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August 29, 2025

This month’s newsletter features a report analyzing how quickly Iran might
enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of
U.S. and Israeli air strikes in June. The analysis assumes that Iran would
make use of its surviving enriched uranium stockpile and secret enrichment
sites in any attempt to drive for a bomb, and it considers various
scenarios based on estimates of what centrifuges and material Iran may have
been able to stash away or salvage.

The newsletter also includes news about European governments’ triggering
the “snapback” of U.N. sanctions on Iran, efforts to resume International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in Iran, and an Iranian nuclear
delegation’s visit to Russia last year, as well as profiles of a company
and an individual sanctioned for supplying Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing
efforts. Additions to the Iran Watch library include government comments on
the triggering of snapback, new sanctions against Iran’s drone program and
oil sales, and actions by European governments and Australia against
Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism.

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PUBLICATIONS

[4]

A cascade of IR-6 centrifuges. (Photo Credit: Islamic Republic News Agency)

Report | [5]Hidden Among the Rubble: Iran’s Post-Strike Weapon Potential

The U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in
June set back Iran’s nuclear program, but by how much and for how long is
uncertain. One clear result is that such work is more likely than ever to
take place at secret sites, which Iran could potentially operate using
centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpiles either hidden in advance or
salvaged from the wreckage of its declared sites. This report considers
scenarios involving three sizes of sites and differing levels of usable
enriched uranium to establish theoretical estimates for how long it might
take Iran to manufacture fuel for a small nuclear arsenal in the aftermath
of the strikes.

[6]READ THE REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

Iran will need to restore its centrifuge production capacity if it decides
to restart its nuclear program. Manufacturers, contractors and procurement
agents for the [7]Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) will have
crucial roles in that effort.

[8]Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA)

An Iranian company linked to the AEOI that manufactures centrifuge parts;
involved in the production of IR-1 and IR-2M centrifuges and reportedly
IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, as well as the testing of IR-8 centrifuges.

[9]LEARN MORE

[10]Atbin Ista Technical and Engineering Company

An Iran-based industrial services company and manufacturer specializing in
gaskets and seals; facilitates TESA’s acquisition of components from
foreign suppliers.

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Majid Mosallat

Managing director and chairman of the board of directors of Atbin Ista
Technical and Engineering Company; has overseen the purchase and shipment
of items to TESA.

[13]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[14]

The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom discuss
the Iranian nuclear issue with the European Union’s High Representative for
Foreign Policy. (Photo Credit: French Ministry of Europe and Foreign
Affairs)

[15]Europeans Launch UN Sanctions Process on Iran, Letter Says | Reuters

August 28, 2025: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E3) notified
the United Nations Security Council that they were triggering the process
known as the "snapback mechanism" to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran. The
notification initiates a 30-day process which would result in the reentry
into force of U.N. sanctions imposed before 2015 on Iran's financial,
banking, energy, and defense sectors. The E3 had been in talks with Iran
since mid-June on a negotiated settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. The
letter sent by E3 foreign ministers to the Security Council indicated that
the E3 might be willing to defer the renewed sanctions if Iran provides
nuclear-related commitments prior to the end of September.

[16]UN Nuclear Watchdog Back in Iran, No Deal Yet on Inspections | Reuters

August 27, 2025: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors
returned to Iran for the first time after being expelled following Israeli
and U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear program in June. Iranian Foreign
Minister Abbas Araqchi said that the inspectors would observe the changing
of fuel at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Araqchi also said that Iran had
not yet reached an agreement with the IAEA for additional inspections.

[17]The Covert Trip by Iranian Nuclear Experts to Russia | Financial Times

August 5, 2025: A delegation of Iranian nuclear scientists and procurement
agents traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian companies that
produce dual-use technologies, according to documents reviewed by FT. The
delegation was led by Ali Kalvand, the director of Tehran-based consulting
firm DamavandTec, and its members included scientists and businessmen
linked to Iran's Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND).
The delegation visited two companies owned by a Russian nuclear scientist
and vacuum technology expert that produce klystrons and electron
accelerators, which have applications in nuclear weapons testing. Kalvand
had earlier written to a Russian nuclear isotope supplier to request
radioactive isotope samples including tritium, which has applications in
nuclear implosion testing and boosting the yield of nuclear warheads. 

FROM THE LIBRARY

The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) [18]triggered the JCPOA’s
snapback mechanism after Iran failed to make sufficient commitments in a
series of talks.
* The E3 [19]sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council in early August
asserting their ability and intention to trigger snapback “should no
satisfactory solution be reached by the end of August 2025” – August 8
* Russia [20]sent a letter to the Security Council in response, arguing
against the E3’s ability to initiate the snapback mechanism – August 11
* A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson [21]stated that China opposed
any triggering of the snapback mechanism – August 15
* The E3 released a [22]joint statement explaining their rationale for
triggering snapback – August 28
* The United States [23]welcomed the E3’s initiation of snapback – August
28

The United States continued its maximum pressure campaign against Iran,
sanctioning Iran’s military drone program and, together with the United
Kingdom, Iran’s oil export networks.
* The U.S. [24]Treasury and [25]State Departments sanctioned more than 50
entities connected to well-connected oil and petrochemical smuggler Hossein
Shamkhani, who transports petroleum exports from both Iran and Russia –
July 30
* The Treasury Department [26]targeted suppliers of Iran’s military drone
program located in China and Taiwan – July 31
* The United States also [27]sanctioned banks and their officials
involved in Iran’s “shadow banking” network for laundering oil sale
proceeds – August 7
* The [28]Treasury and [29]State Departments targeted a Greek national
and his network of companies and vessels involved in shipping Iranian oil
to China - August 21
* The United Kingdom also [30]froze the assets of Hossein Shamkhani and
several of his companies – August 21

Australia, several European governments, and the United States acted in
response to Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism on their territories.
* European governments and the United States released a [31]joint
statement condemning attempts by Iranian intelligence services to kill,
kidnap, and harass people in Europe and North America – July 31
* Australia [32]cut off diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled the
Iranian ambassador from Canberra after linking multiple attacks on Jewish
organizations to the IRGC – August 26

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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