In May, the general trend with ISIS-K-linked propaganda outlets no longer
reporting on their attacks in Afghanistan unless they are of significant size
or symbolic importance continued. This pattern was already visible during the
past few months. Interestingly, the ISIS-linked Al-Naba Newsletter did not
feature attack reports by ISIS-K between May 4 and 25. External observers also
did not note significant ISIS-K terror operations in the country in May.





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: May 2023



Afghanistan Terrorism Report: May 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
<[link removed]>

Following is the May 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.



In May, the general trend with ISIS-K-linked propaganda outlets no longer
reporting on their attacks in Afghanistan unless they are of significant size
or symbolic importance continued. This pattern was already visible during the
pastfew months
<[link removed]>
. Interestingly, the ISIS-linked Al-Naba Newsletter did not feature attack
reports by ISIS-K between May 4 and 25. External observers also didnot note
<[link removed]>
significant ISIS-K
<[link removed]>
terror operations in the country in May. This parallels a drop in activities by
ISIS-core in Syria
<[link removed]>
in the same month. In both areas, ISIS structures have been under sustained
pressure and suffered someleadership losses
<[link removed]>
. However, it would be premature to expect that this reduced number of ISIS-K
terror operations in recent months indicates that the group’s ability has been
sustainably diminished. The latestUnited Nations Monitoring Team
<[link removed]>
report assesses ISIS-K resources to be substantial. Furthermore, the group’s
operational capabilities had already been significantly reduced prior to the
August 2021 takeover of power by the Taliban, only for it to recover quickly.
In other regions, such as West Africa,ISIS affiliates
<[link removed]>
continue to operate with continued intensity.



However, despite this clear slowdown in operational tempo, pro-ISIS-K
propaganda outlets continued their ideological campaign against the Taliban
regime, continuously criticizing its actions domestically and internationally.
As expected, the dispute between the Taliban regime and Iran concerning the
division of water from the Helmand River featured in pro-ISIS-K online
propaganda in May. The water supply that the river affords both to Afghanistan
and Iran is crucial for both countries. To a significant extent, the Iranian
provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan
<[link removed]>
depends on the river’s water supply. Several Afghan provinces, including
Helmand province with its agricultural area, are equallysupplied
<[link removed]> by the river as a
primary source of fresh water. Since 1973, atreaty
<[link removed]>
between Iran and Afghanistan regulates the water distribution from the river.
However, in recent years, Afghanistan constructed a range ofdams
<[link removed]>
, significantly reducing the water flow towards Iran. This led to frequent
protests from the Iranian side. Although in 2022 and the beginning of 2023,
discussions <[link removed]> between Iranian
officials and the Taliban seemed to have made headway in resolving this
dispute. Both sidesclashed
<[link removed]>
at the border in May and at the beginning of June. As expected, pro-ISIS-K
propaganda posts accused the Taliban of being “captives” of Iran.



Another foreign policy issue that pro-ISIS-K propaganda highlighted is the
developing relationship between the Taliban regime and China. In several
propaganda posts, pro-ISIS outlets argue that the Taliban are signing
agreements with China even though China does not recognize them as the
legitimate government. Indeed in May, several potentially significant new
agreements were signed. Most prominently, the Taliban regime, Pakistan, and
China agreed to extend the ChineseBelt and Road Initiative
<[link removed]>
to Afghanistan. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2023, agreements were
penned between several Chinese companies and the Taliban regime concerningrare
earth
<[link removed]>
minerals andoil
<[link removed]>
. However, given the near complete lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan, it
remains to be seen when and how these agreements translate into tangible
economic development. Pro-ISIS-K propaganda also highlighted the ongoing
oppression of theUyghur community
<[link removed]>
in China. In its May issue, pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan Web Magazine devoted an
article to the persecution of the Uyghurs in an apparent attempt to criticize
the ongoing cooperation of the Taliban regime with China.



Interestingly, although pro-ISIS-K propaganda continuously highlights internal
Taliban disagreements and in May focused on criticizing the close relationship
between the leadership of the Haqqani Network and Pakistan, pro-ISIS-K outlets
did not comment on the replacement of the interim prime minister of the Taliban
regime,Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund
<[link removed]>. Hassan
Akhund, one of the movement’s founders, served in various positions in the
previous Taliban regime until 2001 and was a member of theTaliban leadership
structure
<[link removed]>
(Quetta Shura) until 2021. Due to his prominence within the movement, Hassan
Akhund was sanctioned by theUnited Nations Security Council
<[link removed]>
in January 2001. He had been appointed interim prime minister inSeptember 2021
<[link removed]>. The Taliban regime claims that
Akhund is onlytemporarily stepping down
<[link removed]>
due tohealth issues
<[link removed]>
. However, observers have questioned this claim and have spoken of areplacement
<[link removed]>
. The new interim prime minister of the Taliban regime isAbdul Kabir Mohammad
Jan <[link removed]>, who
currently also retains his position as the deputy prime minister for political
affairs of the Taliban regime. He was sanctioned by theUnited Nations Security
Council
<[link removed]>
on the same day in 2001 as Hassan Akhund. After the fall of the Taliban regime
in 2001, Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan remained part of the Taliban leadership
structure. In 2007 when he was responsible for Taliban operations in Eastern
Afghanistan, asuicide attack <[link removed]>
killed more than 70 Afghans, including children, during a visit to a factory in
Baghlan by a parliamentary delegation. Since the return to power by the Taliban
in 2021, he has been involved in talks between theTaliban and the United States
<[link removed]>
in Doha. It remains to be seen if the hopes expressed by some observers that
he is a morepragmatic Taliban leader
<[link removed]>
open to a dialogue with the international community will lead to any change in
the hardline decision-making of the regime. His role in the failedintra-Afghan
talks <[link removed]>
following the U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement does not bode particularly well.



Finally, the clashes between ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates in West Africa have
continued to be featured in Afghanistan-related ISIS-linked propaganda outlets.
In May, the pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan web magazine devoted a highly critical
article on the operations of al-Qaeda in Africa. The article claimed that
al-Qaeda in Africa is only interested in expanding its power and does not work
towards establishing a true Islamic state. This sharp criticism is a reaction
to a string of significant attacks of the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS)
targeting forces of the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalitionJama’at Nusrat al-Islam
wal Muslimeen (JNIM)
<[link removed]>
, which occurred inMali, Burkina Faso, and Niger
<[link removed]>
throughout May.

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