-K propagandists continued to attempt to delegitimize the Taliban
regime in other posts. In several messages on July 21, pro-ISIS-K propaganda
highlighted the moral corruption of the Taliban regime, claiming that the
Taliban did not punish officialsaccused of adultery
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in Bamiyan province. In the same posts, the pro-ISIS-K propagandist also
recounts a now infamous case from March 2022. In March, thebrother
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of Alam Gul Haqqani, a member of the Haqqani network and at that time the head
of theAfghan passport office
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in the ministry of interior, was arrested while attending a party in a Kabul
hotel that included alcohol, music, and the attendance of women not wearing
hijab. Thevideo of the arrest
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was shared widely on social media at the time.



In July, ISIS-K propaganda outlets also continued to portray a high
operational tempo of terrorism attacks in Afghanistan.ISIS-K attacked
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the gathering of religious and tribal leaders in Kabul several times, and
unsurprisingly, ISIS-K propaganda outlets reported on these attacks. After
several months of ISIS-K attacks concentrating primarily in the north and east
of the country, in July, ISIS-K reported an attack in Herat, the first of such
attacks in the west of the countrysince April
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. In this recent attack, ISIS-K targeted abus with Taliban military officials
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, killing two and wounding 20 individuals. Remarkably, attacks claimed by
ISIS-K propaganda posts in Pakistan seem to gather speed. In July, ISIS-K
propaganda highlighted several attacks in Pakistani cities along the border
with Afghanistan. Furthermore, once again, ISIS-K claimed a rocket attack
against the Uzbek town of Termez, near the northern border of Afghanistan. On
July 5, media reports confirmed thatfive rockets
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fired from Afghanistan had landed in the city.



Map of incidents highlighted by ISIS-K social media propaganda in July 2022



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The attacks in Pakistan and Uzbekistan demonstrate that the Taliban remain
unable to prevent terrorist attacks from being launched from within the
country. The relationship with Uzbekistan is significant to Afghanistan, as it
is the country’slargest electricity supplier
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, followed byTajikistan
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andIran
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. Interestingly, according to media reports, despite Taliban claims that
international sanctions inhibit
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financial transfers, the Taliban transferredseveral million U.S. dollars
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to Uzbekistan to settle outstanding electricity bills at the beginning of
August. This transfer also highlights the ongoing risks of the Taliban using
largescale asset flows out of the country to launder proceeds from the illicit
drug trade, which according to both pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets and
international media reports
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continues as well as for the laundering of illicit income generated by the
diversion of aid
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.



In June, ISIS-K-linked propaganda outlets highlighted
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the activities of the RAND Corporation and the Special Inspector General for
the Reconstruction of Afghanistan (SIGAR). On July 18, the ISIS-K linked
publication “Voice of Khorasan” again commented on an international
organization, this time taking aim at thePugwash
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Conferences on Science and World Affairs, calling it a conspiracy. In a
lengthy article, “Voice of Khorasan” warned of the activities of Pugwash and
stated that ISIS-K should kill anyone cooperating with the organization. Despite
Taliban representatives
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taking part in such gatherings in the past, it is not clear why ISIS-K
propaganda chose to highlight this organization, as Pugwash announced no new
reports or meetings focusing on Afghanistan in recent months

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