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TBR HISTORY ARTICLE -  THE POUNCE ON PRAGUE - CZECH ABUSES FORCE
HITLER’S HAND IN SUDETENLAND

In 1938, the major powers of Europe and North America were extremely
concerned about the developing situation in the artificially created
state of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs had so abused the ethnically
German inhabitants of Sudetenland, Hitler felt compelled to act to
save his German brothers and sisters. War was seemingly avoided with
the signing of the Munich Agreement in 1938, but Poland decided it too
wanted a piece of Czechoslovakia, as did Hungary. In addition, the
Slovaks had no desire to be part of the amalgamated state of
Czechoslovakia, throwing the whole situation into chaos. Hitler,
concerned about violations of the rights of many of the ethnic groups
living under Czech rule, moved into Prague and organized a large
portion of Czechoslovakia into a German protectorate. While this might
have been a smart move militarily, the author believes Hitler lost the
moral high ground by forcing Slovaks, Moravians, Ruthenians etc to be
subject to German rule without concern for their political
self-determination.  

 By Joaquin Bochaca  

 Three hours after the signing of the Munich Agreement, 1 Poland sent
an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. It was received by the new prime
minister, Dr. Emil Hacha, since Eduard Benes (pronounced
“Beh-nesh”) had resigned. According to this ultimatum, if in 24
hours the Czech administration, police and army had not evacuated the
town of Teschen (in Czech, Cesky Tesin), the Polish army would invade
the area. 

 The Czechs yielded immediately. That very day they abandoned
Teschen, which was then annexed to Poland. The four signatory powers
of the Munich Agreement—the UK, France, Germany and Italy—did not
intervene. It is true that they had guaranteed the boundaries
established in Munich, but such a guarantee cannot exceed the wishes
of the guaranteed entity. 

 The Prague government did not even ask to be supported against the
Poles, who presented their demands in brutal fashion, as a fait
accompli, and giving a clearly insufficient time limit in their
ultimatum. The Munich signatories understood that one cannot go
against nature and that Czechoslovakia could only subsist in its new
form as long as the Slovaks wanted it to. 

 Chamberlain and Daladier had been received enthusiastically on their
return to London and Paris. Peace had been saved! Except for the
influential minority of the members of the war clan, there was not a
single English or French citizen who wanted to go to war to save a
tyrant like Benes. A furious Churchill recounte d 2 that mobs
applauded Chamberlain and Daladier on their returns from Munich. 

 (This was certainly a depressing display of democracy to such a
dapper democrat as Churchill. He had spent his life praising the
benefits of democracy, only to describe contemptuously as a
“vociferous mob” people who did not want to follow him to war.) 

 Meanwhile other “democrats,” the Soviet Russians, had received
the news of the Munich Agreement with holy indignation, and
Chamberlain had been burned in effigy in Red Square in Moscow.
Litvinov officially attended this democratic Soviet “voodoo”
ceremony. As far as we know, the British Government did not file a
diplomatic protest. 3 Can you imagine the outcry in the world media
if, for example, Leon Blum had been burned in effigy in Berlin when
the Franco-Soviet Pact was signed? 

 POLAND ATTACKS 

  The attack by Poland on Czechoslovakia was “carried out with the
voraciousness of a hyena,” wrote the journalist Henri De Kérillls.
The attack was the death blow for the Czechoslovak state. The return
of the Sudetenland to Germany meant Prague had lost 40 percent of the
industry and one-third (the most industrious) of the population.
However, the loss of Teschen, more importantly than its strategic or
economic interest, meant that Czechoslovakia did not inspire anyone
with respect. 

 And so, even though in Paris the attitude of Poland caused great
disgust and inspired diatribes against the rulers of Warsaw, suddenly
there were new, even bigger concerns. Hungary noted that, contrary to
its promises contained within the agreements signed in Munich,
Czechoslovakia did not grant internal administrative autonomy to its
Magyar minority. 

 Consequently Hungary turned to the governments of the Four Great
Powers urging them to compel Prague to carry out its promises.  

 MAYHEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA  

 The Czechoslovak state definitively collapsed on October 6, when
Slovakia proclaimed its autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. Prague
recognized the Slovak autonomous government, led by Father Tiso. On
October 10 in Uzhorod, an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian
Ruthenia) government was formed, chaired by Andrej Brody, who was also
instantly recognized by Prague. A week later, however, Brody was
arrested by the Czech police. Dr. Hacha, who had replaced Benes as
head of state, sent a Czech general, Leo Prchala to Bratislava, naming
him a member of the Slovak government. The measure was
unconstitutional. On March 10 Prague struck another blow against the
autonomous regimes that its constitution guaranteed and the government
of Carpatho-Ukraine was removed en bloc . 

 A day later Father Tiso, president of the autonomous government of
Slovakia, was arrested along with two of his ministers. The Slovaks
poured onto the streets in Bratislava in protest, and there were many
dead and wounded on both sides. 

 Under pressure from the populace, Prague released Tiso, ordering him
to form a government. He refused because Czech soldiers were occupying
Slovakia and Leo Prchala was still a mandatory member of the Slovak
government. Meanwhile, three Czechoslovak state central governments
formed by Dr. Hacha fell within a month. 

 Despite representing an important segment of the population,
Karmassin, leader of the German minority in Bohemia (in Prague alone
there were about 200,000 Germans) was not invited to hold any position
in the three governments, despite being entitled to it according to
the Czechoslovak constitution. 

 THE FINAL COLLAPSE  

 Hitler interpreted all these measures by Prague as a violation of
the Munich Agreement, in which he had recognized the new Czech borders
upon the express condition that the Czechs would “solve the issue of
national minorities by peaceful means, constitutionally and without
oppression.” So when, on March 14, 1939, Hungarian troops entered
the regions of Ungvar and Munkacs, Berlin recognized the annexation.
Two days later, the Hungarians occupied the Carpatho-Ukrainian region,
immediately establishing an autonomous government presided over by
Brody, who had been released from prison. 

 On March 17, Slovakia proclaimed its full independence. The
Czechoslovak state had crumbled. It no longer existed. Poland too had
re-mobilized and massed its troops on the Czech border. Slovakia and
Ruthenia (Carpathian Ukraine) placed themselves under the protection
of the Reich, i.e., they retained their full sovereignty but signed
agreements with Berlin that placed them, in exchange for Germany’s
political and military protection, within the orbit of Germanic
influence. 

 There followed, inevitably, border frictions between the Czechs on
the one hand, and Slovaks and Poles on the other. In view of the
aggravation of the situation, Dr. Hacha and his minister of Foreign
Affairs Chavlkovski asked to be received by Hitler. The Fuehrer
berated them for their constant breaches of the Munich Agreement in
regard to national minorities and announced that early the next
morning German troops would enter Bohemia and Moravia. Dr. Hacha
fainted on hearing these words and had to be treated by the
Fuehrer’s own doctor. Upon regaining consciousness, his first action
was to communicate the news to Prague and stipulate that no resistance
should be offered. Dr. Hacha then signed a document in which he “put
the fate of the nation and the Czech people in the hands of the
Fuehrer of Germany.” Hitler promised to “admit the Czech people
under the protection of the Reich and guarantee it an independent
development suited to its national traits.” 4 

 Today, historians have no doubt that the document signed by Dr.
Hacha was not drafted by him. Dr. Hacha went to Berlin to get a kind
of protection—and in politics protection means dependence—similar
to that obtained by the Slovaks and Ruthenians. But he found himself
presented with the fait accompli of a “protectorate,” similar to
that in which Morocco found itself at that time in relation to France
and Spain. 

 Hitler was irritated, with good reason, with the Czech government,
and wanted to make it pay for its depredations against ethnic Germans
formerly under its protection. This was a political mistake.
Attributable to Hitler? Attributable to von Ribbentrop? I believe,
frankly, that it was both, but especially, in this instance, Hitler. I
find it hard to believe that Hitler himself did not draft the document
signed by Hacha. For us it is very clear that Dr. Hacha was a liberal,
and a liberal does not talk about “destiny” in this historical
circumstance. A liberal does not refer to the nation and the people,
differentiating between them. Finally, a head of state who is going to
ask for protection does not faint when the “protector” announces
that his troops will cross the border to ensure order. 

 Historian Andre-Francois Poncet, who cannot be described as a
Germanophile, said:  

 The Slovaks and Ruthenians had obtained the autonomy that the
Czechoslovak state constitution itself permitted them. But the Czechs
refused to consider them as autonomous entities. For Hitler to wipe
Czechoslovakia off the map it was sufficient for him to take sides
with the Slovaks and Ruthenians, and when both were under the legal
protection of Berlin, the Czechs found themselves legally absolutely
alone. It is therefore evident that the Munich Agreement was violated
first by Prague, and not by Berlin. 5  

 But, on the other hand, the Munich Agreement stated that the Four
Powers undertook to consult each other to resolve issues of common
interest. Hitler should, then, before admitting Slovaks and Ruthenians
under his protection, have consulted with England and France. When he
perceived that the Czechoslovak attitude, openly violating the Munich
Agreement, was directed from London by Benes (who had exiled himself
there voluntarily) and the English war clan, and from Moscow by
Clement Gottwald 6 , he should have contacted the English and French
prime ministers. And when the Slovaks and Ruthenians placed themselves
under his protection, he should have notified them that they must
place themselves under the protection of London and Paris as well. 

 Similarly, when Poland took control of Teschen vis military means,
Berlin should have prevented it. Of course London and Paris should
have done the same, and yet they remained unperturbed. What would have
happened if Berlin had scrupulously observed the Munich Agreement? It
would have been very difficult for the English and French governments
to let the situation continue to escalate, ignoring complaints by
Tiso, Volozin, the Hungarians and Hitler, without losing the respect
of the world. Hitler did not need to hurry, since the bulk of the
Germans in the Sudetenland had been rescued from Czech control and
were not in danger. But he wanted to solve the problem in his own way
and the Czechoslovak state exploded. We agree with A.J.P. Taylor
himsel f 7 that the so-called “pounce on Prague” was a political
mistake. 

 Even though, as noted by the Fuehrer, many Germans lived in Prague
and had founded the first German university there, even though Bohemia
and Moravia had formed parts of German states for centuries, the fact
remained that those territories could no longer be considered German
lands. Until the “pounce on Prague,” Hitler could present himself
with all justice as a defender of the right of free yet dispossessed
peoples. After the “pounce on Prague,” Hitler no longer held the
moral high ground. 

 For instance, Dr. Hacha himself appeared in Berlin, of his own free
will, only to be placed under the political orbit of the Reich, with
the same conditions as the Slovaks and Ukrainians. Over time, and at
peace, by simple socio-political osmosis, the Czech Republic
(Bohemia-Moravia) would have merged with Germany. The rush, again, was
a huge psychological and political mistake. 

 One cannot talk constantly about creating in the heart of Europe,
itself, a protectorate, as if it were Berbers of the Maghreb or a
black tribe from central Africa. It is understandable, however, that
Hitler would be fed up with the politicians from “Chateau” Prague
and not trust them. On a purely moral plane, one could even justify
the famous “pounce on Prague.” But on a political plane,
absolutely not, and for one simple reason: Hitler did not gain
anything by it and instead lost strength in his position, hitherto
impregnable, as champion of peoples’ right to self-determination. 

 It is possible, however, that the real reason Hitler moved to annex
the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia, turning them into protectorates,
was a purely strategic evaluation of the situation. The “Czech
aircraft carrier” 8 was a wedge of almost 1,000 square miles right
in the midst of Germany. At the same time, given the democratic
internal structure of the Czechoslovakian rump-state (Bohemia-Moravia)
Hitler had no guarantee that Dr. Hacha would not soon be replaced by a
follower of Benes and problems once again arise, resurrecting the
threat of having a foreign nation largely contained within another
nation’s borders. 

 Indeed, the USSR rightly felt threatened by Germany. The threat
could materialize as a direct military attack, as a political-economic
blockade and/or as assistance, directly or indirectly, to Ukrainian
nationalists by Berlin. This was described in its large lines in Mein
Kampf , and after settling the outstanding issues with the West,
Germany could turn to the East. In Munich a tacit agreement had been
reached: Europe for Europeans. The USSR would be left out of
discussions about European issues. England and France would stay out
of eastern Europe. Hungary and the new Slovakia would join the Reich
in an anti-Communist political block, while Poland—whose relations
with Germany were excellent and which had collaborated with the Reich
in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—would accentuate its
anti-Communist policy. 

 In the Central European block that was being erected against the
USSR, led by Germany, Czechoslovakia was an obstacle. It was a pebble
in the gears of the powerful war machine that was being forged. None
of its neighbors regretted the disappearance of the artificial state,
and Hitler—this time, yes—implemented the policy of fait accompli
himself. All the generals approved. As for von Ribbentrop and von
Neurath, the career diplomats, while not openly disapproving of
Hitler’s Czechoslovakia policy, were not so sure. In any case,
Czechoslovakia had disappeared, and the USSR felt itself more than
ever in quarantine. 

 Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, responded coolly to a question
of Labour leader Clement Attlee: “The state whose borders we
attempted to guarantee has collapsed from within. Therefore, the
government of his Majesty does not consider itself obligated, any
longer, with respect to Prague.” 

 In other words, Hitler now had a free hand in the East: exactly what
he had always wanted.  

 ENDNOTES: 

 1 The Munich Agreement was a settlement permitting Nazi Germany’s
annexation of Czechoslovakia’s areas along the country’s borders
mainly inhabited by ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland. The agreement
was negotiated at a conference held in Munich, Germany, and signed in
1938 by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy without the
presence of Czechoslovakia. 

 2 Winston S. Churchill: Memoirs . 

 3 Archibald Maule Ramsay: The Nameless War . 

 4 Arnold Toynbee: Hitler’s Europe . 

 5 The History of the Vanquished , Bochaca, Joaquin, Part I, p.
124. 

 6 Clement Gottwald, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party leader,
later purged (physically liquidated) by Stalin for being a Troskyite
and “cosmopolitan,” i.e., Zionist. 

 7 A.J.P. Taylor: The Origins of the Second World War . 

 8 This expression was coined by Pierre Cot, French minister of Air:
“ Tchécoslovaquie, porte-avions de la Democratie ”
(Czechoslovakia, aircraft carrier of Democracy). Clemenceau, Poincare
and Briand had said several times that Czechoslovakia was intended, in
event of war, to serve as a base for bombing Germany. And in
Memorandum 1 of the Czech Delegation to Versailles is written, without
euphemisms: “The special situation of Czechoslovakia makes it,
necessarily, the mortal enemy of Germany.” 

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