[1]

April 24, 2025

This month’s newsletter features a case study of a U.S. export enforcement
action against a network that procured U.S.-origin electronics for drones
used to kill three U.S. service members in the 2024 “Tower-22” attack in
Jordan. The study illustrates how two men duped an American company into
exporting electronics and technical data through Switzerland to Iran, with
lethal consequences.

The newsletter also includes profiles of Chinese front companies that have
acquired dual-use goods for Iran’s drone program, as well as news about the
Trump administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, Saudi-Iranian
rapprochement, and the state of play of Chinese imports of Iranian oil on
the eve of the U.S.-Iran negotiations. Additions to the Iran Watch library
include the reactions of foreign governments to U.S.-Iran talks, U.S.
sanctions and prosecutions targeting Iran’s nuclear and drone programs, and
additional U.S. actions in support of its maximum pressure campaign.

Was this email forwarded to you? [2]Sign up to receive the newsletter in
your inbox, or [3]view the newsletter in your browser.

PUBLICATIONS

[4]

A network map illustrating the Iranian scheme to obtain U.S. electronics.
(Credit: Wisconsin Project)

Case Study | [5]U.S. Disrupts Iranian Procurement Scheme Tied to Drone
Attacks on U.S. Military Base

In December, a federal court charged two men with conspiring to export
U.S.-origin electronics to an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The case shows a direct link between
export control violations and battlefield use of a weapon: An Iranian-made
navigation system containing the same types of parts was recovered from the
wreckage of a drone used in a January 2024 attack in Jordan that killed
three U.S. service members and injured 40 others. How the Iranian scheme
unfolded highlights the importance of due diligence screening in
transactions related to sensitive technology, especially since
microelectronics and intangible technical data are easily transferred by a
dubious customer or a rogue employee.

[6]READ THE CASE STUDY

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

A recent [7]Iran Watch report describes Iran’s heavy reliance on networks
of Chinese companies to obtain dual-use items to build drones and missiles.
The United States continues to target these networks, including through
recent [8]sanctions against several China- and Hong Kong-based front
companies supplying Iran’s drone program.

[9]JP Oriental International Holdings Limited

A Hong Kong-based trading company; part of a network operated by
[10]Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) and its subsidiary, [11]Narin
Sepehr Mobin Isatis, involved in acquiring components for unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs); export markets have included Brazil and Sri Lanka.

[12]LEARN MORE

[13]Hong Kong Tianle International Co Limited

A Hong Kong-based front company; used by PKGB to facilitate the procurement
of U.S.-origin electronics for [14]Rastafann Ertebat Engineering Company,
which supports the IRGC and Iran’s [15]Naval Defense Missile Industry
Group.

[16]LEARN MORE

[17]Yonghongan Trade Limited

A Hong Kong-based front company; has been used by multiple PKGB front
companies, including [18]Advantage Trading Co., Limited and [19]Duling
Technology HK Limited, to procure Western-origin aircraft components.

[20]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[21]

The Omani Foreign Ministry in Muscat, Oman. (Photo Credit: Foreign Ministry
of Oman)

[22]US and Iran say talks over Tehran’s nuclear program make progress and
set plans for more | Associated Press

April 19, 2025: Iran and the United States said they made progress in
negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in Rome and that their senior
negotiators would meet again in Oman following technical-level discussions.
The talks in Rome were the second round of negotiations mediated by Oman
that began earlier in April. Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araqchi met
with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow before the Rome talks,
while U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Israeli officials and the
director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Two days prior
to the talks, two Airbus A330-200 aircraft sought by Iranian national
airline Iran Air arrived in Tehran. Delivery of the aircraft would have
required approval from the U.S. Treasury Department due to U.S. sanctions
on Iran.

[23]Saudi defense minister visits Iran in highest-level trip in decades as
nuclear talks proceed | CNN

April 17, 2025: Saudi Arabia's defense minister visited Tehran to discuss
defense relations and regional cooperation. Minister Prince Khalid bin
Salman Al Saud was the first member of the Saudi royal family to visit Iran
since 1997. He met with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, an Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer who is the chief of staff of
Iran's armed forces. Bagheri's Saudi Arabian military counterpart visited
Iran in November 2024, and Iran and Saudi Arabia held their first joint
naval exercise a month earlier. The two countries signed an agreement in
2023 normalizing their diplomatic relations, which they had cut off in 2016
following the execution of a Shi'ite cleric in Saudi Arabia.

[24]China's March Iranian oil imports surge on US sanctions fears | Reuters

April 11, 2025: China imported more than 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd)
of oil from Iran in March, according to the ship tracking firm Vortexa. The
quantity represents an all-time high. Other sources estimated volumes
between 1.67 million and 1.8 million bpd, which would reflect a peak for
the past several months. China purchases approximately 90% of Iran's oil
exports, much of which are falsely labeled as Malaysian after being
transferred at sea near Malaysia and Singapore. Iranian oil accounts for
16% of China's seaborne crude oil imports.

FROM THE LIBRARY

Foreign governments reacted guardedly to U.S. negotiations with Iran.
* The Chinese foreign ministry [25]placed the onus for progress on the
United States and noted its commitment to [26]ongoing trilateral
consultations with Iran and Russia – April 8.
* The Russian foreign ministry [27]rejected threats of force against Iran
and offered to facilitate negotiations – April 9.
* French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot [28]reminded the French
parliament that the window for a diplomatic breakthrough is narrow due to
the expiration of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism in October – April 16.
* Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov [29]met with his Iranian
counterpart in Moscow and discussed the two countries’ strategic
partnership [30]agreement – April 18.
* Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi [31]also met with Chinese Vice
Premier Ding Xuexiang in Beijing to discuss the negotiations and Iran-China
cooperation – April 23.

The United States targeted Iran’s nuclear and drone programs with sanctions
and a prosecution.
* The Treasury Department [32]sanctioned a network of entities in Iran,
China, and the United Arab Emirates that were supplying Iranian military
end users with drone components – April 1.
* In a coordinated move, the Justice Department [33]charged two Iranian
nationals and an Iranian company with conspiring to provide material
support to the IRGC – April 1.
* The Treasury Department then [34]targeted several Iranian companies
providing support to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its
subsidiaries – April 9.

The United States also pressed forward in other areas of its maximum
pressure campaign.
* Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent [35]addressed a Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) [36]conference convened to combat Iranian
sanctions evasion – April 2.
* The Departments of [37]State and [38]Treasury sanctioned a Chinese oil
terminal operator and several vessels and companies involved in
transporting Iranian oil – April 10.
* The Treasury Department [39]targeted additional “shadow fleet” entities
and a Chinese “teapot” refinery while issuing an updated [40]sanctions
advisory for the shipping industry on Iranian oil sanctions evasion – April
16.
* The Treasury Department then [41]sanctioned the business network of an
Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) trader – April 22.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

[42]HOME

[43]ABOUT

[44]CONTACT US

[45]Twitter [46]LinkedIn [47]Facebook

References

1. [link removed]
2. [link removed]
3. [link removed]
4. [link removed]
5. [link removed]
6. [link removed]
7. [link removed]
8. [link removed]
9. [link removed]
10. [link removed]
11. [link removed]
12. [link removed]
13. [link removed]
14. [link removed]
15. [link removed]
16. [link removed]
17. [link removed]
18. [link removed]
19. [link removed]
20. [link removed]
21. [link removed]
22. [link removed]
23. [link removed]
24. [link removed]
25. [link removed]
26. [link removed]
27. [link removed]
28. [link removed]
29. [link removed]
30. [link removed]
31. [link removed]
32. [link removed]
33. [link removed]
34. [link removed]
35. [link removed]
36. [link removed]
37. [link removed]
38. [link removed]
39. [link removed]
40. [link removed]
41. [link removed]
42. [link removed]
43. [link removed]
44. [link removed]
45. [link removed]
46. [link removed]
47. [link removed]
Manage Your Subscription:
[link removed]
This message was sent to [email protected] from [email protected]

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
Iran Watch
1701 K Street NW Suite 805
Washington, DC 20006
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

iContact - Engage, WOW, and grow your audience: [link removed]