Key findings:
- Data show that states with so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) laws have lower unionization rates, wages, and benefits compared with non-RTW states.
- On average, workers in RTW states are paid 3.2% less than workers with similar characteristics in non-RTW states, which translates to $1,670 less per year for a full-time worker.
- Claims that weakening unions will lead to state job growth have proven inaccurate. There are no measurable employment advantages between RTW and non-RTW states.
This week, Michigan’s 2023 repeal of a so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) law takes effect. Meanwhile, New Hampshire’s state legislature is once again debating a RTW bill at a moment when it could not be clearer that RTW laws damage states’ economies by accelerating income inequality and reducing job quality, without delivering any job growth.
RTW laws—and the phrase “right to work” itself—are intended to deceive and confuse. The misleadingly named policy is designed to make it more difficult for workers to form and sustain unions and negotiate collectively for better wages, benefits, and working conditions.
As Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed out in 1961, “right to work” is a “false slogan” since RTW laws provide neither rights nor work and are in fact designed “to rob us of our civil rights and job rights [and] to destroy labor unions and the freedom of collective bargaining by which unions have improved wages and working conditions of everyone.” Decades later, research bears out King’s contention that “wherever these laws have been passed, wages are lower.”
RTW laws are historically rooted in racism and designed to maintain unequal power. When private-sector workers first gained legal protection to unionize following passage of the federal National Labor Relations Act in 1935, unionization rates grew quickly. In response, opponents waged anti-union, explicitly white supremacist campaigns to limit worker power and maintain Jim Crow labor relations. These campaigns pursued state legislation as a means to constrain workers’ newly won federal union rights via RTW policies, and especially to block multiracial union organizing. RTW laws have since spread to 27 states and continue to generate economic outcomes that disadvantage all workers.
CHART A shows that Southern and Western states adopted the majority of RTW laws in the mid-twentieth century. But since 2010, five additional states with historically above average unionization rates—Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—adopted RTW laws, newly limiting workers’ collective bargaining rights in those states. Michigan became the first of these states to repeal its RTW law.
CHART A
States with RTW laws limiting worker powerStates with statutory restrictions on all workers' collective bargaining rights due to so-called "right-to-work" laws
State
“Right to work”
Alaska
Non-RTW
California
Non-RTW
Colorado
Non-RTW
Connecticut
Non-RTW
Delaware
Non-RTW
District of Columbia
Non-RTW
Hawaii
Non-RTW
Illinois
Non-RTW
Kansas
Pre-2010 RTW
Maine
Non-RTW
Maryland
Non-RTW
Massachusetts
Non-RTW
Minnesota
Non-RTW
Missouri
Non-RTW
Montana
Non-RTW
New Hampshire
Non-RTW
New Jersey
Non-RTW
New Mexico
Non-RTW
New York
Non-RTW
Ohio
Non-RTW
Oregon
Non-RTW
Pennsylvania
Non-RTW
Rhode Island
Non-RTW
Vermont
Non-RTW
Washington
Non-RTW
Alabama
Pre-2010 RTW
Arizona
Pre-2010 RTW
Arkansas
Pre-2010 RTW
Florida
Pre-2010 RTW
Georgia
Pre-2010 RTW
Idaho
Pre-2010 RTW
Iowa
Pre-2010 RTW
Louisiana
Pre-2010 RTW
Mississippi
Pre-2010 RTW
Nebraska
Pre-2010 RTW
Nevada
Pre-2010 RTW
North Carolina
Pre-2010 RTW
North Dakota
Pre-2010 RTW
Oklahoma
Pre-2010 RTW
South Carolina
Pre-2010 RTW
South Dakota
Pre-2010 RTW
Tennessee
Pre-2010 RTW
Texas
Pre-2010 RTW
Utah
Pre-2010 RTW
Virginia
Pre-2010 RTW
Wyoming
Pre-2010 RTW
Indiana
Post-2010 RTW
Kentucky
Post-2010 RTW
Michigan
Post-2010 RTW
West Virginia
Post-2010 RTW
Wisconsin
Post-2010 RTW
Notes: † Michigan enacted RTW in 2013, then in 2023 became the first state in nearly 60 years to repeal a RTW law. This change took effect February 13, 2024.
Source: Author's analysis of "Right-to-Work States," National Conference of State Legislatures.
Right-wing groups similarly targeted New Hampshire for passage of RTW in 2011, when then-Governor John Lynch vetoed a RTW bill passed by the legislature. New Hampshire has since remained a perennial target for anti-union proposals, with RTW bills rejected at least seven times since 2010. Most recently, the New Hampshire House voted down a 2021 RTW proposal.
No New England state has a RTW law, and repeated defeats of RTW have demonstrated its persistent unpopularity among New Hampshire voters and legislators across party lines. Moreover, RTW has faced three consecutive rejections in other states: Michigan repealing RTW in 2023, Illinois voters approving a constitutional Workers’ Rights Amendment (which bans future RTW laws) in 2022, and Missouri voters overwhelmingly rejecting their legislature’s attempt to impose RTW restrictions in 2018.
Nonetheless, in 2024, some well-funded, out-of-state anti-union groups continue to demonstrate relentless interest in using state legislatures as vehicles to attack workers’ rights, and RTW was one of the first bills introduced by House Republicans in New Hampshire’s legislative session.
Below, we share the latest data assessing the economic impacts of RTW laws, including in the five states where the law was most recently adopted, illustrating why New Hampshire has been right to repeatedly reject RTW and why lawmakers should do so again in 2024.
So-called “right-to-work” laws constrain workers’ collective bargaining rights, resulting in lower wages and benefits for all workers
RTW laws are designed to diminish workers’ collective power by prohibiting unions and employers from negotiating union security agreements into collective bargaining agreements, making it harder for workers to form, join, and sustain unions. As a result, states with RTW laws generally have lower unionization rates than non-RTW states. Private-sector workers in RTW states are less likely to be covered by a union contract than peers in non-RTW states, even after controlling for other factors that can be related to unionization (such as industry, occupation, education, age, gender, race, ethnicity, and foreign-born status).
Consequently, workers in states with RTW laws have lower wages, reduced access to health and retirement benefits, and higher workplace fatality rates. On average, workers in RTW states are paid 3.2% less than workers with similar characteristics in non-RTW states, which translates to $1,670 less per year for a full-time worker.1
Chart B illustrates that unionized workers are 64% more likely to have employment-provided health insurance and 63% more likely to have employment-provided retirement benefits than their non-union counterparts. About 80% of union workers have employer-provided health and retirement benefits compared with only about half of non-union workers.
CHART B
Union workers are far more likely to have employer-provided health and retirement benefitsShare of workers with health insurance and retirement benefits, by union status, 2023
Benefit
Share of workers participating in benefit
Health insurance, union
74%
Health insurance, non-union
45%
Retirement, union
85%
Retirement, non-union
52%
ChartData
Source: EPI analysis of 2023 National Compensation Survey (NCS) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
By weakening unions, “right-to-work” laws fuel economic inequality
State policies like RTW that constrain workers’ rights to unionize and collectively bargain are fundamentally linked to key economic and labor market outcomes—including measures of inequality. Data show that unions reduce income inequality across the economy, counteract racial and gender labor market inequities, and reduce public-sector pay gaps.
Through bringing workers’ collective power to the bargaining table, unions are able to win better wages and benefits for working people—reducing income inequality as a result. As shown in CHART C, there was less income inequality in decades when union density was higher. But as unionization rates declined—particularly after 1979—income inequality grew.
The erosion of collective bargaining over the last five decades has suppressed workers’ wages. Median wages would be 7.9% higher if unionization hadn’t declined between 1979 and 2017. This translates into over $3,900 annually in lost wages for a full-time worker.2
CHART C
Attacks on workers’ right to unionize benefit the richUnion membership and share of income going to the top 10%, 1917–2023
Union membership rate
Share of income going to the top 10%
1917
11.00%
45.0%
1918
12.10%
44.0%
1919
14.30%
45.9%
1920
17.50%
44.1%
1921
17.60%
47.4%
1922
14.00%
46.1%
1923
11.70%
43.7%
1924
11.30%
45.7%
1925
11.00%
47.2%
1926
10.70%
47.6%
1927
10.60%
47.1%
1928
10.40%
48.2%
1929
10.10%
47.0%
1930
10.70%
46.3%
1931
11.20%
46.3%
1932
11.30%
48.3%
1933
9.50%
48.0%
1934
9.80%
49.1%
1935
10.80%
48.1%
1936
11.10%
48.4%
1937
18.60%
47.5%
1938
23.90%
47.1%
1939
24.80%
48.6%
1940
23.50%
48.9%
1941
25.40%
47.0%
1942
24.20%
42.3%
1943
30.10%
38.9%
1944
32.50%
36.1%
1945
33.40%
35.3%
1946
31.90%
37.0%
1947
31.10%
36.9%
1948
30.50%
38.9%
1949
29.60%
38.3%
1950
30.00%
39.1%
1951
32.40%
37.9%
1952
31.50%
36.6%
1953
33.20%
35.7%
1954
32.70%
36.0%
1955
32.90%
36.7%
1956
33.20%
35.7%
1957
32.00%
35.7%
1958
31.10%
35.5%
1959
31.60%
36.0%
1960
30.70%
35.5%
1961
28.70%
35.6%
1962
29.10%
36.2%
1963
28.50%
36.6%
1964
28.50%
37.0%
1965
28.60%
36.7%
1966
28.70%
36.3%
1967
28.60%
35.3%
1968
28.70%
35.5%
1969
28.30%
34.1%
1970
27.90%
33.5%
1971
27.40%
34.1%
1972
27.50%
34.4%
1973
27.10%
34.6%
1974
26.50%
33.6%
1975
25.70%
34.0%
1976
25.70%
33.9%
1977
25.20%
34.3%
1978
24.70%
34.0%
1979
25.40%
34.3%
1980
23.60%
33.9%
1981
22.30%
34.3%
1982
21.60%
34.6%
1983
20.1%
35.3%
1984
18.8%
36.5%
1985
18.0%
36.6%
1986
17.5%
36.3%
1987
17.0%
37.5%
1988
16.8%
39.3%
1989
16.4%
38.8%
1990
16.0%
38.8%
1991
16.0%
38.3%
1992
15.7%
39.4%
1993
15.7%
39.1%
1994
15.5%
39.2%
1995
14.9%
39.9%
1996
14.5%
40.8%
1997
14.1%
41.5%
1998
13.9%
41.9%
1999
13.9%
42.3%
2000
13.4%
42.8%
2001
13.3%
42.0%
2002
13.3%
41.5%
2003
12.9%
41.6%
2004
12.5%
42.4%
2005
12.5%
43.6%
2006
12.0%
44.3%
2007
12.1%
44.0%
2008
12.4%
43.6%
2009
12.3%
42.5%
2010
11.9%
43.9%
2011
11.8%
44.3%
2012
11.3%
45.6%
2013
11.3%
44.9%
2014
11.1%
45.6%
2015
11.1%
45.5%
2016
10.7%
45.3%
2017
10.7%
45.5%
2018
10.5%
45.8%
2019
10.3%
45.7%
2020
10.8%
46.5%
2021
10.3%
47.9%
2022
10.1%
48.3%
2023
10.0%
Source: Data on union membership follow the composite series found in Historical Statistics of the United States through 1982, updated through 2023 using Bureau of Labor Statistics, series ID: LUU0204899600. Income inequality (share of income to top 10%) data are from the World Inequality Database.
CHART D shows changes in unionization rates broken down by RTW status, differentiating between states that adopted RTW either before or after 2010. Unionization has declined far more sharply in the states that adopted RTW most recently, falling 3.8 percentage points between 2010 and 2023. But unionization rates remain lowest in states that have long had RTW laws in place. Overall, unionization rates were 5.0% in states that had adopted RTW prior to 2010, 9.7% in states that adopted RTW after 2010, and 14.3% in non-RTW states.
In New Hampshire, union membership held fairly steady during this period, dropping only 0.9 percentage points between 2010 and 2023. The New Hampshire unionization rate was 9.3% in 2023, just below the national average of 10.0%. If New Hampshire adopted RTW, they could expect to risk similarly accelerating declines in union membership and increasing income inequality.
CHART D
Recent RTW-adopting states have seen large decline in union membershipPercentage point change in share of workers who are members of a union between 2010 and 2023
Change in membership, 2010–2023
Pre-2010 RTW
-0.8
Post-2010 RTW
-3.8
Non-RTW
-2.0
New Hampshire
-0.9
Source: EPI analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2023. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 1.0.38, https://microdata.epi.org.
“Right-to-work” laws erode job quality without creating job growth
Despite persistent claims from RTW proponents that weakening unions will lead to state job growth, comparisons of RTW and non-RTW states over decades show no relationship between employment levels and RTW laws. CHART E illustrates the prime-age employment-to-population ratio—the share of the population ages 25–54 with a job—has no clear differences among three sets of states: those that have remained non-RTW, those that adopted RTW before 2010, and those that adopted RTW after 2010. Employment trends across all sets of states reflect fluctuations within business cycles; recessions are shaded in grey. There are no measurable employment advantages between RTW and non-RTW states.
CHART E
Right-to-work does not buy any advantage in creating jobs for state residentsPrime-age (25–54) employment as a share of population, by pre-2010 RTW, post-2010 RTW, and non-RTW states
Year
Pre-2010 RTW
Post-2010 RTW
Non-RTW
1989
80.0%
78.7%
80.1%
1990
80.1%
78.6%
79.6%
1991
79.4%
77.3%
78.3%
1992
79.2%
78.0%
77.8%
1993
79.4%
79.3%
77.9%
1994
80.1%
79.8%
78.6%
1995
80.5%
80.5%
79.1%
1996
80.7%
81.1%
79.7%
1997
81.1%
81.8%
80.6%
1998
81.3%
81.6%
80.9%
1999
81.6%
82.1%
81.2%
2000
81.5%
82.1%
81.3%
2001
80.4%
81.0%
80.6%
2002
79.1%
79.5%
79.5%
2003
78.8%
78.9%
78.8%
2004
78.9%
78.7%
79.1%
2005
79.5%
79.1%
79.3%
2006
79.7%
78.8%
80.1%
2007
79.9%
78.5%
80.2%
2008
78.9%
77.8%
79.4%
2009
75.5%
73.8%
76.3%
2010
74.8%
73.6%
75.6%
2011
74.9%
74.4%
75.4%
2012
75.7%
75.3%
75.8%
2013
75.6%
75.6%
76.2%
2014
76.4%
76.4%
77.0%
2015
76.6%
77.1%
77.8%
2016
77.3%
78.5%
78.3%
2017
78.0%
79.1%
79.0%
2018
78.7%
80.2%
79.8%
2019
79.4%
80.1%
80.4%
2020
75.7%
76.1%
75.5%
2021
77.5%
77.8%
77.6%
2022
79.4%
79.1%
80.4%
2023
80.4%
80.4%
81.0%
Note: Lines are weighted averages of three sets of states: those without RTW laws, those who have passed RTW laws since 2010, and all other RTW states. Shaded areas represent recessions.
Source: EPI analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2023. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 1.0.38, https://microdata.epi.org.
Prior studies have likewise shown no causal link between a state’s RTW status and its job growth. For example, studies of Oklahoma after the state enacted RTW in 2001 found a significant reduction in private-sector unionization, but no measurable effect on employment growth. Similarly, researchers at the University of Kentucky examined state economic performance across Southern U.S. states from 1964 to 2004 and found that RTW status had no relationship to state economic outcomes. When studies have claimed to find such effects, it is often due to failure to control for other critical factors, such as education levels of the workforce, proximity to transportation hubs, technological advances, or natural resources.
New Hampshire should continue to reject RTW and the economic damage it inflicts on states
At a moment of historic inequality and record corporate profits, it is no surprise we are also seeing historically high levels of approval for unions. Workers are looking to unions as critical vehicles for fixing what’s broken at work and in our wildly unequal economy. The large gap between the share of workers who want a union and the share of workers who are in a union underscores that our weak federal labor laws, which are further undermined by RTW measures in over half of U.S. states, are not working. Because state RTW laws diminish workers’ rights, weaken unions, and further concentrate corporate power, they are the opposite of what states need to address chronic economic problems of widening inequality and eroding job quality.
Fundamental reform of our labor laws is required to rebuild an economy that guarantees all workers the freedom to unionize and collectively bargain, and no longer leaves most workers behind. At the state level, this reform must include repeal of existing RTW laws across the country, and continued rejection of new RTW proposals in states like New Hampshire.
Notes
1. This difference is based on a regression model which accounts for demographic differences (e.g. gender, age, marital status, race/ethnicity, and education), individual labor market controls (e.g. full-time status, hourly status, union status, occupation, and industry), state-level labor market controls (e.g. unemployment rate), and three measures that account for differences in the cost of living between RTW and non-RTW states. The 3.2% difference in average wages is applied to an average wage of $23.98.
2. Here, we are extrapolating from 2017 applying the 7.9% difference to the median hourly wage of $23.98 in 2023. For a full-time worker, this yields a difference of $3,940 per year. Further, this is likely a lower bound given the continued decline in unionization of 0.8 percentage points since 2017.
Jennifer Sherer is director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network (EARN) State Worker Power Initiative. Her work focuses on expanding the ability of working people to achieve racial, gender, and economic justice through organizing, collective bargaining, and public policies that promote worker voice.
Elise Gould joined EPI in 2003. Her research areas include wages, poverty, inequality, economic mobility and health care. She is a co-author of The State of Working America, 12th Edition.
