 | April 24, 2025 This month’s newsletter features a case study of a U.S. export enforcement action against a network that procured U.S.-origin electronics for drones used to kill three U.S. service members in the 2024 “Tower-22” attack in Jordan. The study illustrates how two men duped an American company into exporting electronics and technical data through Switzerland to Iran, with lethal consequences. The newsletter also includes profiles of Chinese front companies that have acquired dual-use goods for Iran’s drone program, as well as news about the Trump administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and the state of play of Chinese imports of Iranian oil on the eve of the U.S.-Iran negotiations. Additions to the Iran Watch library include the reactions of foreign governments to U.S.-Iran talks, U.S. sanctions and prosecutions targeting Iran’s nuclear and drone programs, and additional U.S. actions in support of its maximum pressure campaign. Was this email forwarded to you? Sign up to receive the newsletter in your inbox, or view the newsletter in your browser. |
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| A network map illustrating the Iranian scheme to obtain U.S. electronics. (Credit: Wisconsin Project) |
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| In December, a federal court charged two men with conspiring to export U.S.-origin electronics to an Iran-based supplier of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The case shows a direct link between export control violations and battlefield use of a weapon: An Iranian-made navigation system containing the same types of parts was recovered from the wreckage of a drone used in a January 2024 attack in Jordan that killed three U.S. service members and injured 40 others. How the Iranian scheme unfolded highlights the importance of due diligence screening in transactions related to sensitive technology, especially since microelectronics and intangible technical data are easily transferred by a dubious customer or a rogue employee. |
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| A recent Iran Watch report describes Iran’s heavy reliance on networks of Chinese companies to obtain dual-use items to build drones and missiles. The United States continues to target these networks, including through recent sanctions against several China- and Hong Kong-based front companies supplying Iran’s drone program. |
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| The Omani Foreign Ministry in Muscat, Oman. (Photo Credit: Foreign Ministry of Oman) |
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| April 19, 2025: Iran and the United States said they made progress in negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in Rome and that their senior negotiators would meet again in Oman following technical-level discussions. The talks in Rome were the second round of negotiations mediated by Oman that began earlier in April. Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araqchi met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow before the Rome talks, while U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Israeli officials and the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Two days prior to the talks, two Airbus A330-200 aircraft sought by Iranian national airline Iran Air arrived in Tehran. Delivery of the aircraft would have required approval from the U.S. Treasury Department due to U.S. sanctions on Iran. |
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| April 17, 2025: Saudi Arabia's defense minister visited Tehran to discuss defense relations and regional cooperation. Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud was the first member of the Saudi royal family to visit Iran since 1997. He met with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer who is the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces. Bagheri's Saudi Arabian military counterpart visited Iran in November 2024, and Iran and Saudi Arabia held their first joint naval exercise a month earlier. The two countries signed an agreement in 2023 normalizing their diplomatic relations, which they had cut off in 2016 following the execution of a Shi'ite cleric in Saudi Arabia. |
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| April 11, 2025: China imported more than 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil from Iran in March, according to the ship tracking firm Vortexa. The quantity represents an all-time high. Other sources estimated volumes between 1.67 million and 1.8 million bpd, which would reflect a peak for the past several months. China purchases approximately 90% of Iran's oil exports, much of which are falsely labeled as Malaysian after being transferred at sea near Malaysia and Singapore. Iranian oil accounts for 16% of China's seaborne crude oil imports. |
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| Foreign governments reacted guardedly to U.S. negotiations with Iran. - The Chinese foreign ministry placed the onus for progress on the United States and noted its commitment to ongoing trilateral consultations with Iran and Russia – April 8.
- The Russian foreign ministry rejected threats of force against Iran and offered to facilitate negotiations – April 9.
- French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot reminded the French parliament that the window for a diplomatic breakthrough is narrow due to the expiration of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism in October – April 16.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his Iranian counterpart in Moscow and discussed the two countries’ strategic partnership agreement – April 18.
- Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi also met with Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang in Beijing to discuss the negotiations and Iran-China cooperation – April 23.
The United States targeted Iran’s nuclear and drone programs with sanctions and a prosecution. - The Treasury Department sanctioned a network of entities in Iran, China, and the United Arab Emirates that were supplying Iranian military end users with drone components – April 1.
- In a coordinated move, the Justice Department charged two Iranian nationals and an Iranian company with conspiring to provide material support to the IRGC – April 1.
- The Treasury Department then targeted several Iranian companies providing support to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its subsidiaries – April 9.
The United States also pressed forward in other areas of its maximum pressure campaign. - Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent addressed a Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) conference convened to combat Iranian sanctions evasion – April 2.
- The Departments of State and Treasury sanctioned a Chinese oil terminal operator and several vessels and companies involved in transporting Iranian oil – April 10.
- The Treasury Department targeted additional “shadow fleet” entities and a Chinese “teapot” refinery while issuing an updated sanctions advisory for the shipping industry on Iranian oil sanctions evasion – April 16.
- The Treasury Department then sanctioned the business network of an Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) trader – April 22.
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| Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control |
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