Afghanistan Terrorism Report: February 2022

 

Read Afghanistan Terrorism Report: February 2022 by clicking here.

 

Afghanistan Terrorism Report February 2022

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

 

Following is the February 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report”—the first piece in this series. The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

 

Since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, the country has transformed into a permissible space for terror organizations. A significant number of al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan (i.e., al-Qaeda core, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Turkistan Islamic Party (former known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM)) as well as fighters from Pakistani based al-Qaeda affiliates (i.e., Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-i Mohammad, or the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) continue to operate in the country. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that despite the Taliban’s claims that they would not allow Afghanistan to be used for terrorist operations abroad, the symbiotic relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, managed by the Haqqani Network, persists. Furthermore, ISIS-K has developed into the main ideological rival of the Taliban in Afghanistan and continues to have aspirations for terrorist operations beyond the immediate region. Afghanistan remains one of the most active spaces for global terrorist activities and therefore requires close monitoring.

 

In February, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new video clearly demonstrating that he views Afghanistan as a staging ground for his ongoing global fight against the West. He, as did his predecessor Osama bin Laden, swore personal bayat (loyalty oath) to each new leader of the Taliban, from Mullah Omar, to Mullah Akhtar Mansour, to the current leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. Thus, the al-Qaeda network, its members, and its sympathizers perceive the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan as their success as well and are emboldened. Zawahiri’s framing of this development in the latest video highlights the continuing risks of attacks against western interests around the world.

 

The death of several leaders and operatives over the past few years have contributed to the current lull in al-Qaeda-linked terror attacks in Europe and the United States as did COVID-19 restrictions. However, experts also believe that this pause is a deliberate effort by al-Qaeda’s leadership not to compromise the Taliban’s efforts to gain international recognition. Regardless, this position may change. Since the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda has competed for attention from terror sympathizers worldwide, including via rival affiliates in most conflict regions of the globe. With a new operational safe space in Afghanistan, this potential hesitation not to embarrass the Taliban may only be temporary—especially since the Taliban have not undertaken any noticeable efforts to control al-Qaeda-linked fighters in Afghanistan or publicly disavowed their ties to the group.

 

The close link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is also conveyed in the February edition of al-Qaeda magazine’s “Ummah Wāḥidah.” The editorial of the magazine praises the Taliban regime as a functional alternative to democratic governments, maintaining the conceptual framework of the Taliban as a government while al-Qaeda presents as a global terrorist vanguard. The magazine also features an article on Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former leader of the Northern Alliance and depicts him as an instrument of the West as well as a traitor to the Afghan resistance movement. This is clearly an effort to delegitimize the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), the last remaining non-terrorist opposition group against the Taliban. The NRF is led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud. According to media reports, the NRF continues to operate cells in Afghanistan but is currently unable to present a serious challenge to Taliban rule.

 

ISIS-K, ISIS’s branch in Afghanistan, has always been a key affiliate of ISIS’s global network. Rather than establishing an affiliate in Afghanistan based on existing local group structures, ISIS core in Iraq and Syria in 2014 sent a group of envoys to Afghanistan to build this affiliate from the ground up. It is no surprise that the tactics ISIS currently employs in Afghanistan closely mirror tactics used in Iraq and Syria. As shown in ISIS’s Al-Naba newsletters and Amaq statements as well as ISIS online chatter monitored by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), this strategy has three core elements in Afghanistan: instilling fear through raids on Taliban officials and security forces, assassinations as well as an attempt to exacerbate sectarian tensions, and delegitimizing the existing governance structure. Therefore, the newsletters highlight these events with pictures of dead Taliban officials. Additionally, the Shiite community in Afghanistan, the Hazaras, are referred to using the derogatory Rafidi (those who refuse) and their religious festivals, such as Ashura, are criticized. Moreover, Taliban contacts to Iran are presented are further evidence of the ideological heresy of the current regime in Afghanistan.

 

ISIS-K presents itself online as the ideologically correct alternative to the “apostate Taliban” regime—a term used in a Telegram post on February 19. ISIS propaganda continues to call out the Taliban’s meetings with government representatives from China, Russia, Pakistan, and France, chastising what ISIS describes as Taliban nationalism. ISIS-K propaganda’s strategy to delegitimize the Taliban acts to limit the any ideological moderation of the Taliban regime. Faced with an ideological rival within Afghanistan, ISIS-K, whose membership consists to a considerable extent of disgruntled Taliban, will continue to receive defectors from the Taliban regime and will present both an external as well as an internal threat to the Taliban.

 

ISIS propaganda and chatter tries to portray the image of a group that can operate in most regions of Afghanistan. In addition to reports about attacks and assassinations in Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces, the area in Afghanistan where ISIS-K holds most active fighters, ISIS propaganda also claims operations in Kunar and Takhar Provinces in the north of Afghanistan as well as Helmand Province in the south of the country. Interestingly, ISIS propaganda material also regularly highlights killings of the group in Peshawar, Pakistan, demonstrating that the group maintains an operations wing responsible for attacks outside Afghanistan. Given that the group also recruited members from the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), this is not surprising.

###

 

Unsubscribe