May 29, 2025

This month’s newsletter features a new episode of Iran Watch Listen, a podcast by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. We sat down with Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss the opportunities and pitfalls facing the Trump administration as it makes a last-ditch effort to prevent Iran’s increasingly advanced nuclear program from crossing the threshold to a bomb.

The newsletter also includes profiles of individuals and companies involved in the network that procured U.S.-origin electronics for drones used in the 2024 “Tower-22” attack in Jordan, as well as news about the Trump administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, fresh talks between Iran and the European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, and a new Iranian ballistic missile. Additions to the Iran Watch library include U.S. sanctions in support of its maximum pressure campaign and Iranian and other government comments on the U.S.-Iran talks.

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PUBLICATIONS

A fighter aircraft takes off from the USS Harry S. Truman in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. (Photo Credit: U.S. Department of Defense)

This year began with an opportunity for a breakthrough on U.S. Iran policy caused by the change in administration and events in the Middle East. The opportunity remains, but the risks are perilous: Iran’s nuclear program is more advanced that it has ever been. Should the United States insist on the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear capabilities or buy time and mitigate the near-term risk of a nuclear breakout? How might military action shape the policy environment? What should be the focus of sanctions? Are U.S. counterproliferation goals in tension with efforts to increase the likelihood of regime change? FDD’s Behnam Ben Taleblu and the Washington Institute’s Michael Eisenstadt sat down with us in late April to help answer these questions.

 

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

A recent Iran Watch case study described a procurement network that obtained U.S.-origin electronics for an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose proxies used them in drones that targeted U.S. servicemembers in 2024. Key entities in the network include:

Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi

An Iranian businessman and CEO of Sanat Danesh Rahpuyan Aflak Company Ltd (SDRA); has procured components for navigational systems used by the IRGC Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization to produce missiles and drones.

Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi

A U.S.-Iranian dual national employed by a major U.S. semiconductor manufacturing company; allegedly conspired to establish a business relationship between the U.S. company and a SDRA front company; allegedly transported electronics to Iran during personal travel.

Illumove SA

A Switzerland-based front company for SDRA; used by Abedini Najafabadi and Sadeghi to procure U.S.-origin electronics and sensitive technical data for Iranian end users.

 

IN THE NEWS

The Iranian and Omani foreign ministers discuss proposals related to ongoing U.S.-Iran talks. (Photo Credit: Foreign Ministry of Oman)

May 26, 2025: Iran's foreign ministry denied reports that Tehran was considering offering a three-year suspension of uranium enrichment as part of its nuclear negotiations with the United States. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said that Iran would not accept a suspension of its enrichment program, and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran was willing to walk away from negotiations if necessary. Both Iran and the United States had reported progress in talks held in Rome on May 23.

May 16, 2025: Diplomats from Iran, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom met for talks in Istanbul. It was the first negotiation between Iran and the three European countries since U.S.-Iran talks on Iran's nuclear program began in April. Iran and the European parties agreed to meet again if needed, according to Iran's deputy foreign minister.

May 5, 2025: Iran claimed to have successfully tested a new ballistic missile named Qassem Bassir. Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said the missile had a 1,200 kilometer range and claimed that it could evade the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. Western and Russian experts said that the missile was the first Iranian medium-range ballistic missile to use electro optical (EO) seekers, which make it resistant to electronic jamming. According to Iranian media, the Qassem Bassir is an upgraded version of the Martyr Hajj Qassem missile unveiled in 2020.

 

FROM THE LIBRARY

Iran and other governments commented on ongoing nuclear negotiations.

  • The European Union urged Iran to resume implementing monitoring and verification measures specified in the 2015 deal – May 2.
  • French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said that it was important for French interests that a U.S.-Iran deal addresses Iran’s ballistic missile activities – May 5.
  • Russia’s foreign ministry said that Iran should not be “excluded” from the nuclear energy sector and that Russia would continue cooperating with Iran in it – May 6.
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi called for dialogue with the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in two speeches, but also criticized them – May 11 and 18.
  • Iran’s foreign ministry insisted repeatedly that it would not consider giving up its uranium enrichment as part of a deal – May 17 and 28.


The United States targeted Iran’s nuclear and missile programs with sanctions.

  • The Treasury Department sanctioned a network of entities involved in procuring missile propellant ingredients for Iran – April 29.
  • The State Department sanctioned three individuals and one company affiliated with SPND, an organization involved in nuclear weapons research – May 12.
  • The Treasury Department sanctioned a network of Iranian and Chinese entities for assisting Iran’s efforts to produce carbon fiber domestically – May 14.
  • The State Department determined that ten types of specialized metals are used in connection with Iran’s nuclear, missile, or military programs, mandating sanctions on any entity that knowingly supplies them to Iran – May 21.


The United States also continued its maximum pressure campaign targeting Iran’s revenue sources and support for proxies.

  • The Treasury Department sanctioned several vessels and ship management companies, many of which were linked to Iran, for delivering refined petroleum products to the Houthis – April 28.
  • The State Department designated companies in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey for trading Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum products – April 30.
  • The Treasury Department sanctioned a Chinese “teapot” refinery and three port terminal operators in China for importing Iranian oil – May 8.
  • A subsequent action targeted a network of front companies, trading firms, and vessels for their role in facilitating oil exports benefitting the Iranian defense ministry – May 13.
  • The Treasury Department disrupted a money laundering network transferring funds from Iran to Hezbollah – May 15

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 


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