CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

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CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation, and at times contention, among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRANKs ([link removed]) ).


** November Highlights
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** North Korea and Russia finalize defense pact as offensive against Kursk looms
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North Korea and Russia completed the ratification ([link removed]) of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in early November. Alongside outlining a broad spectrum of defense cooperation, the treaty includes a commitment to mutual defense if attacked. Some South Korean analysts see the Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory in Kursk Oblast as having prompted North Korea to act, as it could be argued to trigger ([link removed]) the mutual defense provision to which they were acceding. However, the Ukrainian move could also merely have provided a pretext for Pyongyang’s aid to Moscow.

Despite speculation about an eventual major increase ([link removed]) in North Korean troop levels, perhaps to as many as 100,000 North Korean personnel, the number committed seems to have plateaued for now. Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh stated on November 18 that the U.S. believes that there are around 11,000 North Korean troops ([link removed]) in the Kursk region. Some reports have indicated that North Korean soldiers are being integrated to support Russian units but may be of limited utility ([link removed]) due to their lack of Russian language training.

The exchange is significantly increasing North Korea’s access to advanced technologies from Russia. South Korean officials have said that North Korea recently received ([link removed]) new Russian anti-aircraft systems to which it had not previously had access.

South Korean observers have also expressed concern that the new alliance could embolden ([link removed]) Kim Jong-Un over time. This view suggests that as the DPRK amasses additional arms, technology, and money from Russia, Kim is likely to engage in increasingly provocative behavior. Growing support from Moscow could also reduce Pyongyang’s relative dependence on China and weaken Beijing’s ability to discourage provocative behavior.


** Nuclear-capable bombers from Russia and China prompt South Korean and Japanese intercepts
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Russian and Chinese heavy nuclear-capable bombers conducted ([link removed]) two days of joint long-range air patrols on November 29-30, this time over the Sea of Japan/East Sea, prompting both Japan and South Korea to send fighter aircraft to make intercepts ([link removed]) . In July, a joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol flew over waters adjacent to Alaska in the North Pacific and the Arctic, prompting U.S. and Canadian fighter intercepts. Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft and a Chinese electronic intelligence aircraft were involved in some parts of the exercise as well. While the Russian and Chinese aircraft did not violate either South Korea’s or Japan’s airspace, South Korea lodged a diplomatic protest with Moscow about their failure to provide notice ([link removed]) of the exercise.


** Continuing Russian payment troubles?
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Some Chinese companies appear to be facing trade and investment challenges in Russia due to U.S. and EU sanctions that limit their ability to clear transactions. For example, a Chinese television manufacturer has had to close ([link removed]) a factory it owns near St. Petersburg due to problems with payments for components. Deprived of access to many of its usual suppliers in Europe, Russian firms have been forced to look to China for alternatives, while Chinese companies face no such pressure to seek Russian sourcing amid the payment difficulties. This is clearly giving China the upper hand in the economic relationship.


** Trump advisor says U.S. to open dialogue with China about Iranian oil
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Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL), who has been tapped by president-elect Trump as his new National Security Advisor, used surprisingly conciliatory language ([link removed]) toward China when he was asked during a CNBC interview on November 27 about how the U.S. would tighten sanctions on Iran. None of this walked back what incoming administration figures have said about a return to “maximum pressure” on Iran. That said, acknowledging the need to open a dialogue with China beforehand could blunt some of the impact on Chinese oil majors and banks if China is willing to compromise. Most oil analysts expect Iranian exports to fall significantly, but not to anywhere near zero, as the U.S. tightens sanctions enforcement. China may aim to use Iranian crude only in independent “teapot” refineries again, with minor banks handling the transactions in yuan, where the trade has expanded a bit beyond that
during the recent period, when the Biden administration has soft-pedaled enforcement.


** Links
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President Joe Biden met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 16 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru, where Biden publicly urged Xi to dissuade North Korea from further assisting Russia in its war in Ukraine. (Associated Press ([link removed]) )

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual Valdai Discussion Club meeting in Sochi on November 7 that he considers China an “ally” of Russia and offered strong support for Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. (Reuters ([link removed]) )

U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs Michael Sfraga said the growing cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic region sends “concerning signals,” specifically citing the “frequency and complexity” of their recent joint military activities. (Reuters ([link removed]) )

The Bank of China is reportedly blocking some yuan transactions from third countries that are suspected of being payments for Russian transshipments. (Newsweek ([link removed]) )

North Korea is estimated to have received one million barrels of Russian oil since March, double the volume it is allowed to receive under United Nations sanctions. (BBC ([link removed]) )

Iranian media commentary on the Chinese and Russian reactions to Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iranian military assets on October 25 was harshly critical of what was seen as inadequate support for Iran. (Middle East Eye ([link removed]) )

North Korea’s trade with China hit a yearly high in the October data, with the DPRK possibly spending some of the windfall from arms sales to Russia. (NK News ([link removed]) )

Chinese customs officials at the main border crossing in Dandong have stopped issuing permits for “personal items,” a classification that has allowed a substantial informal flow of goods into North Korea. The Chinese move may reflect a cooling of relations. (Daily NK ([link removed]) )


** Recent Analysis
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Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or Deconflict? ([link removed]) (Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet, Center for a New American Security)

The United States and the ‘Axis’ of its Enemies: Myths vs. Reality ([link removed]) (Eugene Rumer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Russia’s Fiscal Dependence on China Grows ([link removed]) (John C.K. Daly, Jamestown Foundation)

China’s Dilemma Deepen as North Korea Enters Ukraine War ([link removed]) (Dr. Carla Freeman, Naiyu Kuo, United States Institute of Peace)


** CRANK Perspectives
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BRICS and the Beginning of the End of Western Hegemony ([link removed]----) (PressTV editorial segment)


** CRANK Call
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Editor-in-Chief, Paul Saunders
Editor, Greg Priddy ([email protected])

Image credit: Press Secretary for the President of the Russian Federation (via Wikimedia Commons)

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