Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2023

Afghanistan Terrorism Report: March 2023

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Joshua Fisher-Birch

Following is the March 2023 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

In March 2023, ISIS-linked propaganda outlets resumed reporting on attacks by the group in Afghanistan. In several messages and posts, several high-profile attacks were highlighted, the killing of the Taliban governor of Balkh province, Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, on March 9 in Mazar-e Sharif, an attack on a Shiite cultural center in the same city on March 11, as well as an attack near the foreign ministry in Kabul on March 27. Additionally, ISIS-linked online outlets reported on several shootings in Herat in recent weeks, the most recent being the killing of the Taliban official in charge of the water supply department in the city on March 8. The fact that ISIS-linked outlets published the videos of these shootings in Heart is reminiscent of the early ISIS online propaganda tactic in Iraq from 2014 onwards, which regularly published videos of such incidents to instill fear among the local population and the adversaries of the group. These attacks in Afghanistan also demonstrate that the slight reduction in terrorist activities by the group during the winter months has ended. Furthermore, these propaganda reports also intend to show that, despite continuing attempts by the Taliban to suppress Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), its ability to target high-ranking officials and key installations in the country remains intact.

Mohammad Dawood Muzammil was the highest-ranking Taliban official killed by ISKP since the former’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. Before assuming his position in Balkh, Muzammil was Taliban governor in Nangarhar Province after serving as first deputy minister of interior of the Taliban regime. The inability of the Taliban to protect such a prominent member of the movement is striking, particularly since Muzammil was killed by a suicide bomber inside his office in Mazar-e Sharif. Furthermore, only two days after this significant attack, ISIS operatives were able to again target a high-profile event, the gathering of journalists at a Shiite center in the city. These attacks demonstrate that ISKP can maintain a very effective network in the province. Incidents such as these also underline the current assessment of the U.S. military that ISKP in Afghanistan is likely to be able to conduct attacks outside Afghanistan within the next six months.

https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/afghanistan-provinces-map/

As in previous months, pro-ISIS online propaganda continued highlighting Taliban cronyism and corruption. In particular, the resignation of the acting finance minister of the Taliban regime, Mawlawi Hidayatullah Badri, a.k.a. Gul Agha Ishakzai, in March presented a propaganda opportunity for ISIS. According to media reports, Badri resigned over the misappropriation of funds by the Taliban leadership. The resignation of Badri was a blow to the Ishakzai faction within the Taliban movement. He was their highest-ranking member in the Kabul power structure. A childhood friend of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, Badri headed the finance commission of the Taliban before August 2021 and is designated as a global narcotics trafficker by the US government. Badri’s subsequent appointment as acting governor of Da Afghanistan Bank, the central bank of Afghanistan, is not a lateral move but a downgrade of his position within the Taliban power structure.

Continuing its propaganda line that the Taliban are connected to narcotics, several pro-ISIS propaganda posts alleged in March that the Taliban had concluded a contract with a pharmaceutical company for the commercial production of hashish and that the Taliban would share narcotics with “the Germans.” This refers to news reports from the end of 2021, which indicated that the Taliban were in negotiations with a German company named Entwicklungsgesellschaft CPharm International mbH (ECI) concerning a potential investment in Afghanistan. However, it is unclear whether this deal ever came to fruition. The website of the German company only refers to ongoing talks about the investment with the Taliban and has not been updated since December 2021.

Pro-ISIS online propaganda highlighted alleged disagreements within the Taliban leadership concerning the education of women and girls in Afghanistan in February 2023. The topic remains a contentious one in Afghanistan. Already in December 2022, the Taliban announced that women are no longer allowed to work for national and international non-governmental organizations in the country. The issue seemed to have been partially resolved at the beginning of 2023, with several international humanitarian organizations resuming operations in Afghanistan. However, at the beginning of April 2023, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was informed that the Taliban had decided that women can no longer work for United Nations organizations in the country. As this would greatly affect the provision of humanitarian support and support for basic human needs by the United Nations in Afghanistan, this apparent decision by the Taliban leadership was strongly condemned by the Secretary General of the United Nations. In 2022, the United Nations and its partner organizations provided aid to 26.1 million Afghans, more than half the country’s population. Therefore, endangering these vital operations for Afghan civilians by prohibiting a significant part of the United Nations workforce in the country from operating is another striking demonstration that for the Taliban regime, key ideological decisions trump the survival of their compatriots.

Not only have the Taliban repeated their contentious relationship with United Nations humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan from the 1990s, but the regime also seems to have reverted to taking Western hostages to pressure governments to engage with it directly rather than primarily through aid organizations. At the beginning of April 2023, the U.K. government announced that three British citizens were arrested by the Taliban intelligence service in January 2023 and held since without consular access or clear charges. In mid-March, the Taliban also arrested two Polish citizens and accused them of espionage, forcing Poland to engage directly with the Taliban regime to secure their release after a few weeks. Two U.S. filmmakers were arrested by the Taliban in August 2022 and held on unspecified charges until December of that year. These behavioral patterns demonstrate that the current Taliban regime is not only led by the same team of Taliban leaders as in the 1990s, but is also systematically reverting to its old tactics in dealing with the international community, including behavior that is to the detriment of the Afghan population.

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