[Is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan imminent or is Washington in a
tizzy over nothing? ]
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IS WAR WITH CHINA INEVITABLE?  
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Michael Klare
March 14, 2023
Tom Dispatch
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_ Is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan imminent or is Washington in a
tizzy over nothing? _

Taiwanese soldiers, Shutterstock

 

Is China really on the verge of invading the island of Taiwan, as so
many top American officials seem to believe? If the answer is
“yes” and the U.S. intervenes on Taiwan’s side — as President
Biden has sworn
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it would — we could find ourselves in a major-power conflict,
possibly even a nuclear one, in the not-too-distant future. Even if
confined to Asia and fought with conventional weaponry alone — no
sure thing — such a conflict would still result in human and
economic damage on a far greater scale than observed in Ukraine today.

But what if the answer is “no,” which seems at least as likely?
Wouldn’t that pave the way for the U.S. to work with its friends and
allies, no less than with China itself, to reduce tensions in the
region and possibly open a space for the launching of peaceful
negotiations between Taiwan and the mainland? If nothing else, it
would eliminate the need to boost the Pentagon budget by many billions
of dollars annually, as now advocated by China hawks in Congress.

How that question is answered has enormous implications for us all.
Yet, among policymakers in Washington, it isn’t even up for
discussion. Instead, they seem to be competing with each another to
identify the year in which the purported Chinese invasion will occur
and war will break out between our countries.

IS IT 2035, 2027, OR 2025?

All high-level predictions of an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan
rest on the assumption that Chinese leaders will never allow that
island to become fully independent and so will respond to any move in
that direction with a full-scale military assault. In justifying such
claims, American officials regularly point to the ongoing
modernization of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), and warnings by top Chinese officials that they will crush any
effort by “separatist elements” in Taiwan to impede unification.
In line with that mode of thinking, only one question remains: Exactly
when will the Chinese leadership consider the PLA ready to invade
Taiwan and overpower any U.S. forces sent to the island’s relief?

Until 2021, U.S. military officials tended to place that pivotal
moment far in the future, citing the vast distance the PLA needed to
go to duplicate the technological advantages of U.S. forces. Pentagon
analysts most often forecas
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2035 for this achievement, the date set by President Xi Jinping for
China to “basically complete the modernization of national defense
and the military.”

This assessment, however, changed dramatically in late 2021 when the
Department of Defense published its annual report on the military
power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). That document
highlighted
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a significant alteration in China’s strategic planning: whereas its
leaders once viewed 2035 as the year in which the PLA would become a
fully modern fighting force, they now sought to reach that key
threshold in 2027, by accelerating the “intelligentization” of
their forces (that is, their use of artificial intelligence and other
advanced technologies). If realized, the Pentagon report suggested,
that “new milestone for modernization in 2027… would provide
Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan
contingency.”

Still, some Pentagon officials suggested
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that the PLA was unlikely to achieve full “intelligentization” by
then, casting doubt on its ability to overpower the U.S. in a
hypothetical battle for Taiwan. That, however, hasn’t stopped
Republicans from using the prediction to generate alarm in Congress
and seek additional funds for weaponry geared toward a future war with
China.

As Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) put it
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in 2022, when he was still a minority member of the House Armed
Services Committee, “China’s just throwing so much money into
military modernization and has already sped up its timeline to 2027
for when it wants the PLA to have the capability to seize Taiwan, that
we need to act with a sense of urgency to tackle that threat because
that is something unlike anything we’ve seen in modern history.”
And note that he is now the chairman of the new China-bashing House
Select Committee on China
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A potential 2027 invasion remained common wisdom in U.S. policy
circles until this January, when the head of the Air Force Mobility
Command, General Michael Minihan, told his troops that he suspected
the correct date for a future war with China was 2025, setting off
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another panic attack in Washington. “I hope I am wrong,” he wrote
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to the 50,000 Air Force personnel under his command. “My gut tells
me we will fight in 2025. Xi secured his third term and set his war
council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024
and will offer Xi a reason. The United States’ presidential
elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s
team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”

Though his prediction was derided
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by some analysts who doubted the PRC’s capacity to overpower the
U.S. by that date, Minihan received strong backing from China hawks
in Congress. “I hope he’s wrong as well, but I think he’s right,
though, unfortunately,” said
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Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, in an interview on Fox News Sunday.

At this point, official Washington continues to obsess over the date
of the presumptive Chinese invasion, with some figures now suggesting
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2024. Strangely enough, however, nowhere in official circles is there
a single prominent figure asking the most basic question of all: Does
China actually have any serious intention of invading Taiwan or are we
manufacturing a crisis over nothing?

CHINA’S INVASION CALCULUS

To answer that question means investigating Beijing’s calculus when
it comes to the relative benefits and perils of mounting such an
invasion.

To start off: China’s top leadership has repeatedly stated that
it’s prepared to employ force as a _last resort_ to ensure
Taiwan’s unification with the mainland. President Xi and his top
lieutenants repeat this mantra in every major address they make.
“Taiwan is China’s Taiwan,” Xi characteristically told
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the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last
October. “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with
the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never
promise to renounce the use of force and we reserve the option of
taking all measures necessary.”

In addition, vigorous efforts have gone into enhancing the PLA’s
capacity to invade that island, located 100 miles across the Taiwan
Strait from the Chinese mainland. The PLA has substantially expanded
its naval arm, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and especially its amphibious
assault component. The PLAN, in turn, has conducted numerous
amphibious exercises up and down the Chinese coast, many suggesting
practice for a possible invasion of Taiwan. According to the
Pentagon’s 2022 report on Chinese military power, such maneuvers
have increased
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in recent years, with 20 of them conducted in 2021 alone.

Exercises like these certainly indicate that Chinese leaders are
building the capacity to undertake an invasion, should they deem it
necessary. But issuing threats and acquiring military capabilities do
not necessarily signify intent to take action. The CCP’s top leaders
are survivors of ruthless intraparty struggles and know how to
calculate risks and benefits. However strongly they may feel about
Taiwan, they are not inclined to order an invasion that could result
in China’s defeat and their own disgrace, imprisonment, or death.

WEIGHING THE RISKS

Even under the best of circumstances, an amphibious assault on Taiwan
would prove exceedingly difficult and dangerous. Transporting tens of
thousands of PLA troops across 100 miles of water while under constant
attack by Taiwanese and (probably) U.S. forces and depositing them on
heavily defended beachheads could easily result in disaster. As Russia
discovered in Ukraine, conducting a large-scale assault against
spirited resistance can prove extremely difficult — even when
invading by land. And keep in mind that the PLA hasn’t engaged in
significant armed combat since 1979, when it lost
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(though it has had some border skirmishes
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with India in recent years). Even if it managed to secure a beachhead
in Taiwan, its forces would undoubtedly lose dozens of ships, hundreds
of planes, and many thousands of troops — with no assurance of
securing control over Taipei or other major cities.

Just such an outcome emerged in multiple war games conducted in 2022
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a
Washington-based think tank. Those simulations, performed by figures
with “a variety of senior governmental, think tank, and military
backgrounds,” always began with a PLA amphibious assault on Taiwan
accompanied by air and missile attacks on critical government
infrastructure. But “the Chinese invasion quickly founders,” a
CSIS summary
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suggests. “Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground
forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build
up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile, U.S. submarines, bombers, and
fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense
Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s
strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the
result: Taiwan remains autonomous.”

Those like General Minihan who predict an imminent Chinese invasion
usually neglect to mention such hardcore assessments, but other
military analysts have been less reticent. Buried deep in the
Pentagon’s 2022 report
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on Chinese military power, for example, is the following: “An
attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and
invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force
attrition… these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a
significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese
Communist Party.”

Surely Xi’s generals and admirals have conducted similar war games
and reached comparable conclusions. Chinese leaders are also painfully
aware of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies on Russia in
response to its invasion of Ukraine and recognize that an invasion of
Taiwan would automatically result in
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similar penalties. Add in the potential damage to Chinese
infrastructure from U.S. bombers and the country’s economic
prospects could be crushed for years to come — a likely death
sentence for the Chinese Communist Party. Why, then, even think about
an invasion?

THERE’S NO HURRY

Add in one other factor. China’s leaders seem to have concluded that
time is on their side — that the Taiwanese people will, eventually,
voluntarily decide to unite with the mainland. This approach is
spelled out in Beijing’s recent white paper
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“The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,”
released last August by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC’s State
Council. As China grows increasingly prosperous, the paper argues, the
Taiwanese — especially young Taiwanese — will see ever greater
benefits from unification, diminishing the appeal of independence, or
“separatism.”

“China’s development and progress, and in particular the steady
increases in its economic power, technological strength, and national
defense capabilities, are an effective curb against separatist
activities,” the paper states. “As more and more compatriots from
Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start
businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the mainland… the economic
ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper…
leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.”

And keep in mind that this is not a short-term proposition but a
strategy that will take years — even decades — to achieve success.
Nevertheless, most of that white paper’s content is devoted not to
military threats — the only parts of the paper to receive coverage
in the West — but to bolstering bilateral trade and increasing
China’s economic appeal to young Taiwanese. “Following the path of
socialism with Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its
governance and maintained long-term economic growth,” it asserts.
“As a result, the overall strength and international influence of
the mainland will continue to increase, and its influence over and
appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing.”

In such a take-it-slow approach surely lies a recognition that
military action against Taiwan could prove a disaster for China. But
whatever the reasoning behind such planning, it appears that Chinese
leaders are prepared to invest massive resources in persuading the
Taiwanese that reunification is in their best interests. Whether or
not such a strategy will succeed
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is unknown. It’s certainly possible that a Taiwanese preference for
political autonomy will outweigh
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any interest in mainland business opportunities, but with Beijing
banking so heavily on the future in this manner, a military assault
seems far less likely. And that’s something you won’t hear these
days in an ever more belligerent Washington.

CONSIDERING THE ALTERNATIVES

It’s difficult for outsiders — let alone most Chinese — to know
what goes on in Beijing’s closed-door CCP leadership councils and,
of all state secrets, that leadership’s calculations about a
possible invasion of Taiwan are probably the most guarded. It’s
certainly possible, in other words, that Xi and his top lieutenants
are prepared to invade at the earliest sign of a drive towards
independence by Taiwan’s leaders, as many U.S. officials claim. But
there’s no evidence in the public realm to sustain such an
assessment and all practical military analysis suggests that such an
endeavor would prove suicidal. In other words — though you’d never
know it in today’s frenzied Washington environment — concluding
that an invasion is _not_ likely under current circumstances is all
too reasonable.

In the belief that Beijing is prepared to mount an invasion, the
United States is already providing Taiwan with billions of dollars
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worth of advanced weaponry, while bolstering
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its own capacity to defeat China in any potential conflict. Sadly,
such planning for a future Pacific war is likely to consume an
ever-increasing share of taxpayer dollars, result in ever more
military training
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planning
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in the Pacific, and as Rep. Gallagher and Republican House Majority
leader Kevin McCarthy suggested recently
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ever more belligerent attitudes toward China. Given the reasonable
probability that Chinese leaders have decided against an invasion, at
least in the immediate future, doesn’t it make sense to consider
alternative policies that will cost all of us less and make all of us
safer?

Imagine, in fact, adopting a less antagonistic stance towards Beijing
and seeking negotiated solutions to some of the issues dividing us,
including China’s militarization of contested islands in the South
China Sea and its provocative air and sea maneuvers
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Taiwan. Reduced tensions in the Western Pacific might, in turn, make
it possible to avoid massive increases in the Pentagon budget, thereby
permitting increased spending on domestic priorities like health,
education, and climate action.

If only…

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Michael Klare [[link removed]]
Michael T. Klare, a _TomDispatch_ regular
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five-college professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College and a senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control
Association. He is the author of 15 books, the latest of which
is _All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate
Change
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He is a founder of the Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy
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* War with China; Taiwan; Michael Klare;
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