Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2022

Afghanistan Terrorism Report March 2022 

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

During the past month, the social media propaganda machinery of ISIS-K—the affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Afghanistan—has continued to portray an image of high operational tempo in several areas of Afghanistan. Given the geographic distribution of the incidents for which ISIS-K claims responsibility, it seems clear that while ISIS-K seems to maintain networks in the north, east, and south of the country, it does not appear to have particularly well-developed networks in the west of the country. The latest high-profile attack in Western Afghanistan for which ISIS-K declared responsibility occurred in January in Herat.

Given the severity of the incident, it is not surprising that ISIS-K propaganda highlighted in repeated posts the group’s attack against a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan. According to media reports, this suicide bombing killed more than 50 individuals and injured at least 100. This high-profile operation outside the territory of Afghanistan, as well as regular attacks against Pakistani security forces in March, highlighted by ISIS-K propaganda, demonstrates that the group attempts to show to its sympathizers its ability to operate not only in one country but regionally. According to reports by the United Nations (U.N.), ISIS-K maintains a specific office that coordinates ISIS-K activities in the entire Khorasan region. According to the definition by ISIS-K, the Khorasan region includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh but also encompasses Central Asia and reaches as far as Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

As in February, ISIS-K propaganda in March also highlights attacks in Kunduz province. This is an obvious attempt to demonstrate the group’s reach into the north of the country. However, in March, ISIS-K propaganda also took up the issue of discrimination of Uzbeks by the Taliban in several posts. Highlighting the issue plays on internal Taliban divisions and the lack of inclusion of other ethnicities in positions of responsibility by the Taliban. Indeed, according to U.N. reports, the Taliban power structure remains dominated by Pashtuns. However, by repeatedly raising the issue of Uzbek discrimination in its propaganda, ISIS-K could be attempting to recruit additional sympathizers from this ethnic group in Afghanistan. ISIS-K structures in the north of the country, and in particular in Uzbek areas remain weak. In 2018, ISIS-K suffered a significant setback in the north of the country. In that year, a Taliban operation killed several hundred ISIS-K fighters, and several hundred fighters surrendered to the Taliban and Afghan government forces. Since that time, ISIS-K was able to maintain attack cells in the north but was not able to rebuild a stronghold in that region of the country.

Map of Incidents Highlighted by ISIS-K Social Media Propaganda in March 2022

Source: https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/afghanistan-provinces-map/

ISIS-K propaganda, both official and unofficial, also continues to criticize Taliban domestic policies, portraying the Taliban regime as “apostates.” An entire issue of the pro-ISIS-K online magazine “Voice of Khurasan” was devoted to this, promoting its so-called caliphate as the only alternative to the Taliban’s so-called emirate. As in previous months, ISIS-K propaganda portrays Taliban contacts with foreign governments, including China, Pakistan, Iran, and the United States as well as meetings with representatives of the U.N. as a sign that the movement is an instrument of foreign powers. As expected, its propaganda machine mentioned the Taliban decision not to allow secondary education for girls in Afghanistan but used internal Taliban discussions concerning this decision as another example that the movement is deviating from a hardline ideological interpretation of Islam. Sectarian issues regularly play a central role in ISIS propaganda, including in the social media statements of ISIS-K. Not only did pro-ISIS-K online channels criticize Pashtunwali—the traditional lifestyle and behavioral code of Pashtuns in Afghanistan—as deviant, but the channels also continue to call for stronger repression of Shiites by the Taliban. Many Afghans also celebrated the Persian new year of Nowruz at the end of March without interference from the Taliban, which pro-ISIS-K online channels interpreted as another sign of deviance by the Taliban.

Interestingly in March, pro-ISIS-K social media propaganda also emphasized the close relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While its criticism of al-Qaeda remains more subdued than that of the Taliban, the unofficial ISIS-K propaganda machinery has begun to argue that due to al-Qaeda’s close relationship with the Taliban, it too is contributing to the religious deviance that the Taliban represent. In one post, a pro-ISIS-K commenter even characterizes al-Qaeda itself as “apostates.” The fact that ISIS-K propaganda takes up this issue could point to an increasing rivalry between both groups in Afghanistan. Highlighting a video by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri from November 2021 in which he criticized the U.N., pro-ISIS-K propaganda speculated that this was a potential attempt by al-Qaeda to separate from the Taliban as they regularly interact with U.N. officials.

The fact that ISIS-K supporters featured a video by Zawahiri in its public communications is also an example of a remarkable difference between the communication strategies of the top leadership of ISIS and al-Qaeda that has been developing since last year. While March 2022 saw the public announcement of the new leader of ISIS, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, by ISIS, the group revealed little else about this individual. This continued the strategy of his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi, who kept an extremely low profile before and during his leadership of the organization. In stark contrast, al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri released a fourth video since the takeover of power by the Taliban in 2021. Zawahiri spoke to al-Qaeda sympathizers in September 2021, November 2021, February 2022, and April 2022. After not appearing in a video for several months from 2020 to 2021, sparking rumors of his demise, the head of al-Qaeda apparently currently feels safe enough to regularly release video statements. That this newly found operational confidence coincides with the Taliban usurpation of power in Afghanistan is another indication of the close relationship between both groups.

Unfortunately, both the operational tempo of ISIS-K in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the new high-profile communications strategy of al-Qaeda are both very likely early warning signs that the regional and global terror threat emanating from Afghanistan is slowly increasing.

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