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May 29, 2025

This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a
podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with
Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Michael
Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss the
opportunities and pitfalls facing the Trump administration as it makes a
last-ditch effort to prevent Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program
from crossing the threshold to a bomb.

The newsletter also includes profiles of individuals and companies involved
in the network that procured U.S.-origin electronics for drones used in the
2024 “Tower-22” attack in Jordan, as well as news about the Trump
administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, fresh talks between Iran
and the European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, and a new Iranian
ballistic missile. Additions to the Iran Watch library include U.S.
sanctions in support of its maximum pressure campaign and Iranian and other
government comments on the U.S.-Iran talks.

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PUBLICATIONS

[4]

A fighter aircraft takes off from the USS Harry S. Truman in the U.S.
Central Command area of responsibility. (Photo Credit: U.S. Department of
Defense)

Podcast | [5]How to Keep Iran from the Bomb?

This year began with an opportunity for a breakthrough on U.S. Iran policy
caused by the change in administration and events in the Middle East. The
opportunity remains, but the risks are perilous: Iran’s nuclear program is
more advanced that it has ever been. Should the United States insist on the
dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear capabilities or buy time and mitigate the
near-term risk of a nuclear breakout? How might military action shape the
policy environment? What should be the focus of sanctions? Are U.S.
counterproliferation goals in tension with efforts to increase the
likelihood of regime change? FDD’s Behnam Ben Taleblu and the Washington
Institute’s Michael Eisenstadt sat down with us in late April to help
answer these questions.

[6]LISTEN TO THE PODCAST

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

A recent Iran Watch [7]case study described a procurement network that
obtained U.S.-origin electronics for an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose proxies used them in drones that
targeted U.S. servicemembers in 2024. Key entities in the network include:

[8]Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi

An Iranian businessman and CEO of [9]Sanat Danesh Rahpuyan Aflak Company
Ltd (SDRA); has procured components for navigational systems used by the
[10]IRGC Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization to produce
missiles and drones.

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi

A U.S.-Iranian dual national employed by a major U.S. semiconductor
manufacturing company; allegedly conspired to establish a business
relationship between the U.S. company and a SDRA front company; allegedly
transported electronics to Iran during personal travel.

[13]LEARN MORE

[14]Illumove SA

A Switzerland-based front company for SDRA; used by Abedini Najafabadi and
Sadeghi to procure U.S.-origin electronics and sensitive technical data for
Iranian end users.

[15]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

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The Iranian and Omani foreign ministers discuss proposals related to
ongoing U.S.-Iran talks. (Photo Credit: Foreign Ministry of Oman)

[17]Iran Rules Out Enrichment Break as Bait for US Nuclear Deal | Al
Jazeera

May 26, 2025: Iran's foreign ministry denied reports that Tehran was
considering offering a three-year suspension of uranium enrichment as part
of its nuclear negotiations with the United States. Foreign Ministry
spokesman Esmail Baghaei said that Iran would not accept a suspension of
its enrichment program, and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian said that
Iran was willing to walk away from negotiations if necessary. Both Iran and
the United States had reported progress in talks held in Rome on May 23.

[18]Iran, Europeans Hold Nuclear Talks, Agree to More, Diplomats Say |
Reuters

May 16, 2025: Diplomats from Iran, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
met for talks in Istanbul. It was the first negotiation between Iran and
the three European countries since U.S.-Iran talks on Iran's nuclear
program began in April. Iran and the European parties agreed to meet again
if needed, according to Iran's deputy foreign minister.

[19]Iran Tests Missile It Claims Can Reach Israel, Get Past US Defenses |
RFE/RL

May 5, 2025: Iran claimed to have successfully tested a new ballistic
missile named Qassem Bassir. Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said
the missile had a 1,200 kilometer range and claimed that it could evade the
U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.
Western and Russian experts said that the missile was the first Iranian
medium-range ballistic missile to use electro optical (EO) seekers, which
make it resistant to electronic jamming. According to Iranian media, the
Qassem Bassir is an upgraded version of the Martyr Hajj Qassem missile
unveiled in 2020.

FROM THE LIBRARY

Iran and other governments commented on ongoing nuclear negotiations.
* The European Union [20]urged Iran to resume implementing monitoring and
verification measures specified in the 2015 deal – May 2.
* French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot [21]said that it was important
for French interests that a U.S.-Iran deal addresses Iran’s ballistic
missile activities – May 5.
* Russia’s foreign ministry [22]said that Iran should not be “excluded”
from the nuclear energy sector and that Russia would continue cooperating
with Iran in it – May 6.
* Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi called for dialogue with the E3
(France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in [23]two [24]speeches, but also
criticized them – May 11 and 18.
* Iran’s foreign ministry [25]insisted [26]repeatedly that it would not
consider giving up its uranium enrichment as part of a deal – May 17 and
28.

The United States targeted Iran’s nuclear and missile programs with
sanctions.
* The Treasury Department [27]sanctioned a network of entities involved
in procuring missile propellant ingredients for Iran – April 29.
* The State Department [28]sanctioned three individuals and one company
affiliated with [29]SPND, an organization involved in nuclear weapons
research – May 12.
* The Treasury Department [30]sanctioned a network of Iranian and Chinese
entities for assisting Iran’s efforts to produce carbon fiber domestically
– May 14.
* The State Department [31]determined that ten types of specialized
metals are used in connection with Iran’s nuclear, missile, or military
programs, mandating sanctions on any entity that knowingly supplies them to
Iran – May 21.

The United States also continued its maximum pressure campaign targeting
Iran’s revenue sources and support for proxies.
* The Treasury Department [32]sanctioned several vessels and ship
management companies, many of which were linked to Iran, for delivering
refined petroleum products to the Houthis – April 28.
* The State Department [33]designated companies in the United Arab
Emirates and Turkey for trading Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum
products – April 30.
* The Treasury Department [34]sanctioned a Chinese “teapot” refinery and
three port terminal operators in China for importing Iranian oil – May 8.
* A subsequent action [35]targeted a network of front companies, trading
firms, and vessels for their role in facilitating oil exports benefitting
the Iranian defense ministry – May 13.
* The Treasury Department [36]disrupted a money laundering network
transferring funds from Iran to Hezbollah – May 15

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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