Important Covid-19 Scandal Update



[INSIDE JW]

NEW RECORDS REVEAL FBI INQUIRY OF WUHAN GRANT

[[link removed]]
What did Anthony Fauci know, and when did he know it? That
perennial question in Washington easily applies to federal health
bureaucrats, who have tried to keep us from learning about their
dealings with China and coronavirus research.

But we persist. We received 1651 pages
[[link removed]]
of records from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) revealing an
FBI “inquiry” into the NIH’s controversial bat coronavirus grant
tied to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

The records show National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) officials were concerned about “gain-of-function” research
in China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2016. The Fauci agency was
also concerned about EcoHealth Alliance’s
[[link removed]]
lack of compliance with reporting
rules and use of gain-of-function research in the NIH-funded research
involving bat coronaviruses in Wuhan, China.

The records also show EcoHealth Alliance’s legal team suggesting
that a records request for data on their bat coronavirus research in
Wuhan be denied because of the January 6 disturbance.

“Gain-of-function” research can lead to
[[link removed]]
organisms that are “more transmissible or more virulent than the
original organism or those that evade current detection methods and
available treatments.” Little wonder then that Anthony Fauci, head
of the NIAID, has not been forthcoming
[[link removed]]
about his agency’s funding of this kind of research.

We obtained the records through a FOIA lawsuit
[[link removed]]
for records
of communications, contracts and agreements with the Wuhan Institute
of Virology (_Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services_
[[link removed]]
(No. 1:21-cv-00696)).

Here are the details we uncovered.

In an email
[[link removed]]
dated May 22, 2020, with the subject line, “Grant Questions – FBI
Inquiry – 1-R01A1I110964-01 – 2-R01AI110964-06,” Ashley Sanders
[[link removed]],
a senior
investigations officer in the NIH Division of Program Integrity,
within NIH’s Office of Management Assessment, emails David A.
Miller, an agent at the FBI’s Newark Field Office to inform Miller,
“In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik [Stemmy] (cc’d) has
provided responses to your initial questions below (also attached).”
Also copied on Sanders’ email is Mike Shannon, whose email address
indicates he works in the NIH Office of the Director. The responses
are completely redacted but are labeled “SF [Standard Form
[[link removed]]]
424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018),” which refers to NIH
grant award R01AI110964, “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence.”

The records reveal several indications of gain-of-function research,
as well as failures to comply with reporting regulations, including a
May 9, 2016, email
[[link removed]]
marked “High” importance, in which NIH official Carine Normil
notes Peter Daszak’s failure to file a progress report on
EcoHealth’s bat coronavirus research:

This is the second communication from NIAID requesting that you file
the progress report for the above-referenced grant [5R01AI110964] that
was due no later than April 15, 2016. Please submit the delinquent
report by May 12, 2016…. [P]lease be advised that continued late
submission of your non-competing grant progress report and any
subsequently requested documentation will result in a reduction of
time and/or funds for this grant.
NIAID official Erik Stemmy, who is copied on her email, replies to
Normil noting, “They have proposed work for the next year of the
award that may be subject to the gain-of-function funding pause.”

EcoHealth Alliance Chief of Staff Alexa Chmura separately responds to
Normil writing, “We received a warning that one of the publications
[redacted] listed from the past year is non-compliant.”

In a letter
[[link removed]]
dated May 28, 2016, from NIH official Jenny Greer and NIH Program
Manager Erik Stemmy, the officials advise Chmura that the NIH grant
for the Wuhan bat project, “may include Gain of Function (GoF)
research that is subject to the U.S. Government funding pause …
issued on October 17, 2014.” They add that this pause was based on
the following line in the grant application: “Aim 3: Testing
predictions of CoV inter-species transmission.”

In an email
[[link removed]]
dated June 15, 2016, from Stemmy to Grant Operations, Stemmy notes
that the EcoHealth bat research at WIV may include gain-of-function
research: “The Daszak award may have GoF [gain-of-function] and
I’ve been in touch with the GMS [Grants Management Specialist] for a
while now.”

In an email dated August 3, 2021, EcoHealth Alliance Chief of Staff
Aleksei Chmura sends an email to NIH officials with the subject line
“5 ROl AI110964 (Interim Report),” which is the grant number for
the “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” program.
The report, which seems to detail gain-of-function research, is
attached:

To analyze which viruses were a potential public health risk, we
managed to cultivate three strains of SARSr-CoVs from bat feces… We
used the genetic codes of some of the other viruses we found in bats
and inserted spike protein genes of those viruses (the proteins that
attach to cells) into the cultured viruses. By doing this experiment
we showed that other viruses may also be able to infect human cells,
and were able to do this safely without the need to culture large
amounts of virus…. This work proves that there is a clear and
present danger for future emergence of novel SARS-like viruses in
people.
The August 2021 report also details that $66,500 of the award was
budgeted for China in the grant period June 1, 2014, to May 31, 2019.

Records in 2020 include an April 21 NIH email thread
[[link removed]]
regarding “additional subawardees,” referring to NIH grant award
R01AI110964 “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence.”
Ten facilities are listed including:

Wuhan Institute of Virology, China;
Institute of Pathogen Biology, China;
Duke-NUS, Singapore;
San Pya Clinic, Burma;
Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, Cambodia;
Primate Research Center at Bogor Agricultural University, Indonesia;
Conservation Medicine, Ltd, Malaysia;
King Chulagongkorn Memorial Hospital, Thailand;
Hanoi Agricultural University, Vietnam;National Animal Health
Laboratory, Laos;
East China Normal University, China, is listed as a “consultant.”
Also in this thread, on April 21, 2020, senior NIH official Matthew
Fenton advises his NIH colleagues that in the EcoHealth Wuhan bat
project’s grant, the WIV received $76,301 one year, the Institute of
Pathogen Biology in Beijing received $75,600 and the East China Normal
University in Shanghai received $49,750.

In an October 23, 2020, letter
[[link removed]]
NIH Deputy Director Michael Lauer
[[link removed]]
notes to Daszak that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had not satisfied
safety requirements that applied to subawards with EcoHealth:

[W]e have concerns that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which
previously served as a subrecipient of the Project, had not satisfied
safety requirements that applied to its subawards with EcoHealth, and
that EcoHealth had not satisfied its obligations to monitor the
activities of its subrecipient to ensure compliance.”
Lauer then enumerated all the funds WIV had received in the first
five years of the grant through EcoHealth, including $133,595,
$139,015, $159,122, $159,122 and $159,122.

In an email
[[link removed]]
dated April 11, 2021, and flagged as “High” importance, Daszak
acknowledges that he knows FOIA requests would be inevitable for
information on EcoHealth’s work.

I’ve tried to stick to a logical argument, but I’m also mindful of
the dozens of FoIA requests targeting EHA [EcoHealth Alliance] and
myself and that previous letters have been leaked to the press, so
have made sure all details are laid out. I do not aim to make this
letter public, of course and am sending this to you confidentially.

In an email and letter
[[link removed]]
both dated April 11, 2021, Daszak informs Lauer that it would be
difficult to get the information Lauer requested about the Wuhan bat
project because of the termination of EcoHealth’s funding:

This termination of a funded relationship with the [Wuhan Institute of
Virology] makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely
impossible to provide the information requested about an autonomous
foreign organization – as would also be the case for a domestic one
– that our organization neither works with currently, nor has
control over.
Daszak further states that NIH’s FOIA officer, Gorka
Garcia-Malene, had informed Daszak that “any indication from my
program [NIH FOIA Office] that there is an ongoing investigation into
WIV [Wuhan Institute of Virology] can now be disregarded, as we
recently confirmed there are no pending investigations into that
organization.” [Emphasis in original]

NIH asks EcoHealth to “Provide [a sample] of the actual SARS-CoV-2
virus that WIV used to determine the viral sequence.” Daszak
responds that it would be “effectively impossible” to request such
a sample.

In response to NIH’s requirement to provide copies of all WIV
biosafety reports from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2019, Daszak
writes, “Given the intense geopolitical pressure around the
accusations that WIV intentionally or accidentally released SARS-CoV-2
(something which the WHO mission deemed ‘extremely unlikely’),
obtaining such information is not a plausible option at present.”
Daszak includes email correspondence between the law firm representing
EcoHealth and NIH’s FOIA office on January 25, 2021. When NIH sought
assistance from EcoHealth in processing a FOIA request, the law
firm’s representative said the FOIA request should be denied because
of the January 6 disturbance: “[A]s demonstrated by the recent
attack on the US Capitol fueled by disinformation and conspiracy
theories, the need to protect the privacy of EcoHealth Alliance’s
employees and affiliates is more important than ever.”

In a letter
[[link removed]]
dated April 13, 2021, Lauer indicates that Daszak has failed to
provide all reports and documents that NIH had previously asked him to
produce regarding NIH grant R01AI100964. Lauer also cites the contract
language requiring Daszak to provide these documents.

In a letter
[[link removed]]
dated July 23, 2021, from Lauer to Daszak and Chmura, Lauer requires
EcoHealth to produce detailed records relating to three of their NIH
awards including the Wuhan Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence project
as well as grant U01A/151797, titled Understanding Risk of Zoonotic
Virus Emergence in EID Hotspots of Southeast Asia involving
Chulalongkorn Hospital and Chulalongkorn University in Thailand,
Duke-National Singapore University and University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill; and grant U01A/153420 involving the
International Center for Diarrhoearal Disease Research of Bangladesh,
Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research of Bangladesh.
Lauer writes:

For us to continue our analyses, we will need to receive and review
WIV’s [Wuhan Institute of Virology] records validating expenditures
specific to R01AI100964 … that WIV submitted to you. As a reminder,
subawardees are required to have a financial management system that
includes records that identify adequately the source and application
of funds for federally-funded activities.

***

We will also need to see subaward agreements, subawardee audit
reports, subawardee safety monitoring documents, subawardee progress
reports submitted to you, and subawardee financial and accounting
records for two other NIH EcoHealth Alliance grants.
Lauer informs Daszak that the NIH had determined EcoHealth to be out
of compliance:

We are also writing to notify you that a review of our records for
R01AI100964 [the Wuhan bat project] indicates that EcoHealth Alliance,
Inc. is out of compliance with requirements to submit the following
reports that are outlined in the NIHGPS [National Institutes of Health
Grants Policy Statement]: the Federal Financial Report … and the
Interim Research Performance Progress Report …
Lauer adds that the grant was issued under a “Streamlined
Noncompeting Award Process (SNAP)” and that EcoHealth Alliance had
not submitted a required report that was due months earlier. Lauer
warns Daszak, “[A] history of non-compliance related to R01AI100964,
including reporting non-compliance, may impact other projects where
EcoHealth serves as the primary grant recipient.”

(The NIH in April 2020 suspended funding to EcoHealth Alliance that
“had previously established a partnership with a virology laboratory
in Wuhan, China,” but in August 2021 provided a grant of $7.5
million that would reportedly
[[link removed]]
“focus on Southeast Asia and the emergence of coronaviruses;
filoviruses, the family responsible for Ebola; and paramyxoviruses, a
family of viruses that includes measles and mumps.”)

The incredible disclosure of an FBI inquiry shows that Fauci and
others involved in this scandal were being dishonest in dismissing the
seriousness of questions about their cover-up of their funding of
dangerous gain-of-function research in China. Any FBI inquiry would be
appropriate as these documents, which we extracted after years of
their stonewalling, also show that Fauci’s agency knew and should
have known, going back to 2016, that it funded dangerous and
prohibited gain-of-function research in China.

JUDICIAL WATCH: COVID-19 CORRUPTION UPDATE!

Judicial Watch is the national leader in exposing the facts behind the
COVID-19 crisis. In addition to just this week
[[link removed]]
disclosing FBI interest in Fauci agency funding of the infamous Wuhan
Institute and other damning information about Fauci dishonesty, our
litigation has disclosed much of the big news thus far uncovered about
the COVID-19 origin cover-up:

* HHS records revealed that from 2014 to 2019, $826,277
[[link removed]]
was given to the
Wuhan Institute of Virology for bat coronavirus research by the NIAID.
* NIAID records showed that it gave nine China-related grants to
EcoHealth Alliance
[[link removed]]
to research
coronavirus emergence in bats and was the NIH’s top issuer of grants
to the Wuhan lab itself. The records also included an email from the
vice director of the Wuhan Lab asking an NIH official for help finding
disinfectants for decontamination of airtight suits and indoor
surfaces.
* HHS records included an “urgent for Dr. Fauci
[[link removed]]
” email chain,
citing ties between the Wuhan lab and the taxpayer-funded EcoHealth
Alliance
[[link removed]].
The government emails
also reported that the foundation of U.S. billionaire Bill Gates
worked closely with the Chinese government to pave the way for
Chinese-produced medications to be sold outside China and help
“raise China’s voice of governance by placing representatives from
China on important international counsels as high level commitment
from China.”
* HHS records included a grant application for research involving
the coronavirus that appears to describe “gain-of-function
[[link removed]
research involving RNA extractions from bats, experiments on viruses,
attempts to develop a chimeric virus and efforts to genetically
manipulate the full-length bat SARSr-CoV WIV1 strain molecular clone.
* HHS records showed the State Department and NIAID knew immediately
in January 2020 that China was withholding COVID data
[[link removed]],
which was
hindering risk assessment and response by public health officials.
* HHS records include emails
[[link removed]]
between National Institutes of Health (NIH) then-Director Francis
Collins
[[link removed]]
and Anthony
Fauci, the director of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID), about hydroxychloroquine and COVID-19.
* HHS records show that NIH officials tailored confidentiality forms
[[link removed]]
to China’s terms
and that the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted an unreleased,
“strictly confidential” COVID-19 epidemiological analysis in
January 2020.
* Fauci emails
[[link removed]]
include
his approval of a press release supportive of China’s response to
the 2019 novel coronavirus.

And we’ve also uncovered records about dangerous research here
involving gain of function plus new questions about the controversial
vaccines:

* May 2022: University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) records
[[link removed]]
show the former director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the
University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Dr. James W. Le Duc
[[link removed]]
warned Chinese
researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology of potential
investigations into the COVID issue by Congress.
* May 2022: HHS records regarding biodistribution studies and
related data for the COVID-19 vaccines show a key component of the
vaccines developed by Pfizer/BioNTech, lipid nanoparticles (LNPs),
were found outside the injection site
[[link removed]],
mainly the liver, adrenal glands, spleen and ovaries of test animals,
eight to 48 hours after injection.
* April 2022: Records from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)
reveal safety lapses
[[link removed]]
and violations at U.S. biosafety laboratories that conduct research on
dangerous agents and toxins.

I encourage you to review and share this information as the corrupt
media continues to provide cover for the Chinese communists, Fauci,
and the public health establishment. And check back here often, as
more is always being uncovered by your intrepid Judicial Watch!

NEW BIDEN POLICY SHIELDS ‘VULNERABLE WORKERS WHO LACK WORK
AUTHORIZATION’

Every agency in the Biden administration is doing its share to promote
a wide-open border. Just days after a leftist group sent a letter to
the Biden Labor Department about illegal workers, the department leapt
into action, as our _Corruption Chronicles_ blog reports
[[link removed]].


Days after an influential open borders group ordered the government to
“promptly develop and implement” a policy to protect illegal
immigrants involved in labor disputes from deportation, the Biden
administration has obliged. This month the Department of Labor (DOL)
issued a new measure
[[link removed]],
drafted in English and Spanish, offering immigration related
prosecutorial discretion for undocumented workers involved in labor
disputes with their U.S. employers. Created at the request of the Los
Angeles-based Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, the
policy directs illegal alien workers to contact the agency if they
fear supervisors will try to get authorities to deport them for
reporting workplace abuse. The DOL will then contact the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to request the undocumented employee be
protected from deportation, according to the measure.

“DOL’s mission and effective enforcement depends on the
cooperation of workers,” the recently issued guidance states.
“However, vulnerable workers who lack work authorization or
sufficiently “portable” immigration status are often reluctant to
report violations, engage with government enforcement agencies, or
otherwise exercise their rights.” The document continues by offering
the following example; undocumented workers who experience labor law
violations may fear that cooperating with an investigation will result
in the disclosure of their immigration status or that of family
members, or that it will result in immigration-based retaliation from
their employers and adverse immigration consequences for themselves or
their family. “As a result, both workers and the Department face
barriers to equitable and effective enforcement of workplace rights
and protections, and the many employers that adhere to labor and
employment laws face unfair competition.”

Undocumented workers experiencing a labor dispute are instructed to
submit a statement of interest to the DOL in support of a request to
DHS for immigration-related prosecutorial discretion, the new guidance
says. Requesters should include a description of the labor dispute,
any retaliation or threats experienced by workers, a description of
how fear of potential immigration-related retaliation or other
immigration enforcement in the future is likely to deter workers from
reporting violations related to the labor dispute or otherwise
cooperating with DOL. The agency will assess each request by
considering several factors, including whether DHS’s use of
immigration-related prosecutorial discretion would support DOL’s
interest in holding labor law violators accountable and whether
immigration enforcement of witnesses or victims could impede DOL’s
ability to enforce labor laws or provide all available remedies within
its jurisdiction. The agency will also consider the “likelihood that
immigration enforcement could be an instrument used to undermine
DOL’s enforcement of laws in the geographic area or industry and/or
give rise to further immigration-based retaliation.”

In a press release
[[link removed]]
celebrating
the new policy the DOL explains that to carry out the laws it
enforces, workers must feel free to participate in investigations and
proceedings without fear of retaliation or consequences related to
their immigration status. “The department has long supported DHS’
use of prosecutorial discretion – on a case-by-case basis – for
certain workers subjected to abusive and exploitative labor
practices,” the DOL writes, adding that “for decades, the
department has memorialized this relationship through agreements with
immigration officials.” As an example the agency lists an agreement
between the DOL and DHS to work together to ensure that their
respective civil worksite enforcement activities do not conflict and
recognizing that effective enforcement of labor law is essential to
ensure proper wages and working conditions for all workers regardless
of immigration status.

It appears that the DOL issued its new policy to protect illegal
immigrant workers in response to demands by the Center for Human
Rights and Constitutional Law, an open-borders group that claims to
protect the civil, constitutional, and human rights of immigrants,
refugees, children, prisoners, and the poor. In the recent letter
[[link removed]]
to DHS
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and DOL Secretary Martin Walsh the group
asks the administration to increase the willingness of immigrant
workers to assert their labor and civil rights and ensure immigration
enforcement does not become a tool of unscrupulous employers. “This
letter is to provide support for the effort to promptly develop and
implement a more robust policy aimed at encouraging immigrant workers
to report labor law violations and cooperate in their investigation
and to extend temporary protection from arrest or removal to immigrant
workers engaged in labor disputes,” the group writes. Within days
the administration implemented the new policy.
Until next week …






[Contribute]
[[link removed]]


<a
href="[link removed]"
target="_blank"><img alt="WU02"
src="[link removed]"
style="width:100%; height:auto;" /></a>

[32x32x1]
[[link removed]]

[32x32x2]
[[link removed]]

[32x32x3]
[[link removed]]

[32x32x3]
[[link removed]]

Judicial Watch, Inc.
425 3rd St Sw Ste 800
Washington, DC 20024

202.646.5172



© 2017 - 2022, All Rights Reserved
Manage Email Subscriptions
[[link removed]]
|
Unsubscribe
[[link removed]]

View in browser
[[link removed]]