 | August 29, 2025 This month’s newsletter features a report analyzing how quickly Iran might enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of U.S. and Israeli air strikes in June. The analysis assumes that Iran would make use of its surviving enriched uranium stockpile and secret enrichment sites in any attempt to drive for a bomb, and it considers various scenarios based on estimates of what centrifuges and material Iran may have been able to stash away or salvage. The newsletter also includes news about European governments’ triggering the “snapback” of U.N. sanctions on Iran, efforts to resume International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in Iran, and an Iranian nuclear delegation’s visit to Russia last year, as well as profiles of a company and an individual sanctioned for supplying Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing efforts. Additions to the Iran Watch library include government comments on the triggering of snapback, new sanctions against Iran’s drone program and oil sales, and actions by European governments and Australia against Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism. Was this email forwarded to you? Sign up to receive the newsletter in your inbox, or view the newsletter in your browser. |
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| A cascade of IR-6 centrifuges. (Photo Credit: Islamic Republic News Agency) |
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| The U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June set back Iran’s nuclear program, but by how much and for how long is uncertain. One clear result is that such work is more likely than ever to take place at secret sites, which Iran could potentially operate using centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpiles either hidden in advance or salvaged from the wreckage of its declared sites. This report considers scenarios involving three sizes of sites and differing levels of usable enriched uranium to establish theoretical estimates for how long it might take Iran to manufacture fuel for a small nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of the strikes. |
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| Iran will need to restore its centrifuge production capacity if it decides to restart its nuclear program. Manufacturers, contractors and procurement agents for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) will have crucial roles in that effort. |
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| The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom discuss the Iranian nuclear issue with the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Policy. (Photo Credit: French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs) |
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| August 28, 2025: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E3) notified the United Nations Security Council that they were triggering the process known as the "snapback mechanism" to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran. The notification initiates a 30-day process which would result in the reentry into force of U.N. sanctions imposed before 2015 on Iran's financial, banking, energy, and defense sectors. The E3 had been in talks with Iran since mid-June on a negotiated settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. The letter sent by E3 foreign ministers to the Security Council indicated that the E3 might be willing to defer the renewed sanctions if Iran provides nuclear-related commitments prior to the end of September. |
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| August 27, 2025: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors returned to Iran for the first time after being expelled following Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear program in June. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said that the inspectors would observe the changing of fuel at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Araqchi also said that Iran had not yet reached an agreement with the IAEA for additional inspections. |
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| August 5, 2025: A delegation of Iranian nuclear scientists and procurement agents traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian companies that produce dual-use technologies, according to documents reviewed by FT. The delegation was led by Ali Kalvand, the director of Tehran-based consulting firm DamavandTec, and its members included scientists and businessmen linked to Iran's Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND). The delegation visited two companies owned by a Russian nuclear scientist and vacuum technology expert that produce klystrons and electron accelerators, which have applications in nuclear weapons testing. Kalvand had earlier written to a Russian nuclear isotope supplier to request radioactive isotope samples including tritium, which has applications in nuclear implosion testing and boosting the yield of nuclear warheads. |
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| The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) triggered the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism after Iran failed to make sufficient commitments in a series of talks. - The E3 sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council in early August asserting their ability and intention to trigger snapback “should no satisfactory solution be reached by the end of August 2025” – August 8
- Russia sent a letter to the Security Council in response, arguing against the E3’s ability to initiate the snapback mechanism – August 11
- A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson stated that China opposed any triggering of the snapback mechanism – August 15
- The E3 released a joint statement explaining their rationale for triggering snapback – August 28
- The United States welcomed the E3’s initiation of snapback – August 28
The United States continued its maximum pressure campaign against Iran, sanctioning Iran’s military drone program and, together with the United Kingdom, Iran’s oil export networks. - The U.S. Treasury and State Departments sanctioned more than 50 entities connected to well-connected oil and petrochemical smuggler Hossein Shamkhani, who transports petroleum exports from both Iran and Russia – July 30
- The Treasury Department targeted suppliers of Iran’s military drone program located in China and Taiwan – July 31
- The United States also sanctioned banks and their officials involved in Iran’s “shadow banking” network for laundering oil sale proceeds – August 7
- The Treasury and State Departments targeted a Greek national and his network of companies and vessels involved in shipping Iranian oil to China - August 21
- The United Kingdom also froze the assets of Hossein Shamkhani and several of his companies – August 21
Australia, several European governments, and the United States acted in response to Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism on their territories. - European governments and the United States released a joint statement condemning attempts by Iranian intelligence services to kill, kidnap, and harass people in Europe and North America – July 31
- Australia cut off diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled the Iranian ambassador from Canberra after linking multiple attacks on Jewish organizations to the IRGC – August 26
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| Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control |
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