Studying nuclear confrontations is a strange job. On one hand, it’s very difficult. Crises that could plausibly lead to nuclear weapons use are rare, which means there aren’t that many cases to study. When it comes to the nightmare scenario of two nuclear powers becoming embroiled in an escalatory spiral resulting in mutual, increasingly destructive nuclear strikes, the historical record is bare. The only time any country has launched a nuclear attack — the United States attacking Japan in 1945 — it did so with the impunity that came with knowing it was the only nuclear power on earth. It’s hard to draw conclusions about the likelihood of something that’s never happened.

On the other hand, there are ways in which it’s quite straightforward. Control over how nuclear crises play out is shared by a very small group of people around the world. There are only a few countries that have nuclear weapons, and within those countries only a few people with meaningful power over whether and how nuclear arsenals are deployed, which means it’s relatively easy to know who you’re actually studying. Not only that, but to the extent that those people desire stability in their relationships with nuclear decision makers in other countries, they have an interest in speaking publicly about their approach to potential nuclear crises. When people are eager to tell you about their decision-making processes, you can learn a lot.

In the next two editions of Deep Dive, we’ll look at what scholars are gleaning from their discussions with nuclear policymakers, and how those discussions themselves may shape future nuclear crises.

In an article published in the latest edition of International Security, political scientists Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel dug into how the Chinese government thinks about potential nuclear confrontations. They spoke to 24 members of China’s nuclear strategy community and read a range of official and unofficial documents to understand how likely Chinese strategists think it is that a conventional war between China and the US will escalate into a nuclear war.

The message from Chinese experts was clear: They don’t think it’s very likely at all. Their confidence comes from their belief that limited nuclear war is basically impossible. Once one country uses one nuclear weapon, no matter the circumstance, the mainline Chinese view is that both countries will have strong incentives to escalate quickly, to avoid being caught in a position where their strategic nuclear arsenals would be destroyed. That quick escalation would mean mass destruction on both sides, making any nuclear use unlikely.

Buttressing that belief is a confidence in both China and America’s ability to manage escalation of conventional conflicts, to ensure they don’t produce a move to nuclear strikes. Even in instances where nuclear powers have lost conventional wars, Chinese General Pan Zhenqiang wrote, “they still do not dare to use nuclear weapons to reverse a [losing] war situation.” If both sides believe that any nuclear escalation would be extremely dangerous, the mainline Chinese view is that both sides have every reason to seek deescalation in even the most dire conventional conflict situations.

That all seems like good news for the future of US-China strategic competition. If the Chinese government isn’t concerned that the US is about to nuke China, then it probably won’t pursue the kinds of dangerous nuclear expansion policies that would protect China’s second strike capability from an American first strike. However, Cunningham and Fravel argue, the news isn’t all rosy. Though Chinese views reflect an instinct for safety in a potential nuclear crisis, many American policymakers don’t share those views. Instead, American nuclear doctrine assumes that nuclear escalation can be controlled, and that smaller, “tactical” nuclear strikes might not inherently result in massive “strategic” retaliation. That asymmetry is dangerous. If the US launches a tactical nuclear strike under the belief that China will respond in kind, but China sees that strike as tantamount to all-out nuclear war, American policymakers are going to spend the last moments before a massive nuclear conflagration looking extremely stupid.

Daniel Ofman spoke to Ukranian veterans of the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region about their concerns that impeachment proceedings in the US will derail American aid for Ukraine’s war effort against Kremlin-backed separatists. Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia are set to begin today, during which the Ukrainian government will want to present the strongest possible front. With President Trump’s alleged manipulation of military aid to Ukraine coming under increased scrutiny, however, Ukrainian veterans are increasingly unsure that crucial American support will continue to flow into the country.

Tristan Guyette decried the structures within the security policy community that prevent people who haven’t followed a particular educational path from accessing the field. Drawing on her own experiences overcoming imposter syndrome in nuclear policy, Guyette argued for a radical expansion of who is allowed a seat at the table in security policy discussions. Credential-based restrictions, she pointed out, make it difficult for the field to diversify across a range of metrics.

James Reinl discussed one of the hidden dangers of the long-running wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq: antibiotic-resistant bacteria. These so-called “superbugs” infect war wounds at an astronomical rate in the Middle East, dragging out recovery times for victims and putting limbs and lives at risk. In European cities, superbugs appear in 5-10% of wound infections, while doctors from Médecins Sans Frontières in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq report rates near 80%.

In 2019, the first generation of young people not yet born on 9/11 entered a US military still fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, 2019 is also a milestone for another 21st century American boondoggle.

When biologists talk about tagging endangered species, this isn’t what they mean.

The prospect of monarchical succession makes people jittery and, apparently, prone to taking as gospel the WhatsApp chats of sailors named Gibbo, Burnsy, Cheeks, Josh, and Morty.

She sees you when you’re sleeping / she knows when you’re awake / she knows if you’ve been misusing J.L. Austin’s theory of speech acts / so stop saying “performative” when you mean “fake.”

Have you been plagued by the sense that there just aren’t any good metaphors to describe the balance between security and social good in American politics? Are you staying up late at night, staring into the middle distance, wondering how to pithily communicate how Congress has decided to prioritize national spending in an era of unending wars of choice? Good news!