During the past month, the social media propaganda machinery of ISIS-K—the
affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Afghanistan—has


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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2022

 

Afghanistan Terrorism Report March 2022 

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch
Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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During the past month, the social media propaganda machinery of ISIS-K—the
affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Afghanistan—has
continued to portray an image of high operational tempo in several areas of
Afghanistan. Given the geographic distribution of the incidents for which
ISIS-K claims responsibility, it seems clear that while ISIS-K seems to
maintain networks in the north, east, and south of the country, it does not
appear to have particularly well-developed networks in the west of the country.
The latest high-profile attack in Western Afghanistan for which ISIS-K declared
responsibility occurred in January in Herat
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.

 

Given the severity of the incident, it is not surprising that ISIS-K
propaganda highlighted in repeated posts the group’s attack
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 against a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan. According to media reports,
this suicide bombing killed more than 50 individuals and injured at least 100.
This high-profile operation outside the territory of Afghanistan, as well as
regular attacks against Pakistani security forces in March, highlighted by
ISIS-K propaganda, demonstrates that the group attempts to show to its
sympathizers its ability to operate not only in one country but regionally.
According to reports by the United Nations (U.N.), ISIS-K maintains a specific
office
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 that coordinates ISIS-K activities in the entire Khorasan region. According to
the definition by ISIS-K, the Khorasan region includes Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh but also encompasses Central Asia and reaches as far as Sri
Lanka and the Maldives.

 

As in February, ISIS-K propaganda in March also highlights attacks in Kunduz
province. This is an obvious attempt to demonstrate the group’s reach into the
north of the country. However, in March, ISIS-K propaganda also took up the
issue of discrimination of Uzbeks by the Taliban in several posts. Highlighting
the issue plays on internal Taliban divisions
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 and the lack of inclusion of other ethnicities in positions of responsibility
by the Taliban. Indeed, according to U.N. reports, the Taliban power structure
remains dominated by Pashtuns
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. However, by repeatedly raising the issue of Uzbek discrimination in its
propaganda, ISIS-K could be attempting to recruit additional sympathizers from
this ethnic group in Afghanistan. ISIS-K structures in the north of the
country, and in particular in Uzbek areas remain weak. In 2018, ISIS-K suffered
a significant setback
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 in the north of the country. In that year, a Taliban operation killed several
hundred ISIS-K fighters, and several hundred fighters surrendered to the
Taliban and Afghan government forces. Since that time, ISIS-K was able to
maintain attack cells in the north but was not able to rebuild a stronghold in
that region of the country.

 

Map of Incidents Highlighted by ISIS-K Social Media Propaganda in March 2022

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ISIS-K propaganda, both official and unofficial, also continues to criticize
Taliban domestic policies, portraying the Taliban regime as “apostates.” An
entire issue of the pro-ISIS-K online magazine “Voice of Khurasan” was devoted
to this, promoting its so-called caliphate as the only alternative to the
Taliban’s so-called emirate. As in previous months, ISIS-K propaganda portrays
Taliban contacts with foreign governments, including China, Pakistan, Iran, and
the United States as well as meetings with representatives of the U.N. 
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as a sign that the movement is an instrument of foreign powers. As expected,
its propaganda machine mentioned the Taliban decision not to allow secondary
education
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 for girls in Afghanistan but used internal Taliban discussions concerning this
decision as another example that the movement is deviating from a hardline
ideological interpretation of Islam. Sectarian issues regularly play a central
role in ISIS propaganda, including in the social media statements of ISIS-K.
Not only did pro-ISIS-K online channels criticize Pashtunwali—the traditional
lifestyle and behavioral code of Pashtuns in Afghanistan—as deviant, but the
channels also continue to call for stronger repression of Shiites by the
Taliban. Many Afghans also celebrated the Persian new year of Nowruz at the end
of March without interference from the Taliban, which pro-ISIS-K online
channels interpreted as another sign of deviance by the Taliban.

 

Interestingly in March, pro-ISIS-K social media propaganda also emphasized the
close relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While its criticism of
al-Qaeda remains more subdued than that of the Taliban, the unofficial ISIS-K
propaganda machinery has begun to argue that due to al-Qaeda’s close
relationship with the Taliban, it too is contributing to the religious deviance
that the Taliban represent. In one post, a pro-ISIS-K commenter even
characterizes al-Qaeda itself as “apostates.” The fact that ISIS-K propaganda
takes up this issue could point to an increasing rivalry between both groups in
Afghanistan. Highlighting a video
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 by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri from November 2021 in which he criticized
the U.N., pro-ISIS-K propaganda speculated that this was a potential attempt by
al-Qaeda to separate from the Taliban as they regularly interact with U.N.
officials.

 

The fact that ISIS-K supporters featured a video by Zawahiri in its public
communications is also an example of a remarkable difference between the
communication strategies of the top leadership of ISIS and al-Qaeda that has
been developing since last year. While March 2022 saw the public announcement
of the new leader of ISIS
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al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi
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by ISIS, the group revealed little else about this individual. This continued
the strategy of his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi
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, who kept an extremely low profile
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 before and during his leadership of the organization. In stark contrast,
al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri released a fourth video since the takeover of power by
the Taliban in 2021. Zawahiri spoke to al-Qaeda sympathizers in September 2021
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, November 2021
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, February 2022
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, and April 2022
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. After not appearing in a video for several months from 2020 to 2021, sparking 
rumors of his demise
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, the head of al-Qaeda apparently currently feels safe enough to regularly
release video statements. That this newly found operational confidence
coincides with the Taliban usurpation of power in Afghanistan is another
indication of the close relationship between both groups.

 

Unfortunately, both the operational tempo of ISIS-K in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and the new high-profile communications strategy of al-Qaeda are both
very likely early warning signs that the regional and global terror threat
emanating from Afghanistan is slowly increasing.
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