Following is the May 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.
In May, the general trend with ISIS-K-linked propaganda outlets no longer reporting on their attacks in Afghanistan unless they are of significant size or symbolic importance continued. This pattern was already visible during the past few months. Interestingly, the ISIS-linked Al-Naba Newsletter did not feature attack reports by ISIS-K between May 4 and 25. External observers also did not note significant ISIS-K terror operations in the country in May. This parallels a drop in activities by ISIS-core in Syria in the same month. In both areas, ISIS structures have been under sustained pressure and suffered some leadership losses. However, it would be premature to expect that this reduced number of ISIS-K terror operations in recent months indicates that the group’s ability has been sustainably diminished. The latest United Nations Monitoring Team report assesses ISIS-K resources to be substantial. Furthermore, the group’s operational capabilities had already been significantly reduced prior to the August 2021 takeover of power by the Taliban, only for it to recover quickly. In other regions, such as West Africa, ISIS affiliates continue to operate with continued intensity.
However, despite this clear slowdown in operational tempo, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets continued their ideological campaign against the Taliban regime, continuously criticizing its actions domestically and internationally. As expected, the dispute between the Taliban regime and Iran concerning the division of water from the Helmand River featured in pro-ISIS-K online propaganda in May. The water supply that the river affords both to Afghanistan and Iran is crucial for both countries. To a significant extent, the Iranian provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan depends on the river’s water supply. Several Afghan provinces, including Helmand province with its agricultural area, are equally supplied by the river as a primary source of fresh water. Since 1973, a treaty between Iran and Afghanistan regulates the water distribution from the river. However, in recent years, Afghanistan constructed a range of dams, significantly reducing the water flow towards Iran. This led to frequent protests from the Iranian side. Although in 2022 and the beginning of 2023, discussions between Iranian officials and the Taliban seemed to have made headway in resolving this dispute. Both sides clashed at the border in May and at the beginning of June. As expected, pro-ISIS-K propaganda posts accused the Taliban of being “captives” of Iran.
Another foreign policy issue that pro-ISIS-K propaganda highlighted is the developing relationship between the Taliban regime and China. In several propaganda posts, pro-ISIS outlets argue that the Taliban are signing agreements with China even though China does not recognize them as the legitimate government. Indeed in May, several potentially significant new agreements were signed. Most prominently, the Taliban regime, Pakistan, and China agreed to extend the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative to Afghanistan. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2023, agreements were penned between several Chinese companies and the Taliban regime concerning rare earth minerals and oil. However, given the near complete lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan, it remains to be seen when and how these agreements translate into tangible economic development. Pro-ISIS-K propaganda also highlighted the ongoing oppression of the Uyghur community in China. In its May issue, pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan Web Magazine devoted an article to the persecution of the Uyghurs in an apparent attempt to criticize the ongoing cooperation of the Taliban regime with China.
Interestingly, although pro-ISIS-K propaganda continuously highlights internal Taliban disagreements and in May focused on criticizing the close relationship between the leadership of the Haqqani Network and Pakistan, pro-ISIS-K outlets did not comment on the replacement of the interim prime minister of the Taliban regime, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund. Hassan Akhund, one of the movement’s founders, served in various positions in the previous Taliban regime until 2001 and was a member of the Taliban leadership structure (Quetta Shura) until 2021. Due to his prominence within the movement, Hassan Akhund was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council in January 2001. He had been appointed interim prime minister in September 2021. The Taliban regime claims that Akhund is only temporarily stepping down due to health issues. However, observers have questioned this claim and have spoken of a replacement. The new interim prime minister of the Taliban regime is Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan, who currently also retains his position as the deputy prime minister for political affairs of the Taliban regime. He was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council on the same day in 2001 as Hassan Akhund. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan remained part of the Taliban leadership structure. In 2007 when he was responsible for Taliban operations in Eastern Afghanistan, a suicide attack killed more than 70 Afghans, including children, during a visit to a factory in Baghlan by a parliamentary delegation. Since the return to power by the Taliban in 2021, he has been involved in talks between the Taliban and the United States in Doha. It remains to be seen if the hopes expressed by some observers that he is a more pragmatic Taliban leader open to a dialogue with the international community will lead to any change in the hardline decision-making of the regime. His role in the failed intra-Afghan talks following the U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement does not bode particularly well.
Finally, the clashes between ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates in West Africa have continued to be featured in Afghanistan-related ISIS-linked propaganda outlets. In May, the pro-ISIS Voice of Khorasan web magazine devoted a highly critical article on the operations of al-Qaeda in Africa. The article claimed that al-Qaeda in Africa is only interested in expanding its power and does not work towards establishing a true Islamic state. This sharp criticism is a reaction to a string of significant attacks of the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeting forces of the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), which occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger throughout May.
