[/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=]

DATA SHOW ANTI-UNION ‘RIGHT-TO-WORK’ LAWS DAMAGE STATE ECONOMIES
 
[[link removed]]


 

Jennifer Sherer and Elise Gould
February 13, 2024
Economic Policy Institute
[[link removed]]


*
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*
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*
*
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_ As Michigan’s repeal takes effect, New Hampshire should continue
to reject ‘right-to-work’ legislation _

Protesters sit in the rotunda of the state Capitol in Lansing,
Michigan, protesting right to work legislation which was passed in
2012., (Paul Sancya / Associated Press)

 

KEY FINDINGS:

* Data show that states with so-called “right-to-work” (RTW)
laws have lower unionization rates, wages, and benefits compared with
non-RTW states.
* On average, workers in RTW states are paid 3.2% less than workers
with similar characteristics in non-RTW states, which translates to
$1,670 less per year for a full-time worker.
* Claims that weakening unions will lead to state job growth have
proven inaccurate. There are no measurable employment advantages
between RTW and non-RTW states.

This week, Michigan’s 2023 repeal
[[link removed]] of
a so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) law takes effect
[[link removed]].
Meanwhile, New Hampshire’s state legislature is once again debating
a RTW bill
[[link removed]] at a
moment when it could not be clearer that RTW laws damage states’
economies by accelerating income inequality and reducing job quality,
without delivering any job growth.  

RTW laws—and the phrase “right to work” itself—are intended to
deceive and confuse. The misleadingly named policy is designed to make
it more difficult for workers to form and sustain unions and negotiate
collectively for better wages, benefits, and working conditions.

As Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed out in 1961
[[link removed]],
“right to work” is a “false slogan” since RTW laws provide
neither rights nor work and are in fact designed “to rob us of our
civil rights and job rights [and] to destroy labor unions and the
freedom of collective bargaining by which unions have improved wages
and working conditions of everyone.” Decades later, research bears
out
[[link removed]] King’s
contention that “wherever these laws have been passed, wages are
lower.”

RTW laws are historically rooted in racism and designed to maintain
unequal power. When private-sector workers first gained legal
protection to unionize following passage of the federal National Labor
Relations Act in 1935, unionization rates grew quickly. In response,
opponents waged anti-union, explicitly white supremacist campaigns to
limit worker power
[[link removed]] and
maintain Jim Crow labor relations. These campaigns pursued state
legislation as a means to constrain workers’ newly won federal union
rights via RTW policies, and especially to block multiracial union
organizing. RTW laws have since spread to 27 states
[[link removed]] and
continue to generate economic outcomes that disadvantage all workers.

CHART A shows that Southern and Western states adopted the majority
of RTW laws in the mid-twentieth century. But since 2010, five
additional states with historically above average unionization
rates—Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin—adopted RTW laws, newly limiting workers’ collective
bargaining rights in those states. Michigan became the first of these
states to repeal its RTW law
[[link removed]].

CHART A

States with RTW laws limiting worker powerStates with statutory
restrictions on all workers' collective bargaining rights due to
so-called "right-to-work" laws

State
“Right to work”

Alaska
Non-RTW

California
Non-RTW

Colorado
Non-RTW

Connecticut
Non-RTW

Delaware
Non-RTW

District of Columbia
Non-RTW

Hawaii
Non-RTW

Illinois
Non-RTW

Kansas
Pre-2010 RTW

Maine
Non-RTW

Maryland
Non-RTW

Massachusetts
Non-RTW

Minnesota
Non-RTW

Missouri
Non-RTW

Montana
Non-RTW

New Hampshire
Non-RTW

New Jersey
Non-RTW

New Mexico
Non-RTW

New York
Non-RTW

Ohio
Non-RTW

Oregon
Non-RTW

Pennsylvania
Non-RTW

Rhode Island
Non-RTW

Vermont
Non-RTW

Washington
Non-RTW

Alabama
Pre-2010 RTW

Arizona
Pre-2010 RTW

Arkansas
Pre-2010 RTW

Florida
Pre-2010 RTW

Georgia
Pre-2010 RTW

Idaho
Pre-2010 RTW

Iowa
Pre-2010 RTW

Louisiana
Pre-2010 RTW

Mississippi
Pre-2010 RTW

Nebraska
Pre-2010 RTW

Nevada
Pre-2010 RTW

North Carolina
Pre-2010 RTW

North Dakota
Pre-2010 RTW

Oklahoma
Pre-2010 RTW

South Carolina
Pre-2010 RTW

South Dakota
Pre-2010 RTW

Tennessee
Pre-2010 RTW

Texas
Pre-2010 RTW

Utah
Pre-2010 RTW

Virginia
Pre-2010 RTW

Wyoming
Pre-2010 RTW

Indiana
Post-2010 RTW

Kentucky
Post-2010 RTW

Michigan
Post-2010 RTW

West Virginia
Post-2010 RTW

Wisconsin
Post-2010 RTW

NOTES: † Michigan enacted RTW in 2013, then in 2023 became the
first state in nearly 60 years to repeal a RTW law. This change took
effect February 13, 2024.

SOURCE: Author's analysis of "Right-to-Work States
[[link removed]],"
National Conference of State Legislatures.

Right-wing groups similarly targeted New Hampshire for passage of RTW
in 2011, when then-Governor John Lynch vetoed a RTW bill
[[link removed]] passed
by the legislature. New Hampshire has since remained a perennial
target for anti-union proposals, with RTW bills rejected at least
seven times
[[link removed]] since 2010.
Most recently, the New Hampshire House voted down
[[link removed]] a
2021 RTW proposal.

No New England state has a RTW law, and repeated defeats of RTW have
demonstrated its persistent unpopularity among New Hampshire voters
and legislators across party lines. Moreover, RTW has faced three
consecutive rejections in other states: Michigan
[[link removed]] repealing
RTW in 2023, Illinois voters
[[link removed]] approving
a constitutional Workers’ Rights Amendment (which bans future RTW
laws) in 2022, and Missouri voters
[[link removed]] overwhelmingly
rejecting their legislature’s attempt to impose RTW restrictions in
2018.  

Nonetheless, in 2024, some well-funded, out-of-state anti-union groups
continue to demonstrate relentless interest in using state
legislatures as vehicles to attack workers’ rights, and RTW was one
of the first bills introduced by House Republicans in New
Hampshire’s legislative session.

Below, we share the latest data assessing the economic impacts of RTW
laws, including in the five states where the law was most recently
adopted, illustrating why New Hampshire has been right to repeatedly
reject RTW and why lawmakers should do so again in 2024.

SO-CALLED “RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS CONSTRAIN WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RIGHTS, RESULTING IN LOWER WAGES AND BENEFITS FOR ALL
WORKERS 

RTW laws are designed to diminish workers’ collective power by
prohibiting unions and employers from negotiating union security
agreements
[[link removed]] into
collective bargaining agreements, making it harder for workers to
form, join, and sustain unions. As a result, states with RTW laws
generally have lower unionization rates
[[link removed]] than
non-RTW states. Private-sector workers in RTW states are less likely
to be covered by a union contract
[[link removed]] than
peers in non-RTW states, even after controlling for other factors that
can be related to unionization (such as industry, occupation,
education, age, gender, race, ethnicity, and foreign-born status). 

Consequently, workers in states with RTW laws have lower wages
[[link removed]],
reduced access to health and retirement benefits, and higher
workplace fatality rates
[[link removed]].
On average, workers in RTW states are paid 3.2% less
[[link removed]] than
workers with similar characteristics in non-RTW states, which
translates to $1,670 less per year for a full-time worker.1
[[link removed]]

CHART B illustrates that unionized workers are 64% more likely to
have employment-provided health insurance and 63% more likely to have
employment-provided retirement benefits than their non-union
counterparts. About 80% of union workers have employer-provided health
and retirement benefits compared with only about half of non-union
workers.  

CHART B

Union workers are far more likely to have employer-provided health and
retirement benefitsShare of workers with health insurance and
retirement benefits, by union status, 2023

Benefit
Share of workers participating in benefit

Health insurance, union
74%

Health insurance, non-union
45%

 
 

Retirement, union
85%

Retirement, non-union
52%

ChartData
[[link removed]]

SOURCE: EPI analysis of 2023 National Compensation Survey
[[link removed]] (NCS) data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

By weakening unions, “right-to-work” laws fuel economic inequality

State policies like RTW that constrain workers’ rights to unionize
and collectively bargain are fundamentally linked to key economic and
labor market outcomes—including measures of inequality. Data show
that unions reduce income inequality
[[link removed]] across the
economy, counteract racial and gender labor market inequities
[[link removed]],
and reduce public-sector pay gaps
[[link removed]]. 

Through bringing workers’ collective power to the bargaining table,
unions are able to win better wages and benefits for working
people—reducing income inequality as a result. As shown in CHART C,
there was less income inequality in decades when union density was
higher. But as unionization rates declined—particularly after
1979—income inequality grew.

The erosion of collective bargaining over the last five decades has
suppressed workers’ wages. Median wages would be 7.9% higher
[[link removed]] if
unionization hadn’t declined between 1979 and 2017. This translates
into over $3,900 annually in lost wages for a full-time worker.2
[[link removed]]

CHART C

Attacks on workers’ right to unionize benefit the richUnion
membership and share of income going to the top 10%, 1917–2023

 
Union membership rate
Share of income going to the top 10%

1917
11.00% 
45.0%

1918
12.10%
44.0%

1919
14.30%
45.9%

1920
17.50%
44.1%

1921
17.60%
47.4%

1922
14.00%
46.1%

1923
11.70%
43.7%

1924
11.30%
45.7%

1925
11.00%
47.2%

1926
10.70%
47.6%

1927
10.60%
47.1%

1928
10.40%
48.2%

1929
10.10%
47.0%

1930
10.70%
46.3%

1931
11.20%
46.3%

1932
11.30%
48.3%

1933
9.50%
48.0%

1934
9.80%
49.1%

1935
10.80%
48.1%

1936
11.10%
48.4%

1937
18.60%
47.5%

1938
23.90%
47.1%

1939
24.80%
48.6%

1940
23.50%
48.9%

1941
25.40%
47.0%

1942
24.20%
42.3%

1943
30.10%
38.9%

1944
32.50%
36.1%

1945
33.40%
35.3%

1946
31.90%
37.0%

1947
31.10%
36.9%

1948
30.50%
38.9%

1949
29.60%
38.3%

1950
30.00%
39.1%

1951
32.40%
37.9%

1952
31.50%
36.6%

1953
33.20%
35.7%

1954
32.70%
36.0%

1955
32.90%
36.7%

1956
33.20%
35.7%

1957
32.00%
35.7%

1958
31.10%
35.5%

1959
31.60%
36.0%

1960
30.70%
35.5%

1961
28.70%
35.6%

1962
29.10%
36.2%

1963
28.50%
36.6%

1964
28.50%
37.0%

1965
28.60%
36.7%

1966
28.70%
36.3%

1967
28.60%
35.3%

1968
28.70%
35.5%

1969
28.30%
34.1%

1970
27.90%
33.5%

1971
27.40%
34.1%

1972
27.50%
34.4%

1973
27.10%
34.6%

1974
26.50%
33.6%

1975
25.70%
34.0%

1976
25.70%
33.9%

1977
25.20%
34.3%

1978
24.70%
34.0%

1979
25.40%
34.3%

1980
23.60%
33.9%

1981
22.30%
34.3%

1982
21.60%
34.6%

1983
20.1%
35.3%

1984
18.8%
36.5%

1985
18.0%
36.6%

1986
17.5%
36.3%

1987
17.0%
37.5%

1988
16.8%
39.3%

1989
16.4%
38.8%

1990
16.0%
38.8%

1991
16.0%
38.3%

1992
15.7%
39.4%

1993
15.7%
39.1%

1994
15.5%
39.2%

1995
14.9%
39.9%

1996
14.5%
40.8%

1997
14.1%
41.5%

1998
13.9%
41.9%

1999
13.9%
42.3%

2000
13.4%
42.8%

2001
13.3%
42.0%

2002
13.3%
41.5%

2003
12.9%
41.6%

2004
12.5%
42.4%

2005
12.5%
43.6%

2006
12.0%
44.3%

2007
12.1%
44.0%

2008
12.4%
43.6%

2009
12.3%
42.5%

2010
11.9%
43.9%

2011
11.8%
44.3%

2012
11.3%
45.6%

2013
11.3%
44.9%

2014
11.1%
45.6%

2015
11.1%
45.5%

2016
10.7%
45.3%

2017
10.7%
45.5%

2018
10.5%
45.8%

2019
10.3%
45.7%

2020
10.8%
46.5%

2021
10.3%
47.9%

2022
10.1%
48.3%

2023
10.0%
 

SOURCE: Data on union membership follow the composite series found in
Historical Statistics of the United States through 1982, updated
through 2023 using Bureau of Labor Statistics
[[link removed]],
series ID: LUU0204899600. Income inequality (share of income to top
10%) data are from the World Inequality Database
[[link removed]].

CHART D shows changes in unionization rates broken down by RTW
status, differentiating between states that adopted RTW either before
or after 2010. Unionization has declined far more sharply in the
states that adopted RTW most recently, falling 3.8 percentage points
between 2010 and 2023. But unionization rates remain lowest in states
that have long had RTW laws in place. Overall, unionization rates were
5.0% in states that had adopted RTW prior to 2010, 9.7% in states that
adopted RTW after 2010, and 14.3% in non-RTW states.

In New Hampshire, union membership held fairly steady during this
period, dropping only 0.9 percentage points between 2010 and 2023.
The New Hampshire unionization rate
[[link removed]] was
9.3% in 2023, just below the national average of 10.0%. If New
Hampshire adopted RTW, they could expect to risk similarly
accelerating declines in union membership and increasing income
inequality.

CHART D

Recent RTW-adopting states have seen large decline in union
membershipPercentage point change in share of workers who are members
of a union between 2010 and 2023

 
Change in membership, 2010–2023

Pre-2010 RTW
-0.8

Post-2010 RTW
-3.8

Non-RTW
-2.0

New Hampshire
-0.9

SOURCE: EPI analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2023. Current
Population Survey Extracts, Version 1.0.38, [link removed]
[[link removed]].

“RIGHT-TO-WORK” LAWS ERODE JOB QUALITY WITHOUT CREATING JOB GROWTH

Despite persistent claims from RTW proponents that weakening unions
will lead to state job growth, comparisons of RTW and non-RTW states
over decades show no relationship between employment levels and RTW
laws. CHART E illustrates the prime-age employment-to-population
ratio—the share of the population ages 25–54 with a job—has no
clear differences among three sets of states: those that have remained
non-RTW, those that adopted RTW before 2010, and those that adopted
RTW after 2010. Employment trends across all sets of states reflect
fluctuations within business cycles; recessions are shaded in grey.
There are no measurable employment advantages between RTW and non-RTW
states.

CHART E

Right-to-work does not buy any advantage in creating jobs for state
residentsPrime-age (25–54) employment as a share of population, by
pre-2010 RTW, post-2010 RTW, and non-RTW states

Year
Pre-2010 RTW
Post-2010 RTW
Non-RTW

1989
80.0%
78.7%
80.1%

1990
80.1%
78.6%
79.6%

1991
79.4%
77.3%
78.3%

1992
79.2%
78.0%
77.8%

1993
79.4%
79.3%
77.9%

1994
80.1%
79.8%
78.6%

1995
80.5%
80.5%
79.1%

1996
80.7%
81.1%
79.7%

1997
81.1%
81.8%
80.6%

1998
81.3%
81.6%
80.9%

1999
81.6%
82.1%
81.2%

2000
81.5%
82.1%
81.3%

2001
80.4%
81.0%
80.6%

2002
79.1%
79.5%
79.5%

2003
78.8%
78.9%
78.8%

2004
78.9%
78.7%
79.1%

2005
79.5%
79.1%
79.3%

2006
79.7%
78.8%
80.1%

2007
79.9%
78.5%
80.2%

2008
78.9%
77.8%
79.4%

2009
75.5%
73.8%
76.3%

2010
74.8%
73.6%
75.6%

2011
74.9%
74.4%
75.4%

2012
75.7%
75.3%
75.8%

2013
75.6%
75.6%
76.2%

2014
76.4%
76.4%
77.0%

2015
76.6%
77.1%
77.8%

2016
77.3%
78.5%
78.3%

2017
78.0%
79.1%
79.0%

2018
78.7%
80.2%
79.8%

2019
79.4%
80.1%
80.4%

2020
75.7%
76.1%
75.5%

2021
77.5%
77.8%
77.6%

2022
79.4%
79.1%
80.4%

2023
80.4%
80.4%
81.0%

NOTE: Lines are weighted averages of three sets of states: those
without RTW laws, those who have passed RTW laws since 2010, and all
other RTW states. Shaded areas represent recessions.

SOURCE: EPI analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2023. Current
Population Survey Extracts, Version 1.0.38, [link removed]
[[link removed]].

Prior studies have likewise shown no causal link between a state’s
RTW status and its job growth. For example, studies of Oklahoma after
the state enacted RTW in 2001 found a significant reduction in
private-sector unionization, but no measurable effect
[[link removed]] on
employment growth. Similarly, researchers at the University of
Kentucky examined state economic performance across Southern U.S.
states from 1964 to 2004 and found that RTW status had no
relationship [[link removed]] to
state economic outcomes. When studies have claimed to find such
effects, it is often due to failure to control for other critical
factors
[[link removed]],
such as education levels of the workforce, proximity to transportation
hubs, technological advances, or natural resources.

NEW HAMPSHIRE SHOULD CONTINUE TO REJECT RTW AND THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE IT
INFLICTS ON STATES

At a moment of historic inequality and record corporate profits
[[link removed]],
it is no surprise we are also seeing historically high levels of
approval for unions
[[link removed]].
Workers are looking to unions as critical vehicles for fixing what’s
broken at work and in our wildly unequal economy. The large gap
between the share of workers who _want_ a union
[[link removed]] and the
share of workers who are _in_ a union underscores that our weak
federal labor laws, which are further undermined by RTW measures in
over half of U.S. states, are not working. Because state RTW laws
diminish workers’ rights, weaken unions, and further concentrate
corporate power, they are the opposite of what states need to address
chronic economic problems of widening inequality and eroding job
quality.

Fundamental reform of our labor laws is required to rebuild an economy
that guarantees all workers the freedom to unionize and collectively
bargain, and no longer leaves most workers behind. At the state
level, this reform must include repeal of existing RTW laws across the
country, and continued rejection of new RTW proposals in states like
New Hampshire.

NOTES

1. 
[[link removed]]This
difference is based on a regression model which accounts for
demographic differences (e.g. gender, age, marital status,
race/ethnicity, and education), individual labor market controls (e.g.
full-time status, hourly status, union status, occupation, and
industry), state-level labor market controls (e.g. unemployment rate),
and three measures that account for differences in the cost of living
between RTW and non-RTW states. The 3.2% difference in average wages
is applied to an average wage of $23.98.

2. 
[[link removed]]Here,
we are extrapolating from 2017 applying the 7.9% difference to the
median hourly wage of $23.98 in 2023. For a full-time worker, this
yields a difference of $3,940 per year. Further, this is likely a
lower bound given the continued decline in unionization of 0.8
percentage points since 2017.

_Jennifer Sherer is director of the Economic Analysis and Research
Network (EARN) State Worker Power Initiative. Her work focuses on
expanding the ability of working people to achieve racial, gender, and
economic justice through organizing, collective bargaining, and public
policies that promote worker voice._

_Elise Gould joined EPI in 2003. Her research areas include wages,
poverty, inequality, economic mobility and health care. She is a
co-author of The State of Working America, 12th Edition. _

* Right-to-Work
[[link removed]]
* Michigan
[[link removed]]
* economics
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

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