Since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021,
the country has transformed into a permissible space for terror organiza


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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: February 2022

 

Read Afghanistan Terrorism Report: February 2022 by clicking here
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.

 

Afghanistan Terrorism Report February 2022

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

 

Following is the February 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism
Report”—the first piece in this series. The authors provide a monthly analysis
concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a
comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

 

Since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021,
the country has transformed into a permissiblespace
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for terror organizations. A significant number of al-Qaeda affiliates in
Afghanistan (i.e.,al-Qaeda core
<[link removed]>, al-Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent
<[link removed]>, the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
<[link removed]>, the
Islamic Jihad Group
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, theTurkistan Islamic Party
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(former known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM)) as well as
fighters from Pakistani based al-Qaeda affiliates (i.e.,Lashkar-e Taiba
<[link removed]>, Jaish-i Mohammad
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, or theTehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
<[link removed]>)
continue to operate in the country. This situation is exacerbated by the fact
that despite the Taliban’s claims that they would not allow Afghanistan to be
used
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for terrorist operations abroad, the symbiotic relationship between al-Qaeda
and the Taliban, managed by theHaqqani Network
<[link removed]>, persists.
Furthermore,ISIS-K
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has developed into the main ideological rival of theTaliban
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to haveaspirations
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for terrorist operations beyond the immediate region. Afghanistan remains one
of the most active spaces for global terrorist activities and therefore
requires close monitoring.

 

In February, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
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video clearly demonstrating that he views Afghanistan as a staging ground for
his ongoing global fight against the West. He, as did his predecessor Osama bin
Laden,swore
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personal bayat (loyalty oath) to each new leader of the Taliban, fromMullah
Omar <[link removed]>, to Mullah
Akhtar Mansour <[link removed]>, to
the current leaderHaibatullah Akhundzada
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. Thus, the al-Qaeda network, its members, and its sympathizers perceive the
Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan as their success as well and are emboldened.
Zawahiri’s framing of this development in the latest video highlights the
continuing risks of attacks against western interests around the world.

 

The death
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of several leaders and operatives over the past few years have contributed to
the current lull in al-Qaeda-linked terror attacks in Europe and the United
States as didCOVID-19 restrictions
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. However, experts also believe that this pause is a deliberate effort by
al-Qaeda’s leadership not to compromise the Taliban’sefforts
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to gain international recognition. Regardless, this position may change. Since
the rise ofISIS <[link removed]>, al-Qaeda has
competed for attention from terror sympathizers worldwide, including via rival
affiliates in most conflict regions of the globe. With a new operational safe
space in Afghanistan, this potential hesitation not to embarrass the Taliban
may only be temporary—especially since the Taliban havenot undertaken
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any noticeable efforts to control al-Qaeda-linked fighters in Afghanistan or
publicly disavowed their ties to the group.

 

The close link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is also conveyed in the
February edition of al-Qaeda magazine’s “Ummah Wāḥidah.” The editorial of the
magazine praises the Taliban regime as a functional alternative to democratic
governments, maintaining the conceptual framework of the Taliban as a
government while al-Qaeda presents as a global terrorist vanguard. The magazine
also features an article on Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former leader of the
Northern Alliance and depicts him as an instrument of the West as well as a
traitor to the Afghan resistance movement. This is clearly an effort to
delegitimize theNational Resistance Front of Afghanistan
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(NRF), the last remaining non-terrorist opposition group against the Taliban.
The NRF is led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud. According to
media reports, the NRF continues tooperate cells
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in Afghanistan but is currently unable to present a serious challenge to
Taliban rule.

 

ISIS-K, ISIS’s branch in Afghanistan, has always been a key affiliate of
ISIS’s global network. Rather than establishing an affiliate in Afghanistan
based on existing local group structures, ISIS core in Iraq and Syria in 2014
sent agroup of envoys
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to Afghanistan to build this affiliate from the ground up. It is no surprise
that the tactics ISIS currently employs in Afghanistan closely mirror tactics
used in Iraq and Syria. As shown in ISIS’s Al-Naba newsletters and Amaq
statements as well as ISIS online chatter monitored by the Counter Extremism
Project (CEP), this strategy has three core elements in Afghanistan: instilling
fear through raids on Taliban officials and security forces, assassinations as
well as an attempt to exacerbate sectarian tensions, and delegitimizing the
existing governance structure. Therefore, the newsletters highlight these
events with pictures of dead Taliban officials. Additionally, the Shiite
community in Afghanistan, the Hazaras, are referred to using the derogatory
Rafidi (those who refuse) and their religious festivals, such as Ashura, are
criticized. Moreover, Taliban contacts to Iran are presented are further
evidence of the ideological heresy of the current regime in Afghanistan.

 

ISIS-K presents itself online as the ideologically correct alternative to the
“apostate Taliban” regime—a term used in a Telegram post on February 19. ISIS
propaganda continues to call out the Taliban’s meetings with government
representatives from China, Russia, Pakistan, and France, chastising what ISIS
describes as Taliban nationalism. ISIS-K propaganda’s strategy to delegitimize
the Taliban acts to limit the any ideological moderation of the Taliban regime.
Faced with an ideological rival within Afghanistan, ISIS-K, whose membership
consists to a considerable extent ofdisgruntled
<[link removed]> Taliban, will
continue to receive defectors from the Taliban regime and will present both an
external as well as an internalthreat
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Taliban.

 

ISIS propaganda and chatter tries to portray the image of a group that can
operate in most regions of Afghanistan. In addition to reports about attacks
and assassinations in Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces, the area in Afghanistan
where ISIS-K holdsmost active fighters
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operations in Kunar and Takhar Provinces in the north of Afghanistan as well as
Helmand Province in the south of the country. Interestingly, ISIS propaganda
material also regularly highlights killings of the group in Peshawar, Pakistan,
demonstrating that the group maintains an operations wing responsible for
attacks outside Afghanistan <[link removed]>. Given that the
group also recruited members from theTehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
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, this is not surprising.
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