New Records Reveal FBI Inquiry of Wuhan
Grant
What did Anthony Fauci know, and when did he know it? That perennial
question in Washington easily applies to federal health bureaucrats, who
have tried to keep us from learning about their dealings with China and
coronavirus research.
But we persist. We received 1651
pages of records from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) revealing
an FBI “inquiry” into the NIH’s controversial bat coronavirus grant
tied to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The records show National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) officials were concerned about “gain-of-function” research in
China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2016. The Fauci agency was also
concerned about EcoHealth
Alliance’s lack of compliance with reporting rules and use of
gain-of-function research in the NIH-funded research involving bat
coronaviruses in Wuhan, China.
The records also show EcoHealth Alliance’s legal team suggesting that a
records request for data on their bat coronavirus research in Wuhan be
denied because of the January 6 disturbance.
“Gain-of-function” research can lead
to organisms that are “more transmissible or more virulent than the
original organism or those that evade current detection methods and
available treatments.” Little wonder then that Anthony Fauci, head of the
NIAID, has not been forthcoming
about his agency’s funding of this kind of research.
We obtained the records through a FOIA lawsuit
for records of communications, contracts and agreements with the Wuhan
Institute of Virology (Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (No.
1:21-cv-00696)).
Here are the details we uncovered.
In an
email dated May 22, 2020, with the subject line, “Grant Questions –
FBI Inquiry – 1-R01A1I110964-01 – 2-R01AI110964-06,” Ashley
Sanders, a senior investigations officer in the NIH Division of Program
Integrity, within NIH’s Office of Management Assessment, emails David A.
Miller, an agent at the FBI’s Newark Field Office to inform Miller, “In
preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik [Stemmy] (cc’d) has provided
responses to your initial questions below (also attached).” Also copied
on Sanders’ email is Mike Shannon, whose email address indicates he works
in the NIH Office of the Director. The responses are completely redacted
but are labeled “SF [Standard
Form] 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018),” which refers to
NIH grant award R01AI110964, “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence.”
The records reveal several indications of gain-of-function research, as
well as failures to comply with reporting regulations, including a May 9,
2016, email
marked “High” importance, in which NIH official Carine Normil notes
Peter Daszak’s failure to file a progress report on EcoHealth’s bat
coronavirus research:
This is the second communication from NIAID requesting that you file the
progress report for the above-referenced grant [5R01AI110964] that was due
no later than April 15, 2016. Please submit the delinquent report by May
12, 2016…. [P]lease be advised that continued late submission of your
non-competing grant progress report and any subsequently requested
documentation will result in a reduction of time and/or funds for this
grant.
NIAID official Erik Stemmy, who is copied on her email, replies to Normil
noting, “They have proposed work for the next year of the award that may
be subject to the gain-of-function funding pause.”
EcoHealth Alliance Chief of Staff Alexa Chmura separately responds to
Normil writing, “We received a warning that one of the publications
[redacted] listed from the past year is non-compliant.”
In a
letter dated May 28, 2016, from NIH official Jenny Greer and NIH
Program Manager Erik Stemmy, the officials advise Chmura that the NIH grant
for the Wuhan bat project, “may include Gain of Function (GoF) research
that is subject to the U.S. Government funding pause … issued on October
17, 2014.” They add that this pause was based on the following line in
the grant application: “Aim 3: Testing predictions of CoV inter-species
transmission.”
In an
email dated June 15, 2016, from Stemmy to Grant Operations, Stemmy
notes that the EcoHealth bat research at WIV may include gain-of-function
research: “The Daszak award may have GoF [gain-of-function] and I’ve
been in touch with the GMS [Grants Management Specialist] for a while
now.”
In an email dated August 3, 2021, EcoHealth Alliance Chief of Staff Aleksei
Chmura sends an email to NIH officials with the subject line “5 ROl
AI110964 (Interim Report),” which is the grant number for the
“Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” program. The
report, which seems to detail gain-of-function research, is attached:
To analyze which viruses were a potential public health risk, we managed to
cultivate three strains of SARSr-CoVs from bat feces… We used the genetic
codes of some of the other viruses we found in bats and inserted spike
protein genes of those viruses (the proteins that attach to cells) into the
cultured viruses. By doing this experiment we showed that other viruses may
also be able to infect human cells, and were able to do this safely without
the need to culture large amounts of virus…. This work proves that there
is a clear and present danger for future emergence of novel SARS-like
viruses in people.
The August 2021 report also details that $66,500 of the award was budgeted
for China in the grant period June 1, 2014, to May 31, 2019.
Records in 2020 include an April 21 NIH email
thread regarding “additional subawardees,” referring to NIH grant
award R01AI110964 “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence.” Ten facilities are listed including:
Wuhan Institute of Virology, China;
Institute of Pathogen Biology,
China;
Duke-NUS, Singapore;
San Pya Clinic, Burma;
Institut Pasteur du Cambodge,
Cambodia;
Primate Research Center at Bogor
Agricultural University, Indonesia;
Conservation Medicine, Ltd,
Malaysia;
King Chulagongkorn Memorial Hospital,
Thailand;
Hanoi Agricultural University,
Vietnam;National Animal Health
Laboratory, Laos;
East China Normal University, China, is
listed as a “consultant.”
Also in this thread, on April 21, 2020, senior NIH official Matthew Fenton
advises his NIH colleagues that in the EcoHealth Wuhan bat project’s
grant, the WIV received $76,301 one year, the Institute of Pathogen Biology
in Beijing received $75,600 and the East China Normal University in
Shanghai received $49,750.
In an October 23, 2020, letter
NIH Deputy Director Michael
Lauer notes to Daszak that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had not
satisfied safety requirements that applied to subawards with EcoHealth:
[W]e have concerns that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which
previously served as a subrecipient of the Project, had not satisfied
safety requirements that applied to its subawards with EcoHealth, and that
EcoHealth had not satisfied its obligations to monitor the activities of
its subrecipient to ensure compliance.”
Lauer then enumerated all the funds WIV had received in the first five
years of the grant through EcoHealth, including $133,595, $139,015,
$159,122, $159,122 and $159,122.
In an
email dated April 11, 2021, and flagged as “High” importance,
Daszak acknowledges that he knows FOIA requests would be inevitable for
information on EcoHealth’s work.
I’ve tried to stick to a logical argument, but I’m also mindful of the
dozens of FoIA requests targeting EHA [EcoHealth Alliance] and myself and
that previous letters have been leaked to the press, so have made sure all
details are laid out. I do not aim to make this letter public, of course
and am sending this to you confidentially.
In an
email and letter both dated April 11, 2021, Daszak informs Lauer that
it would be difficult to get the information Lauer requested about the
Wuhan bat project because of the termination of EcoHealth’s funding:
This termination of a funded relationship with the [Wuhan Institute of
Virology] makes it extraordinarily difficult and more likely impossible to
provide the information requested about an autonomous foreign organization
– as would also be the case for a domestic one – that our organization
neither works with currently, nor has control over.
Daszak further states that NIH’s FOIA officer, Gorka Garcia-Malene, had
informed Daszak that “any indication from my program [NIH FOIA Office]
that there is an ongoing investigation into WIV [Wuhan Institute of
Virology] can now be disregarded, as we recently confirmed there are no
pending investigations into that organization.” [Emphasis in
original]
NIH asks EcoHealth to “Provide [a sample] of the actual SARS-CoV-2 virus
that WIV used to determine the viral sequence.” Daszak responds that it
would be “effectively impossible” to request such a sample.
In response to NIH’s requirement to provide copies of all WIV biosafety
reports from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2019, Daszak writes, “Given
the intense geopolitical pressure around the accusations that WIV
intentionally or accidentally released SARS-CoV-2 (something which the WHO
mission deemed ‘extremely unlikely’), obtaining such information is not
a plausible option at present.” Daszak includes email correspondence
between the law firm representing EcoHealth and NIH’s FOIA office on
January 25, 2021. When NIH sought assistance from EcoHealth in processing a
FOIA request, the law firm’s representative said the FOIA request should
be denied because of the January 6 disturbance: “[A]s demonstrated by the
recent attack on the US Capitol fueled by disinformation and conspiracy
theories, the need to protect the privacy of EcoHealth Alliance’s
employees and affiliates is more important than ever.”
In a
letter dated April 13, 2021, Lauer indicates that Daszak has failed to
provide all reports and documents that NIH had previously asked him to
produce regarding NIH grant R01AI100964. Lauer also cites the contract
language requiring Daszak to provide these documents.
In a
letter dated July 23, 2021, from Lauer to Daszak and Chmura, Lauer
requires EcoHealth to produce detailed records relating to three of their
NIH awards including the Wuhan Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence project as
well as grant U01A/151797, titled Understanding Risk of Zoonotic Virus
Emergence in EID Hotspots of Southeast Asia involving Chulalongkorn
Hospital and Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, Duke-National Singapore
University and University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; and grant
U01A/153420 involving the International Center for Diarrhoearal Disease
Research of Bangladesh, Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and
Research of Bangladesh. Lauer writes:
For us to continue our analyses, we will need to receive and review WIV’s
[Wuhan Institute of Virology] records validating expenditures specific to
R01AI100964 … that WIV submitted to you. As a reminder, subawardees are
required to have a financial management system that includes records that
identify adequately the source and application of funds for
federally-funded activities.
***
We will also need to see subaward agreements, subawardee audit reports,
subawardee safety monitoring documents, subawardee progress reports
submitted to you, and subawardee financial and accounting records for two
other NIH EcoHealth Alliance grants.
Lauer informs Daszak that the NIH had determined EcoHealth to be out of
compliance:
We are also writing to notify you that a review of our records for
R01AI100964 [the Wuhan bat project] indicates that EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.
is out of compliance with requirements to submit the following reports that
are outlined in the NIHGPS [National Institutes of Health Grants Policy
Statement]: the Federal Financial Report … and the Interim Research
Performance Progress Report …
Lauer adds that the grant was issued under a “Streamlined Noncompeting
Award Process (SNAP)” and that EcoHealth Alliance had not submitted a
required report that was due months earlier. Lauer warns Daszak, “[A]
history of non-compliance related to R01AI100964, including reporting
non-compliance, may impact other projects where EcoHealth serves as the
primary grant recipient.”
(The NIH in April 2020 suspended funding to EcoHealth Alliance that “had
previously established a partnership with a virology laboratory in Wuhan,
China,” but in August 2021 provided a grant of $7.5 million that would reportedly
“focus on Southeast Asia and the emergence of coronaviruses; filoviruses,
the family responsible for Ebola; and paramyxoviruses, a family of viruses
that includes measles and mumps.”)
The incredible disclosure of an FBI inquiry shows that Fauci and others
involved in this scandal were being dishonest in dismissing the seriousness
of questions about their cover-up of their funding of dangerous
gain-of-function research in China. Any FBI inquiry would be appropriate as
these documents, which we extracted after years of their stonewalling, also
show that Fauci’s agency knew and should have known, going back to 2016,
that it funded dangerous and prohibited gain-of-function research in
China.
Judicial Watch: COVID-19 Corruption Update!
Judicial Watch is the national leader in exposing the facts behind the
COVID-19 crisis. In addition to just
this week disclosing FBI interest in Fauci agency funding of the
infamous Wuhan Institute and other damning information about Fauci
dishonesty, our litigation has disclosed much of the big news thus far
uncovered about the COVID-19 origin cover-up:
- HHS records revealed that from 2014 to 2019, $826,277
was given to the Wuhan Institute of Virology for bat coronavirus research
by the NIAID.
- NIAID records showed that it gave
nine China-related grants to EcoHealth Alliance to research coronavirus
emergence in bats and was the NIH’s top issuer of grants to the Wuhan lab
itself. The records also included an email from the vice director of the
Wuhan Lab asking an NIH official for help finding disinfectants for
decontamination of airtight suits and indoor surfaces.
- HHS records included an “urgent
for Dr. Fauci ” email chain, citing ties between the Wuhan lab and
the taxpayer-funded EcoHealth
Alliance. The government emails also reported that the foundation of
U.S. billionaire Bill Gates worked closely with the Chinese government to
pave the way for Chinese-produced medications to be sold outside China and
help “raise China’s voice of governance by placing representatives from
China on important international counsels as high level commitment from
China.”
- HHS records included a grant application for research involving the
coronavirus that appears to describe “gain-of-function”
research involving RNA extractions from bats, experiments on viruses,
attempts to develop a chimeric virus and efforts to genetically manipulate
the full-length bat SARSr-CoV WIV1 strain molecular clone.
- HHS records showed the State Department and NIAID knew immediately in
January 2020 that China
was withholding COVID data, which was hindering risk assessment and
response by public health officials.
- HHS records include emails
between National Institutes of Health (NIH) then-Director Francis
Collins and Anthony Fauci, the director of National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), about hydroxychloroquine and
COVID-19.
- HHS records show that NIH officials tailored
confidentiality forms to China’s terms and that the World Health
Organization (WHO) conducted an unreleased, “strictly confidential”
COVID-19 epidemiological analysis in January 2020.
- Fauci emails
include his approval of a press release supportive of China’s response to
the 2019 novel coronavirus.
And we’ve also uncovered records about dangerous research here involving
gain of function plus new questions about the controversial vaccines:
- May 2022: University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) records
show the former director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the
University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Dr.
James W. Le Duc warned Chinese researchers at the Wuhan Institute of
Virology of potential investigations into the COVID issue by
Congress.
- May 2022: HHS records regarding biodistribution studies and related
data for the COVID-19 vaccines show a key component of the vaccines
developed by Pfizer/BioNTech, lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), were found outside
the injection site, mainly the liver, adrenal glands, spleen and
ovaries of test animals, eight to 48 hours after injection.
- April 2022: Records from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)
reveal safety
lapses and violations at U.S. biosafety laboratories that conduct
research on dangerous agents and toxins.
I encourage you to review and share this information as the corrupt media
continues to provide cover for the Chinese communists, Fauci, and the
public health establishment. And check back here often, as more is always
being uncovered by your intrepid Judicial Watch!
New Biden Policy Shields ‘Vulnerable Workers who Lack Work
Authorization’
Every agency in the Biden administration is doing its share to promote a
wide-open border. Just days after a leftist group sent a letter to the
Biden Labor Department about illegal workers, the department leapt into
action, as our Corruption Chronicles blog reports.
Days after an influential open borders group ordered the government to
“promptly develop and implement” a policy to protect illegal immigrants
involved in labor disputes from deportation, the Biden administration has
obliged. This month the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a new measure,
drafted in English and Spanish, offering immigration related prosecutorial
discretion for undocumented workers involved in labor disputes with their
U.S. employers. Created at the request of the Los Angeles-based Center for
Human Rights and Constitutional Law, the policy directs illegal alien
workers to contact the agency if they fear supervisors will try to get
authorities to deport them for reporting workplace abuse. The DOL will then
contact the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to request the
undocumented employee be protected from deportation, according to the
measure.
“DOL’s mission and effective enforcement depends on the cooperation of
workers,” the recently issued guidance states. “However, vulnerable
workers who lack work authorization or sufficiently “portable”
immigration status are often reluctant to report violations, engage with
government enforcement agencies, or otherwise exercise their rights.” The
document continues by offering the following example; undocumented workers
who experience labor law violations may fear that cooperating with an
investigation will result in the disclosure of their immigration status or
that of family members, or that it will result in immigration-based
retaliation from their employers and adverse immigration consequences for
themselves or their family. “As a result, both workers and the Department
face barriers to equitable and effective enforcement of workplace rights
and protections, and the many employers that adhere to labor and employment
laws face unfair competition.”
Undocumented workers experiencing a labor dispute are instructed to submit
a statement of interest to the DOL in support of a request to DHS for
immigration-related prosecutorial discretion, the new guidance says.
Requesters should include a description of the labor dispute, any
retaliation or threats experienced by workers, a description of how fear of
potential immigration-related retaliation or other immigration enforcement
in the future is likely to deter workers from reporting violations related
to the labor dispute or otherwise cooperating with DOL. The agency will
assess each request by considering several factors, including whether
DHS’s use of immigration-related prosecutorial discretion would support
DOL’s interest in holding labor law violators accountable and whether
immigration enforcement of witnesses or victims could impede DOL’s
ability to enforce labor laws or provide all available remedies within its
jurisdiction. The agency will also consider the “likelihood that
immigration enforcement could be an instrument used to undermine DOL’s
enforcement of laws in the geographic area or industry and/or give rise to
further immigration-based retaliation.”
In a press
release celebrating the new policy the DOL explains that to carry out
the laws it enforces, workers must feel free to participate in
investigations and proceedings without fear of retaliation or consequences
related to their immigration status. “The department has long supported
DHS’ use of prosecutorial discretion – on a case-by-case basis – for
certain workers subjected to abusive and exploitative labor practices,”
the DOL writes, adding that “for decades, the department has memorialized
this relationship through agreements with immigration officials.” As an
example the agency lists an agreement between the DOL and DHS to work
together to ensure that their respective civil worksite enforcement
activities do not conflict and recognizing that effective enforcement of
labor law is essential to ensure proper wages and working conditions for
all workers regardless of immigration status.
It appears that the DOL issued its new policy to protect illegal immigrant
workers in response to demands by the Center for Human Rights and
Constitutional Law, an open-borders group that claims to protect the civil,
constitutional, and human rights of immigrants, refugees, children,
prisoners, and the poor. In the recent letter
to DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and DOL Secretary Martin Walsh the
group asks the administration to increase the willingness of immigrant
workers to assert their labor and civil rights and ensure immigration
enforcement does not become a tool of unscrupulous employers. “This
letter is to provide support for the effort to promptly develop and
implement a more robust policy aimed at encouraging immigrant workers to
report labor law violations and cooperate in their investigation and to
extend temporary protection from arrest or removal to immigrant workers
engaged in labor disputes,” the group writes. Within days the
administration implemented the new policy.
Until next week …
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