In March 2023, ISIS-linked propaganda outlets resumed reporting on attacks by
the group in Afghanistan. In several messages and posts, several high-profile
attacks were highlighted, the killing of the Taliban governor of Balkh
province, Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, on March 9 in Mazar-e Sharif, an attack on
a Shiite cultural center in the same city on March 11, as well as an attack
near the foreign ministry in Kabul on March 27.





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Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2023



Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Read CEP’s Latest Afghanistan Terrorism Report
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Following is the March 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The
authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat
in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K propaganda.



In March 2023, ISIS-linked propaganda outlets resumed reporting on attacks by
the group in Afghanistan. In several messages and posts, several high-profile
attacks were highlighted, the killing of the Taliban governor of Balkh province,
Mohammad Dawood Muzammil
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, on March 9 in Mazar-e Sharif, an attack on aShiite cultural center
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in the same city on March 11, as well as an attacknear the foreign ministry in
Kabul
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on March 27. Additionally, ISIS-linked online outlets reported on several
shootings in Herat in recent weeks, the most recent being the killing of the
Taliban official
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in charge of the water supply department in the city on March 8. The fact that
ISIS-linked outlets published the videos of these shootings in Heart is
reminiscent of the early ISIS online propaganda tactic in Iraq from 2014
onwards, which regularlypublished videos of such incidents
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to instill fear among the local population and the adversaries of the group.
These attacks in Afghanistan also demonstrate that the slight reduction in
terrorist activities by the group during the winter months has ended.
Furthermore, these propaganda reports also intend to show that, despite
continuing attempts by the Taliban to suppress Islamic State Khorasan Province
(ISKP), its ability to target high-ranking officials and key installations in
the country remains intact.



Mohammad Dawood Muzammil was the highest-ranking Taliban official killed by
ISKP since the former’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021.Before assuming
his position
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in Balkh, Muzammil was Talibangovernor in Nangarhar Province
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after serving asfirst deputy minister of interior
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of the Taliban regime. The inability of the Taliban to protect such a
prominent member of the movement is striking, particularly since Muzammil was
killed by a suicide bomberinside his office
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in Mazar-e Sharif. Furthermore, only two days after this significant attack,
ISIS operatives were able to again target a high-profile event, the gathering
of journalists at a Shiite center in the city. These attacks demonstrate that
ISKP can maintain a very effective network in the province. Incidents such as
these also underline the current assessment of the U.S. military that ISKP in
Afghanistan is likely to be able to conduct attacks outside Afghanistanwithin
the next six months
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.



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As in previous months, pro-ISIS online propaganda continued highlighting
Taliban cronyism and corruption. In particular, the resignation of the acting
finance minister of the Taliban regime, Mawlawi Hidayatullah Badri, a.k.a.Gul
Agha Ishakzai
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, in March presented a propaganda opportunity for ISIS. According to media
reports, Badri resigned over themisappropriation of funds
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by the Taliban leadership. The resignation of Badri was a blow to the Ishakzai
faction within the Taliban movement. He was their highest-ranking member in the
Kabul power structure. Achildhood friend
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of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, Badri headed thefinance commission
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of the Taliban before August 2021 and is designated as a globalnarcotics
trafficker
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by the US government. Badri’s subsequent appointment asacting governor
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of Da Afghanistan Bank, the central bank of Afghanistan, is not a lateral move
but a downgrade of his position within the Taliban power structure.



Continuing its propaganda line that the Taliban are connected to narcotics,
several pro-ISIS propaganda posts alleged in March that the Taliban had
concluded a contract with a pharmaceutical company for the commercial
production of hashish and that the Taliban would share narcotics with “the
Germans.” This refers tonews reports
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from the end of 2021, which indicated that the Taliban were in negotiations
with a German company namedEntwicklungsgesellschaft CPharm International mbH
(ECI)
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concerning a potential investment in Afghanistan. However, it is unclear
whether this deal ever came to fruition. The website of the German company only
refers toongoing talks
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about the investment with the Taliban and has not been updated since December
2021.



Pro-ISIS online propaganda highlighted alleged disagreements within the
Taliban leadership concerning the education of women and girls in Afghanistanin
February 2023
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. The topic remains a contentious one in Afghanistan. Already in December 2022,
the Taliban announced that women areno longer
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allowed to work for national and international non-governmental organizations
in the country. The issue seemed to have been partially resolved at the
beginning of 2023, with several international humanitarian organizations
resuming operations
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in Afghanistan. However, at the beginning of April 2023, the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was informed that the Taliban had
decided
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that women can no longer work for United Nations organizations in the country.
As this would greatly affect the provision of humanitarian support and support
for basic human needs by the United Nations in Afghanistan, this apparent
decision by the Taliban leadership was strongly condemned by theSecretary
General
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of the United Nations. In 2022, the United Nations and its partner
organizations provided aid to26.1 million Afghans
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, more than half thecountry’s population
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. Therefore, endangering these vital operations for Afghan civilians by
prohibiting a significant part of the United Nations workforce in the country
from operating is another striking demonstration that for the Taliban regime,
key ideological decisions trump the survival of their compatriots.



Not only have the Taliban repeated their contentious relationship
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with United Nations humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan from the 1990s,
but the regime also seems to have reverted totaking Western hostages
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to pressure governments to engage with it directly rather than primarily
through aid organizations. At the beginning of April 2023, the U.K. government
announced thatthree British citizens
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were arrested by the Taliban intelligence service in January 2023 and held
since without consular accessor clear charges
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. In mid-March, the Taliban also arrestedtwo Polish citizens
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and accused them of espionage, forcing Poland to engage directly with the
Taliban regime to secure their release after a few weeks.Two U.S. filmmakers
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were arrested by the Taliban in August 2022 and held on unspecified charges
until December of that year. These behavioral patterns demonstrate that the
current Taliban regime is not only led by the same team of Taliban leaders as
in the 1990s, but is also systematically reverting to its old tactics in
dealing with the international community, including behavior that is to the
detriment of the Afghan population.

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