[ Russian sociologist Grigory Yudin discusses a year of war and
what comes next]
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‘RUSSIA ENDS NOWHERE,’ THEY SAY  
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Margarita Liutova
February 25, 2023
Meduza
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_ Russian sociologist Grigory Yudin discusses a year of war and what
comes next _

Grigory Yudin,

 

Interview
[[link removed]] by MARGARITA
LIUTOVA. Abridged translation by EMILY LASKIN.

Sociologist Grigory Yudin was one of just a few Russian experts who
believed in February 2022 that a military clash between Russia and
Ukraine was inevitable. In an article
[[link removed]] published
just two days before the invasion, Yudin predicted that a major war
loomed in the near future, that Russians would follow the Kremlin in
blaming the West, and that sanctions would do nothing to stop Putin
— all of which came true. In February 2023, Meduza special
correspondent Margarita Liutova spoke to Yudin about why Putin needs a
“forever war,” and what might ensure the emergence of a broad
anti-war movement in Russia.

THERE’S A WIDESPREAD
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[[link removed]] ABOUT
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICS THAT SAYS WAR IS AN ENDLESS PROCESS FOR
PUTIN, AND PUTIN HIMSELF SEEMED TO CONFIRM
[[link removed]] THE
IDEA IN HIS RECENT FEDERAL ASSEMBLY ADDRESS: HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT HOW
RUSSIA WILL WIN AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THAT. DO YOU THINK THAT
PUTIN’S PLAN IS REALLY ETERNAL WAR?

Yes, of course, the war is now forever. It has no goals that can be
achieved and lead to its end. It continues simply because [in
Putin’s imagination], they are enemies and they want to kill us, and
we want to kill them. For Putin, it’s an existential clash with an
enemy set on destroying him. 

There should be no illusions: while Putin is in the Kremlin, the war
will not end. It will only expand. The size of the Russian army
is increasing
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the economy is reorienting
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guns, and education
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turning into a propaganda tool and war preparation. They’re
preparing the country for a long and difficult war.

AND THEN IT’S OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR PUTIN TO WIN?

It’s absolutely impossible. No one has set any goal [for the war] or
offered any definition of victory.

SO, CAN WE CONSIDER THE POINT TO BE THE PRESERVATION OF VLADIMIR
PUTIN’S AUTHORITY?

They’re almost the same thing. He thinks of his rule as constant
war. Putin and the people who surround him told us
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ago that there’s a war against us. Some preferred not to mark their
words, but they seriously think that they’ve been at war for a long
time. It’s just that now this war has entered such an aggressive
phase, and there’s obviously no exit. War itself is normal, in their
worldview. Stop thinking that peace is the natural state, and you’ll
see the situation through their eyes. As the governor of Khanty-Mansi
[Natalya Komarova] said [[link removed]], “War is
a friend.”

ON FEBRUARY 22, 2022, YOU PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE
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OPENDEMOCRACY, IN WHICH YOU DESCRIBED AN UPCOMING MAJOR WAR AND
PUTIN’S DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SANCTIONS THAT WESTERN
COUNTRIES IMPOSED IN RESPONSE. IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE ARTICLE, YOU
ARGUED THAT “THE WAR WITH UKRAINE WILL BE THE MOST SENSELESS OF ALL
THE WARS IN OUR HISTORY.” DO YOU THINK RUSSIAN SOCIETY HAS STARTED
TO REALIZE THIS OVER THE PAST YEAR?

No, in my view, it hasn’t. It was clear to many, many people from
the very beginning, but since then that category has barely grown. In
Russia today, you find this powerful feeling, and it’s one of those
rare occasions when Vladimir Putin connects with a significant part of
society. It’s far from everyone who shares his wild theories, but he
does connect with people. Even more importantly, he produces this
emotion himself. And that emotion is resentment — monstrous, endless
resentment. Nothing can mollify this resentment. It’s impossible to
imagine what could compensate for it. It doesn’t allow people to
think about establishing any kind of productive relationships with
other countries.

You know, it’s like a young child who gets deeply offended and then
hurts those around him. The harm grows greater and greater, and at
some point, he seriously begins destroying others’ lives, as well as
his own. But the child isn’t thinking about that; he isn’t
thinking that he somehow needs to build relationships.

I think that the feeling of resentment, which has been overflowing
lately in Russia, is supported at a very high level, and we haven’t
yet reached the point where someone might realize that we [Russians]
have normal, legitimate interests, and we need to reach them by
building relationships with other countries in the right way.

There’s a good saying in Russia: “Water is borne on the shoulders
of the offended,” [meaning, roughly, that a grudge is a heavy
burden]. At some point, we’ll understand that this resentment works
against us, that we’re harming ourselves because of it. But at the
moment, too many of us want to be offended.

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WHOM DO VLADIMIR PUTIN AND RUSSIAN SOCIETY RESENT? THE WHOLE WORLD?
THE WEST? THE U.S.?

[They resent] a world order that seems unfair, and, accordingly,
whoever takes responsibility for being “superior” in this world
order, meaning the United States of America. 

I always remember something Putin said in mid-2021. He said
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there’s no happiness in life. It’s a strong statement for a
political leader, who of course doesn’t have to bring people into
heaven but should in theory make their lives better. 

But it’s as if he says: “There’s no happiness in life. The world
is a bad, unjust, difficult place, where the only way to exist is to
struggle constantly, to fight, and, at the outer limit, kill.” 

Resentment of the outside world is deeply rooted in Russia, and it
gets projected
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the U.S., which seems responsible for the world. At some point, the
United States really did take
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the world — not completely successfully. And we see that the
resentment I’m talking about is definitely not only in Russia (where
it of course exists in a catastrophic, horrible form).

A significant part of the world has well-founded complaints about the
current world order, and against the U.S., which took responsibility,
became a hegemon, and has benefited from the world order in many ways.
We see that parts of the world that are engulfed by this resentment
are more understanding toward Vladimir Putin. 

I wouldn’t say that this understanding becomes support, simply
because Putin offers nothing [to the world]. Putin wants to do the
same things for which he criticizes the United States. So, supporting
him is difficult, but many want to join in the resentment.

IS RESENTMENT ROOTED IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY FROM BEFORE PUTIN, IN THE
NINETIES? OR HAS IT BEEN CULTIVATED UNDER PUTIN?

There are some grounds for resentment [in Russian society]. It’s
related to the instructive role that the U.S. and some parts of
Western Europe took on. Ideologically, [that role] was framed in terms
of modernization theory, which said that there are developed countries
and developing countries, and the developed countries — kindly and
supportively — will teach the developing ones: “Guys, you should
be arranged like so.” Generally speaking, no one likes to be
lectured. Especially a big country that has its own imperial past.

In fact, the situation that developed in the 1990s was much more
complicated. [After the collapse of the USSR,] Russia was invited to
join a whole host of key international clubs, and Russia influenced
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on key global questions. But that instructive tone [in relation to
Russia] was there. It was the result of a profound ideological
mistake: In the conditions of the socialist project’s collapse, it
seemed [to many] that there was only one correct path, the famous
“end of history.” So, there were preconditions for resentment, but
there were also preconditions for other emotions.

There were [also] many competing narratives [about the meaning of the
USSR’s collapse for its citizens]. One held that it was
a people’s revolution
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a glorious moment in Russian history and the history of other nations,
because they managed to take control of a hateful, tyrannical regime.
That conception, of course, doesn’t lead to resentment.

But Putin chose resentment. In part, probably, because of his own
personal qualities. And resentment is contagious. It’s a convenient
emotion: you always feel, first of all, in the right, and second, you
feel undeservedly trampled on.

RESENTMENT AND RUSSIAN CULTURE

* ‘We can do it again’ The invention and reinvention of an
‘antifascist-fascist’ slogan
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YOU’VE SAID
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THAN ONCE THAT PUTIN WON’T STOP AT UKRAINE. WHAT EXACTLY DO YOU
ANTICIPATE? MOLDOVA, THE BALTIC STATES, A SELF-DESTRUCTIVE WAR WITH
THE U.S.?

His worldview sees no borders. This formula has become a practically
official line: Russia ends nowhere. This is the standard definition of
an empire because an empire recognizes no borders. 

I’ll remind everyone of [Putin’s] ultimatum
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and NATO] in December of 2021 — it’s crystal clear, it says in
plain text that all of Eastern Europe is Vladimir Putin’s sphere of
influence. How that will be worked out, whether it means a formal loss
of sovereignty or not, what difference does it make? And this zone
without a doubt includes East Germany, just because Putin has personal
memories of it. It’s really hard for me to imagine that he truly
thinks of that territory as not his. Putin definitely intends to
restore the Warsaw Pact zone [the former Eastern Bloc countries under
Soviet influence].

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I often hear, “It’s irrational. It’s senseless. There’s no
possibility of this happening!” Not long ago, people said exactly
the same thing about Ukraine
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They said the same thing even more recently about Moldova
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now we’re hearing that the leadership of Moldova
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and the U.S.
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that Moldova is in grave danger. We’ve already seen that Moldova
was figured
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the plans of the current military operation; it just hasn’t gotten
there yet.

Russia’s general strategy is something like this: let’s bite off a
piece, then that piece will be recognized as legitimate, and in the
next phase, on the basis of that recognition, we can take something
else.

[In this strategy’s logic,] we’ll bite off, roughly, eastern
Ukraine, with the help of some kind of truce. Soon, we’ll start to
hear voices from Europe, saying, “Well, it was their land, after
all. Everyone agreed, it’s fine.” Well, wait a minute. If it’s
“their” land — Russian land — because people there speak
Russian, then what about eastern Estonia? You might say, “But
Estonia is in NATO!” But will NATO fight for Estonia? Putin is
absolutely sure that if the durability of Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty [the article ensuring collective defense] is tested at
the right moment, NATO will fall apart.

To be clear, I don’t see what I’m talking about as the likeliest
possibility. I’m describing Putin’s strategy, but Putin doesn’t
rule the world. He’ll get as much as he’s allowed to get. But a
scenario like that isn’t impossible to imagine. 

IT’S EASY TO IMAGINE THAT PUTIN AND HIS TEAM HELD SUCH VIEWS ON,
SAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2022. BUT A YEAR HAS PASSED, AND THE WEST HAS NOT
COLLAPSED AND IN FACT IS PROVIDING
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WITH APPRECIABLE SUPPORT. COULD THIS YEAR’S EVENTS, INCLUDING
THE RESULTS
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THE RUSSIAN MILITARY CAMPAIGN, HAVE INFLUENCED THE PERCEPTIONS YOU
JUST DESCRIBED?

They could, and they definitely did. The whole year showed [Putin]
that, since the West has seized onto Ukraine, it clearly indicates
that it’s a key region and [the West] was planning an attack on him
precisely from there. Apart from that, [in Putin’s view] it’s good
that this year’s problems came to light before the real war, which
Russian leadership considers inevitable. It would be much worse
[according to their logic] to take such an army into a [future] big
war. So, everything that happens strengthens Putin, in his own eyes.

They’ve been preparing this war for many years. It would be strange
if they went into it with only one plan. [Putin’s logic is like
this:] “Yeah, things didn’t all work out according to the best
scenario — no problem, we’ll press on. We’re prepared to shed as
much blood as necessary on this, and they’re not.”

I’m not saying that such tactics will be successful. In fact, I
think that Putin’s logic dooms him to defeat, and that he
subconsciously wants to lose. The question is how many people will die
before that happens. But if we want to make predictions, we have to
understand the logic that [people in power in Russia] are operating
under.

DO YOU THINK ANYTHING COULD MAKE PUTIN DOUBT HIS OWN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT
THE WORLD?

No. Nothing. 

WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE TOPIC OF THIS CONVERSATION BEFORE THE INTERVIEW,
YOU COMMENTED ON THE CURRENT STATE OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, ITS ATOMIZATION
AND BLOCKED COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND YOU NOTED THAT A CONVERSATION LIKE
THIS CAN ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN THE FEELING OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS,
WHICH YOU DIDN’T WANT TO DO. ARE THERE WAYS TO TALK TO SOCIETY THAT
DON’T FEED THIS SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS?

If the main emotion in Russia is resentment, then the main affect, on
which everything is built now, is fear. It’s existential fear —
fear of a specific person’s wrath, or fear of war, or an abstract
fear of chaos. 

Fear is beaten out by hope. That’s the opposite affect. People need
to be given hope. In this sense, the absolutely understandable,
well-founded accusations
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the people of Russia] are politically shortsighted. Again: they’re
understandable, well-founded, and legitimate, but they’re
politically shortsighted. 

The question is how to give people hope in this situation. Hope is
related to a demonstration that everything can be different, that
Russia can be organized differently. The truth is that, until
[Russians] realize they’re at a dead end, there’s not much
motivation to listen to such things, because they’re scary. It’s
connected to a challenge to the status quo. And that’s threatening
enough to convince people not to get involved.

In Russia, any normative discourse has been snuffed out. It’s been
difficult for a very long time to ask how society should be organized,
how to do it fairly, honestly, and well. A few years ago, respondents
[to a sociological survey I ran] responded, “In Russia? There’s no
way.” This is the suppression of normative discourse, but there will
be a demand for it, inevitably, when people realize they’re at a
dead end. In this situation, it’s important that people have hope.

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Make peace, not war The Kremlin’s internal polling shows that more
than half of Russians now favor negotiations with Ukraine, while only
a quarter want to continue the invasion
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3 months ago
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YOU’VE PRESENTED THE DISCOURSE THAT IS MOST OFTEN HEARD REGARDING
RUSSIAN CULTURE RIGHT NOW: THAT IT’S IMPERIAL, THAT IT BIRTHED AND
NURTURED A SLAVE MENTALITY…

I think that Russian culture has a large imperial element, and the
time has come to deal with it. The collapse of an empire is a good
moment to do that. Will it extinguish Russian culture? No. It might
not even extinguish the works of any given author. Can you find
imperial ideas in a given author’s work? You can, and you must. Why
the need either to reject completely or accept completely? You’re
not marrying anybody and pledging a vow of unconditional love.

Culture develops through reworking itself, including through
criticizing itself. But the criticism can’t be a complete
rejection. 

Culture itself provides the positions from which to criticize it.
There’s nothing demeaning in this; there’s no problem in seeing
[imperial ideas] in Russian culture, isolating it, and examining how
it’s related to other elements. 

CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF A RECIPE FOR WISDOM AND HOPE FROM WITHIN
RUSSIAN CULTURE?

Well, the classic critic of imperialism in the history of political
thought is Vladimir Lenin. It was Lenin who spoke about
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Russian chauvinism” in relation to Ukraine, and he attacked
imperialism in other countries. Today, in universities all over the
world, the study of imperialism begins with Lenin.

Russia also gave global political thought the ability to think beyond
the state: Mikhail Bakunin, Leo Tolstoy, Peter Kropotkin, and in some
regards also Lenin. The list goes on. Russia has not given rise to one
significant statist or centralist thinker. All ideas about
centralization in Russia are imported. Ideas about freedom, mutual
aid, and dignity run in the other direction. 

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE DIVIDE BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE LEFT RUSSIA
AND THOSE WHO HAVE STAYED?

It seems to me that all of us, and our country, are in trouble. It
would be good if everyone who’s now outside of Russia thought about
how to help those who are in Russia. And if everyone in Russia thought
about how to help those who are suffering far away. We’ll get
through it, but we can only get through it together. Only together.

Interview
[[link removed]] by MARGARITA
LIUTOVA

Abridged translation by EMILY LASKIN

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* Russia
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* Ukraine
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* Vladimir Putin
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* Vladimir Lenin
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* imperialism
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