The month of February 2023 saw an increase in attack claims from all Jihadist
factions active throughout the Sahel. When compared with the number of attacks
of the previous months, a slight increase of claimed attacks in different
countries throughout the region is discernible. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa
al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) seems to have significantly increased its media output and
claimed some of the most impactful attacks. ISGS (The Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara) or ISSP (The Islamic State in Sahel Province) made a notable
appearance claiming attacks on JNIM and on government forces in both Burkina
Faso and Niger.





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring February 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring February 2023 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring February 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This third monthly analytical report on open source observations of Jihadi
activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant events that
occurred in February 2023.



The month of February 2023 saw an increase in attack claims from all Jihadist
factions active throughout the Sahel. When compared with the number of attacks
of the previous months, a slight increase of claimed attacks in different
countries throughout the region is discernible. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa
al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) seems to have significantly increased its media output and
claimed some of the most impactful attacks. ISGS (The Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara) or ISSP (The Islamic State in Sahel Province) made a notable
appearance claiming attacks on JNIM and on government forces in both Burkina
Faso and Niger.



One of the most remarkable stories to emerge early February was the arrest
<[link removed]>
in Benin and extradition to Belgium of Jean-Louis Denis (a.k.a. Jean-Louis “Le
Soumis”). The Belgian citizen wasarrested in 2014
<[link removed]>
andsentenced in 2016
<[link removed]> to 10 years
of imprisonment; his sentence was reduced upon appeal to five years in prison
for recruitment of Belgian foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to the war in
Syria and Iraq. Denis was named as the likely successor of Fouad Belkacem,
former leader ofSharia4Belgium
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and one of the top recruiters in Belgium. Denis initiated project he called
“Resto du Tawheed” near one of the main railway stations in Brussels. He and
his wife distributed free meals to the needy. At the same time, however, he was
building a network of recruits. Following hisrelease
<[link removed]> from prison in 2018, Denis stated to
thepress
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that he was more radical than ever. In early January 2023, there was
speculation Denis would reengage in Molenbeek, Brussels; instead, he opted for
Benin. On his ownaccount <[link removed]> he was
engaging there in agricultural projects funded by donations. Most remarkably,
Denis was using the PayPal account of his attorney to collect these donations—a
detail uncovered during our own investigations of his social media accounts.
Since his extradition from Benin, he returned to Belgium and is actively
engaged via social media. He is actively proselytizing on both Twitter and
YouTube.



For Benin, this could be an early example of a potential new trend of
convicted Jihadi recruiters returning to their previous activities in countries
that are vulnerable to Jihadi recruitment. Therefore, this emerging trend of
European extremists relocating to the region and thereby exacerbating already
fragile situation should be monitored.



Attacks in the Sahel – General Trends



As noted in previous reports, it is not only the Jihadist threat posing grave
issues for the international community. A worrying development is that,
following the example ofMali,
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more countries throughout the region are cutting ties with European forces and
instead are relying on the Russian private military contractor the Wagner Group.



As the Soufan Center noted
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“Russia is actively seeking political influence in the Sahel through ostensible
support for counter-insurgency efforts amid the drawdown of the longstanding
French counterterrorism forces in that region […] but this has not led to
counter-insurgency success and, in contrast, has often exacerbated insecurity.”



After Mali severed ties with France and other European peacekeepers, Burkina
Faso
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also decided to halt cooperation with European peacekeeping initiatives. VOA
Newsreported
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on the Burkinabe demarche: “France and Burkina Faso have officially marked the
end of French military operations in the West African nation, the Burkinabe
armed forces said Sunday, after a flag-lowering ceremony at the French special
forces' camp a day earlier.”



According to U.S. security officials, the Wagner Group is also actively
engaged in Chad, where the group is posing a significant threat to the
country’s stability. According to theWall Street Journal
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, “the Wagner Group is cooperating with Chadian rebels to destabilize the
government and potentially kill the president.” Therefore, Russian influence
may also increase in Chad, another former French colony. This demonstrates a
continuing trend throughout the Sahel. The Financial Times alsoreported
<[link removed]> on the Wagner
Group and published a most insightful map, documenting casualties of the Wagner
Group’s activities throughout Northern and Central Africa between January 2019
and January 2023. Most interesting is the data visualization of Russian
propaganda distributed via Twitter (2021). Currently, the Wagner Group is
involved in nearly every conflict zone throughout the African continent.
Therefore, it can be expected that this highly problematic Russian private
military company will be able to further increase its role in the region.



As far as attacks within the region under observation are concerned, at least
42 have been claimed during February 2023. The majority of the Islamic State
claims again comes from the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP). In
total, 18 attacks were claimed by ISWAP.



ISWAP



Similar to January 2023, all attacks claimed by ISWAP are small scale,
inflicting damage but not causing a significant number of casualties. A
continuous trend are attacks focused on locations in the province of Borno,
located on the border of Nigeria, Niger, and Chad.




ISGS



More striking are the most recent claims by the Islamic State’s Greater Sahel
or Sahel Province (ISGS or ISSP). In the last few months ISSP has hardly been
active in publishing any claims. Now, however, high casualty attacks on
al-Qaeda forces and the armed forces of both Niger and Burkina Faso were
reported. It is notable that at least two of these events date back to late
2022.



In Niger, ISGS claims to have killed at least 35 soldiers and two al-Qaeda
members, another attack in Niger likely resulted in multiple casualties. In
Burkina Faso, the army and al-Qaeda members were the main target as well, with
a total of around 100 confirmed killed.



The February 20 attack has been confirmed by the Burkinabe army in the
following statement:



The attack was reported
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The Defense Post, “At least 51 soldiers were killed in an ambush by suspected
jihadists innorthern Burkina Faso
<[link removed]>, the
army said on Monday, adding that 160 of the assailants died during
counter-attacks. The ambush took place on Friday in Oudalan province near the
restive frontier with Mali and Burkina Faso.”



Nearly all images published by Nashir News on these attacks were extremely
graphic content. All of these events occurred on the north-eastern border area
between Burkina Faso and Niger.





JNIM



JNIM’s attacks were relatively low in casualty count. Some of the targets,
however, are particularly noteworthy. JNIM carried out at least two attacks
against the Wagner Group in Mopti province, Mali. The second high-value target
were forces of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the U.N. peace force in the region. Reutersreported
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that at least three U.N. soldiers had been killed and five wounded, these
numbers were confirmed by the Islamic State’s media output. The number of
casualties from the Wagner Group are not documented. No specific region was
targeted, the attacks occurred throughout the entire country.




Az-Zallaqa Media – Infographic on the operations in Rajab 1444 AH:








Conclusion



In February 2023, a slight increase of claimed attacks occurred. In January,
we witnessed a total of 34 attacks, 13 attacks by JNIM in Mali and 21 attacks
by ISWAP throughout Nigeria. This month we registered at least 41 attack
claims, most of them by ISWAP (18) and JNIM (18).



The most impactful events were those claimed by ISGS and JNIM, with several
high-casualty attacks by the Islamic State as seen in Niger and Burkina-Faso
and JNIM’s operations on the Wagner Group and MINUSMA forces.



It is to be expected that events like these will increase in the near future.
Not only is the impact of Jihadi groups in the region is growing, but the
Wagner Group is continuously building its impact area and therefore
significantly exacerbating an already destabilized situation in the region.
Furthermore, the month of Ramadan is approaching (March 22 to April 21, 2023).
During this time, an increase in attacks occurs as Ramadan is seen as a month
of battle in Jihadi ideology. One might expect a noticeable increase in
incidents in the coming weeks.



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