August 17, 2021
We Need to Understand China's Domestic Politics
Former U.S. House Speaker Tip O’Neill was referring to American politics when he quipped that “all politics is local.” However, his famous observation also applies to China. In an article in Real Clear World, Heritage Visiting Fellow Michael Cunningham writes <[link removed]> that as U.S. officials develop their strategy for managing China’s rise, they would do well to keep O’Neill’s words in mind. They will be able to develop more targeted, effective strategies for dealing with an increasingly powerful and assertive China if they account for the political interests driving their Chinese counterparts.

This is not a plea for leniency toward Beijing or for a return to failed engagement policies. Rather, it is a call for U.S. officials to study and understand the full range of interests and concerns driving Beijing’s policymaking. They are not all matters of grand strategy, ideology or economic performance. The traditional view of U.S.-China relations as a geopolitical competition between a dominant power and a dissatisfied rising power pursuing their respective rational self-interest is incomplete for two reasons. First, self-interest is not always rational from a foreign policy perspective. Further, the “selves” pursuing these interests are often disparate groups of policy elites, rather than unified state actors.



In developing a strategy for confronting China’s challenge to the U.S.-led global order, Washington needs to study— in addition to geopolitics—the details of China’s domestic politics at the national, local, and individual levels. Much of this information is available to be examined in open-source literature, as well as by careful monitoring of Chinese
social media and interactions with Chinese interlocutors. What is needed is a persistent, systematic examination of these sources by policymakers, analysts, business leaders, news media, and citizens in general. An informed public debate among all the American stakeholders will go far in producing a more effective and nuanced strategic approach to the PRC. 

In addition to using this information to prevent the blunders that arise when policy drivers are not properly understood, officials should take a page from China’s playbook and use this information to assess how various policy options will affect key Chinese decisionmakers. Officials should understand what kinds of pressure and enticements they can use to better manage
their counterparts in Beijing.

This is an ideal time to start taking this approach. Between now and the party congress expected to occur in fall 2022, domestic politics will occupy the minds of China’s policy elite to an extent seen only once every five years. Official turnover will be high in the lead-up to and during the party congress, and due to the cut-throat nature of Chinese politics, even officials slated to retire will be preoccupied with how it turns out.

This is even more so for Xi, who is expected to seek a precedent-breaking third term at the party’s helm. While Xi is almost certain to retain power, he does not want to take any chances and will be hyper-focused avoiding mistakes. Xi has faced criticism within the party for his handling of U.S.-China relations, so avoiding further deterioration in that relationship will probably be a top foreign-policy priority ahead of the party congress. Xi will likely seek some symbolic victories, such as securing a high-level meeting or agreement of some sort. U.S. policymakers should recognize these efforts for what they are and use Xi’s vulnerability to make him really work for even the most trivial symbolic achievement.

This does not mean Beijing’s overall tone will be softened. Given the emphasis on not looking weak, most of Xi’s aggressive international posturing — “wolf warrior diplomacy” and regular intrusions across the Taiwan Strait midline, for example — is likely to continue. There is also a possibility that any pressure to avoid excessive escalation of U.S.-China tensions will be eclipsed by a clash of interests, resulting in an even more aggressive stance against the United States and China’s various neighbors. In such a case, American leaders will need to recognize the domestic factors influencing Beijing’s actions and seek to defuse tensions in ways that are politically viable in China.

If history is an accurate guide, China will likely become even more aggressive internationally in Xi’s third term. This will make it more important than ever that U.S. policymakers understand the domestic political environment and the interests and concerns driving Beijing’s decisionmakers. Insight into why China behaves as it does will give Washington leverage, enabling the United States to truly confront China from a position of strength.

Related: Click here <[link removed]> to read the Heritage Foundation's 2021 China Transparency Report.
Japanese Strike Capabilities: Security Advantages for U.S. Alliance, Challenges to Overcome
Heritage Senior Research Fellow Bruce Klingner writes <[link removed]> that responding to Asian security threats requires robust U.S. forces in the region and strong alliance partners. Japan’s unexpected cancellation of a strategic missile defense system in 2020 triggered a resurgence of debate about whether the country should augment its defenses by acquiring strike capabilities, i.e., the ability to conduct an attack against targets in an opponent’s
country. Disagreements raged about whether developing such capabilities was a necessary response to escalating regional threats or whether it violated Japan’s pacifist constitution. There was little attention, however, to the modalities of strike systems, how they would be incorporated into Allied strategic plans, or the numerous challenges that will need to be overcome prior to deployment.

During the subsequent year, the issue faded from public discussion, due largely to the resignation last September of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During his lengthy tenure, Abe was a strong proponent of removing post–World War II restrictions imposed on Japan and regaining a “normal nation” status. Abe expanded Japan’s role on the world stage, loosened limitations on Tokyo’s exercise of collective self-defense, and oversaw a buildup of the country’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Abe’s advocacy was less successful for Tokyo developing strike capabilities to target other nations that had contemplated or were contemplating attacks on Japan. Abe’s successor as prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, has not been a strong a proponent—instead devoting his attention toward domestic policy reforms and a myriad of challenges, including Japan’s response to COVID-19. Suga is less likely than Abe to spend his political capital and Japan’s limited defense budget on new capabilities that would face strong domestic and regional resistance.

While muted for now, however, the issue could quickly return to the forefront as a result either of North Korean provocations or increased United States pressure for Japan to assume a bigger regional security role. Given the relentlessly escalating regional security threats, Washington and Tokyo should be working closely to assess Japan’s need to develop strike capabilities. In so doing, however, they should be cognizant of the numerous constitutional, budgetary, technical, and bureaucratic obstacles. Pursuing strike capabilities, or even the formal announcement to do so, would be extremely controversial with Japan’s populace and neighboring countries—and would require deft public diplomacy to overcome
strong resistance to such a significant shift to Japan’s post–World War II security posture.

For both Japan and the United States, balancing the benefits and risks of Tokyo developing strike capabilities will be difficult. It behooves Tokyo to develop the ability to reduce missile strikes against Japan and for Washington to have more capable allies. To get there, constitutional, legal, budgetary, technical, and societal hurdles will need to be overcome. It will require a dedicated and powerful prime minister to convince the Japanese public to accept a dramatic expansion of Japan’s post-war security role.

Related: Click here <[link removed]> to read Heritage CND Director Thomas Spoehr's commentary on Chinese nuclear weapons.
The Prospects for a Real "China Bill"
In an article in Taipei Times, Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes <[link removed]> that the US Congress has become alive to the China challenge. Lawmakers have introduced hundreds of bills to address
specific concerns regarding Chinese behavior on the international stage. They have also moved on two comprehensive proposals that address the problem-set in the broadest possible way. It may be a new, third comprehensive proposal, however, that points to the future.

The first of the big bills was initiated in February, when Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) tasked a range of committees to come up with comprehensive legislation. The resulting bill — the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) — passed the full Senate in June. The bill includes several critically important provisions supplied by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Among them is language ensuring Taiwan receives the diplomatic respect it deserves, barring US official involvement in the 2022 Beijing Olympics, and a long-overdue rebalancing of US diplomatic resources and assistance in favor of the Indo-Pacific. Unfortunately, all the hard work on foreign policy may turn out to have been mere window dressing. The only bits Schumer cares about are the bill’s provisions to spend hundreds of billions of dollars for high-tech research and development and for the production of microprocessors.

The second comprehensive effort on China was a House product. For several days at the end of June and early July, the House Foreign Affairs Committee marked-up the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act. The EAGLE Act is heavy on reporting requirements and toothless expressions of congressional concern. But the bill could be improved and strengthened in negotiations with the Senate. In fact, the House already made some improvements of its own during mark-up. The bigger problem is that the House bill also overreaches. It contains all kinds of measures that have nothing to do with the China challenge. Most striking are the billions of dollars directed at climate change.

Then, there is a third comprehensive effort. A bill from the Republican Study Committee (RSC) substantively addresses many of the most important issues in the China debate. It’s not perfect. For instance, there is an unworkable provision requiring the president to seek reimbursement from China for losses due to COVID-19. Good sentiment. Not gonna happen. Whatever its limitations, though, the study committee’s Countering Communist China Act is clearly about China. Among other good things, it targets the influence operations of China’s United Front Work Department and erects guardrails around the funds the USICA is looking to give away. The USICA subsidies are the wrong way to make American businesses competitive with Chinese firms, but if they become law, we ought to at least make sure we’re not indirectly subsidizing American business operations in China itself. The greatest feature of the RSC bill, however, is its recognition that countering China isn’t about how much money the US can spend; it’s about policy.

The clock is running out on meaningful congressional action this year. But it’s not yet impossible to pass a solid, comprehensive bill addressing the China challenge. For that to happen, lawmakers will have to look beyond narrow constituent interests. They will also have to start taking their own constitutional powers more seriously. There is a process for producing responsive, responsible legislative outcomes. It’s called the “regular order.” This means marking up legislation in committee. And then — here’s the most important part — allowing members to vote on amendments for which the outcome is not preordained. That’s the only way proposals like the RSC’s have a chance to be considered. The rough edges can then be worked out in negotiations between the two Houses. Barring such an approach, Congress will have to wait another couple of years to pass something real on China. Given current polling data, the RSC package could very well be the starting point for the new debate. That would be a positive thing.

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