President Donald Trump is fond of suggesting that the US should “take” oil back as part of its wars in the Middle East, but he has always been short on specifics for exactly how the US might plunder that particular spoil of war. Received this from a friend? SUBSCRIBE [[link removed]] CRITICAL STATE Your weekly foreign policy fix. If you read just one thing…

...read about a failed Syrian oil caper.

President Donald Trump is fond of suggesting that the US should “take” oil back as part of its wars in the Middle East, but he has always been short on specifics for exactly how the US might plunder that particular spoil of war. Last week brought a story [[link removed]]about one group who tried to figure it out for themselves. Businessmen from the US, Israel, and Syria got together to cook up a scheme that would have seen Syrian oil transported to the Palestinian territories in exchange for humanitarian supplies. The scheme fell apart spectacularly, but the story is a great example of the contradictions of American policy in Syria. Syria’s oil fields are being guarded by American troops, but to what end no one really knows.

Hate for cash on Facebook

A Guardian investigation [[link removed]] found evidence for what you’ve probably suspected all along: when your uncle shared that racist meme on Facebook, someone was making money off of it. Specifically, an Israeli jewelry salesman named Ariel Elkaras and probably some of his compatriots.

An Israel-based group that Elkaras is part of coordinates the creation of over 1,000 weekly posts, largely trafficking in Islamophobic tropes, that circulate among right-wing Facebook communities. The links in the posts, which reach over a million viewers a week, lead to fake news sites full of ads, the profits from which go to Elkaras’ group.

Facebook, which has pledged to root out scams like this, had taken no action against Elkaras’ group by the time the Guardian figured out what was going on.

FORWARD TO A FRIEND [[link removed]] Everything you ever wanted to know about swarms but were afraid to ask

A new report [[link removed]] from the European Union takes on the question of how militaries will retain human control over swarms of military assets as they shift toward a more artificial intelligence-driven approach to warfighting. In order for swarms to be effective, actions of individual swarm members are usually governed by algorithms . One of the challenges of military technology and ethics in coming decades will be deciding where the algorithm’s ability to make tactical decisions ends and where human operators’ control begins.

The report recommends that the EU incorporate swarms into existing international structures governing laws of war, such as the diplomatic mouthful the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.”

Shouts to whoever titled the report, “The Question of Swarms Control.” If you don’t get it, say it out loud. Fair warning though, if you repeat “arms control, swarms control” enough times you might find yourself with an executive position in the defense industry.

FORWARD TO A FRIEND [[link removed]] DEEP DIVE The end of the world as we know it: Part I

Studying nuclear confrontations is a strange job. On one hand, it’s very difficult. Crises that could plausibly lead to nuclear weapons use are rare, which means there aren’t that many cases to study. When it comes to the nightmare scenario of two nuclear powers becoming embroiled in an escalatory spiral resulting in mutual, increasingly destructive nuclear strikes, the historical record is bare. The only time any country has launched a nuclear attack — the United States attacking Japan in 1945 — it did so with the impunity that came with knowing it was the only nuclear power on earth. It’s hard to draw conclusions about the likelihood of something that’s never happened.

On the other hand, there are ways in which it’s quite straightforward. Control over how nuclear crises play out is shared by a very small group of people around the world. There are only a few countries that have nuclear weapons, and within those countries only a few people with meaningful power over whether and how nuclear arsenals are deployed, which means it’s relatively easy to know who you’re actually studying. Not only that, but to the extent that those people desire stability in their relationships with nuclear decision makers in other countries, they have an interest in speaking publicly about their approach to potential nuclear crises. When people are eager to tell you about their decision-making processes, you can learn a lot.

In the next two editions of Deep Dive, we’ll look at what scholars are gleaning from their discussions with nuclear policymakers, and how those discussions themselves may shape future nuclear crises.

In an article published [[link removed]] in the latest edition of International Security, political scientists Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel dug into how the Chinese government thinks about potential nuclear confrontations. They spoke to 24 members of China’s nuclear strategy community and read a range of official and unofficial documents to understand how likely Chinese strategists think it is that a conventional war between China and the US will escalate into a nuclear war.

The message from Chinese experts was clear: They don’t think it’s very likely at all. Their confidence comes from their belief that limited nuclear war is basically impossible. Once one country uses one nuclear weapon, no matter the circumstance, the mainline Chinese view is that both countries will have strong incentives to escalate quickly, to avoid being caught in a position where their strategic nuclear arsenals would be destroyed. That quick escalation would mean mass destruction on both sides, making any nuclear use unlikely.

Buttressing that belief is a confidence in both China and America’s ability to manage escalation of conventional conflicts, to ensure they don’t produce a move to nuclear strikes. Even in instances where nuclear powers have lost conventional wars, Chinese General Pan Zhenqiang wrote, “they still do not dare to use nuclear weapons to reverse a [losing] war situation.” If both sides believe that any nuclear escalation would be extremely dangerous, the mainline Chinese view is that both sides have every reason to seek deescalation in even the most dire conventional conflict situations.

That all seems like good news for the future of US-China strategic competition. If the Chinese government isn’t concerned that the US is about to nuke China, then it probably won’t pursue the kinds of dangerous nuclear expansion policies that would protect China’s second strike capability from an American first strike. However, Cunningham and Fravel argue, the news isn’t all rosy. Though Chinese views reflect an instinct for safety in a potential nuclear crisis, many American policymakers don’t share those views. Instead, American nuclear doctrine assumes that nuclear escalation can be controlled, and that smaller, “tactical” nuclear strikes might not inherently result in massive “strategic” retaliation. That asymmetry is dangerous. If the US launches a tactical nuclear strike under the belief that China will respond in kind, but China sees that strike as tantamount to all-out nuclear war, American policymakers are going to spend the last moments before a massive nuclear conflagration looking extremely stupid.

LEARN MORE [[link removed]]

FORWARD TO A FRIEND [[link removed]] SHOW US THE RECEIPTS

Daniel Ofman spoke [[link removed]] to Ukranian veterans of the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region about their concerns that impeachment proceedings in the US will derail American aid for Ukraine’s war effort against Kremlin-backed separatists. Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia are set to begin today, during which the Ukrainian government will want to present the strongest possible front. With President Trump’s alleged manipulation of military aid to Ukraine coming under increased scrutiny, however, Ukrainian veterans are increasingly unsure that crucial American support will continue to flow into the country.

Tristan Guyette decried [[link removed]] the structures within the security policy community that prevent people who haven’t followed a particular educational path from accessing the field. Drawing on her own experiences overcoming imposter syndrome in nuclear policy, Guyette argued for a radical expansion of who is allowed a seat at the table in security policy discussions. Credential-based restrictions, she pointed out, make it difficult for the field to diversify across a range of metrics.

James Reinl discussed [[link removed]] one of the hidden dangers of the long-running wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq: antibiotic-resistant bacteria. These so-called “superbugs” infect war wounds at an astronomical rate in the Middle East, dragging out recovery times for victims and putting limbs and lives at risk. In European cities, superbugs appear in 5-10% of wound infections, while doctors from Médecins Sans Frontières in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq report rates near 80%.

FORWARD TO A FRIEND [[link removed]] WELL PLAYED

In 2019, the first generation of young people not yet born on 9/11 entered a US military still fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, 2019 is also a milestone [[link removed]] for another 21st century American boondoggle.

When biologists talk about tagging endangered species, this [[link removed]] isn’t what they mean.

The prospect of monarchical succession makes people jittery and, apparently, prone to taking as gospel [[link removed]] the WhatsApp chats of sailors named Gibbo, Burnsy, Cheeks, Josh, and Morty.

She sees you when you’re sleeping / she knows when you’re awake / she knows if you’ve been misusing J.L. Austin’s theory of speech acts / so stop saying “performative” [[link removed]] when you mean “fake.”

Have you been plagued by the sense that there just aren’t any good metaphors to describe the balance between security and social good in American politics? Are you staying up late at night, staring into the middle distance, wondering how to pithily communicate how Congress has decided to prioritize national spending in an era of unending wars of choice? Good news! [[link removed]]

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Critical State is written by Sam Ratner and is a collaboration between The World and Inkstick Media.

The World is a weekday public radio show and podcast on global issues, news and insights from PRX, BBC, and WGBH.

With an online magazine and podcast featuring a diversity of expert voices, Inkstick Media is “foreign policy for the rest of us.”

Critical State is made possible in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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