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February 28, 2025

This month’s newsletter features a report with recommendations for how an
aggressively-implemented export control policy can support the new
administration’s objectives on Iran. Tehran and its proxies were weakened
in 2024, and there is now an opportunity to hinder their rearmament by
targeting Iran’s production of drones and missiles. Doing so would
strengthen the United States’ hand in possible diplomacy aimed at denying
Iran a nuclear weapon.

The newsletter also includes profiles of an individual and a company
involved in the transfer of Iranian drones to Sudan, as well as news about
Iran’s increased production of highly enriched uranium, possible Iranian
exploration of simpler nuclear weapon designs, and a new medium-range
ballistic missile. Additions to the Iran Watch library include new U.S.
sanctions and policy documents related to the resumed “maximum pressure”
campaign, statements about Iran at the G7 and FATF meetings, and a speech
by Iran’s Supreme Leader denouncing the prospect of negotiations with the
United States.

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PUBLICATIONS

[4]

A parade by Basij paramilitary forces featuring drones and missiles in
Tehran in January. (Photo credit: Tasnim News Agency; graphic by the
Wisconsin Project)

Report | [5]Maximum Pressure on Iranian Arms Production

Two weeks after assuming office, President Donald Trump announced the
resumption of the maximum pressure policy against Iran that his first
administration pursued from 2018 to 2021. In 2025, Iran is much closer to
producing a nuclear weapon. Yet in the crucial areas of missile and
conventional weapon proliferation, as well as support to regional proxies,
Iran is now vulnerable to renewed pressure. There is an opportunity to
defang Tehran, if Mr. Trump chooses to effectively use the export control
instruments available to him.

[6]READ THE REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

In January, the U.S. Treasury Department [7]sanctioned suppliers of the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), a combatant in the Sudanese civil war that has
received arms from Iran.

[8]Ahmed Abdalla

An official of Defense Industries System (DIS), the primary procurement arm
of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); has coordinated the acquisition of
Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from an Azerbaijani defense
company for shipment to Sudan.

[9]LEARN MORE

[10]Portex Trade Limited

A Hong Kong-based company operated by Ahmed Abdalla; has facilitated
weapons procurement on behalf of the SAF; associated with an address
identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce as posing a high risk of
diversion.

[11]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[12]

Iran’s representative at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in November.
(Photo Credit: Dean Calma / IAEA)

[13]Iran's near-bomb-grade uranium stock jumps, IAEA reports say | Reuters

February 26, 2025: The IAEA's latest reports found that Iran increased
production of highly enriched uranium since December. In the past quarter,
Iran's stock of uranium enriched to 60% purity grew by 92.5 kg to reach a
total of 274.8 kg, which if enriched further is enough for six nuclear
weapons, according to IAEA measures. Iran is now producing between 35 and
40 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% per month, up from between 6 to 9 kg a
month prior to December.

[14]Iran Is Developing Plans for Faster, Cruder Weapon, U.S. Concludes |
New York Times

February 3, 2025: Iran is directing a team of scientists and weapons
engineers to explore a faster way to convert the country's stockpile of
highly enriched uranium into a workable nuclear weapon, according to U.S.
intelligence. This approach would rely on an older-style nuclear weapon
design that could not be miniaturized to fit on a ballistic missile, rather
than the more sophisticated design Iran received from Pakistani nuclear
scientist A.Q. Khan. This shortcut approach might cut the development
timeline for a weapon down to a few months from the current U.S. and
Israeli estimates of between one to two years.

[15]Iran unveils new ballistic missile called Etemad | IRNA

February 2, 2025: Iran unveiled a new ballistic missile called the Etemad
during a ceremony in Tehran attended by President Masoud Pezeshkian. The
missile is 16 meters in length, 1.25 meters in diameter, and has a range of
1,700 km. It was developed by Iran's Defense Ministry.

FROM THE LIBRARY

The United States announced the resumption of its maximum pressure policy
with a slew of new sanctions designations.
* The White House [16]released a national security memorandum outlining
its policy goals with regard to Iran – February 4.
* The Treasury Department [17]sanctioned ship management companies and
vessels associated with multiple countries as well as several Iranian
energy companies for exporting oil on behalf of Iran’s military – February
6.
* The Departments of [18]State and [19]Treasury sanctioned several ship
management companies, vessels, brokers, and Iranian officials overseeing
oil export terminals for facilitating the shipment and sale of Iranian
crude oil and other energy products – February 24.
* [20]Additional U.S. sanctions targeted Hong Kong-based front companies
involved in procuring drone components for Iran – February 26.

The G7 and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) both met and discussed
Iran.
* G7 foreign ministers [21]issued a statement at the Munich Security
Conference that condemned Iran for its military assistance to Russia –
February 15.
* FATF kept Iran on its “blacklist” of countries warranting
countermeasures for terrorist financing, a decision that was [22]welcomed
by the United States – February 21.

Iran’s Supreme Leader [23]rejected negotiations with the United States,
seemingly countermanding other Iranian officials who had expressed openness
to talks – February 7.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2025 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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