ISIS carried out at least 21 confirmed attacks in February in Homs, Hama, and
Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 13 pro-Assad regime
soldiers and at least 80 civilians, while wounding at least 34 additional
soldiers and civilians. Additionally, there were six high quality* attacks in
February.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In February 2023



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In February 2023 by clicking here

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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In February 2023

By Gregory Waters



Following is the February 2023 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2022 and 2021 can be found
here
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andhere
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The January 2023 edition can be foundhere
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also beexplored here
<[link removed]>, here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS carried out at least 21 confirmed attacks in February in Homs, Hama, and
Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least 13 pro-Assad regime
soldiers and at least 80 civilians, while wounding at least 34 additional
soldiers and civilians. Additionally, there were six high quality* attacks in
February. February had more confirmed ISIS attacks than any of the past 16
months and, based on confirmed casualties, was the deadliest month in central
Syria since the insurgency began in early 2019. The majority of this month’s
deaths came during the brutal February 17 ISIS attack on a large group of
civilians and their small security escort who were truffle hunting near Wadi
Doubayat, south of Sukhnah in Homs. However, there were additional reports of
multiple days of heavy fighting between ISIS and security forces along the
Arak-Sukhnah front in the days preceding this attack. It is unclear whether
additional pro-regime fatalities occurred during these battles.



However, as in January, ISIS itself claimed no attacks in central Syria in
February. Unlike past months, February’s activity was both more aggressive (at
least 11 of the 21 confirmed attacks involved small arms, rather than simple
mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and focused heavily in eastern
Homs, rather than Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor). While this author could not confirm
any specific attacks in southern Raqqa this month, a regime soldier with
contacts in Tabqa confirmed in a late-February interview that there are still
ISIS cells in the Tabqa area occasionally attempting IED attacks. Of potential
significance, February was also the first month since September 2021 in which
there were confirmed ISIS small arms attacks in eastern Hama (versus mine or
IED attacks), indicating either a renewed or continued ISIS presence on the
ground in the governorate.



ISIS attacks rose sharply in Homs (12) while increasing slightly in Deir Ez
Zor (4) and Hama (5). No attacks were confirmed in south Aleppo or south Raqqa
in February.

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Homs and Deir Ez Zor



The bulk of ISIS activity in February occurred in eastern Homs, particularly
around the Sukhnah-Arak-T3 axis. On February 5, two trucks carrying civilian
truffle hunters hit mines near Arak, leaving 10 wounded. That same day a
soldier from Tartous was reported killed near Palmyra. Two days later, on the
night of February 7, ISIS fighters reportedly set up a fake checkpoint near
Arak, triggering heavy clashes with security forces. It is unknown whether
casualties occurred. This was the first confirmed use of a fake checkpoint
since March 2021. On February 10, another soldier from Tartous was reported
killed near Palmyra.



The next three days saw continuous clashes between ISIS cells and regime
forces, as well as the first major attack on civilian truffle hunters. ISIS
clashed with National Defense Forces (NDF) and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units
stationed around Arak on February 11 and 12, while another cell ambushed a
group of truffle hunters east of the T3 Station on February 11, killing at
least four and injuring 10. On February 13, local security forces reported that
a member of Russia’s Wagner PMC had been temporarily captured by ISIS during
heavy fighting near the T3 Station but was freed during a Wagner counterattack.
On February 14, a military intelligence fighter was reported missing in action
during a patrol in the Jabal Bala’as region north of Palmyra. This author was
unable to confirm the number of casualties regime forces suffered during these
three days of fighting, but it is clear that multiple ISIS cells launched
sustained attacks on the Arak-T3 axis.



The next major encounter occurred on February 17, when multiple ISIS cells
launched simultaneous attacks against both security forces and civilians. Two
cells ambushed a group of more than 150 civilian truffle hunters and their
small security escort in the Wadi Doubayat area, which has long been under ISIS
control. As one cell initiated the attack, a second reportedly moved in and
ambushed fleeing civilians. At least 59 civilians and seven police officers
were killed. ISIS fighters reportedly stole six trucks and several rifles.
Local security forces who later arrived on the scene reported that some of the
civilians had been decapitated and found notes left behind warning locals
against “working with the regime.” Meanwhile, a third cell launched an attack
on the largest SAA position outside Arak, though the soldiers were able to
repel it.



After this, confirmed activity in east Homs largely ended. The only other
documented attack occurred on February 25 when two soldiers were reportedly
wounded by a mine “in the Badia,” likely somewhere in eastern Homs.



ISIS activity rose slightly in Deir Ez Zor in February, though all confirmed
incidents involved mines or IEDs. On February 3, a field commander from an
Iranian-backed militia was killed by a mine somewhere in the western
countryside. On February 17, two local militiamen were killed by an explosion
in the Quriyah desert, southwest of Mayadin. On February 21 a police officer
from Damascus was killed by a mine near Harbisha, and on February 24 at least
one NDF fighter was wounded by a mine while looking for truffles outside of
Zabari, north of Mayadin. Local opposition sources claimed three other NDF
soldiers were wounded in the same incident, though no pro-regime sources could
corroborate the assertion.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in February 2023 alongside
attacks in 2022. Note that the map does not include one attack conducted
somewhere in “the Badia”.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in February 2023
alongside attacks in 2022. Note that the map does not include one attack
somewhere in the Deir Ez Zor countryside.



Hama and Raqqa



ISIS conducted four attacks in eastern Hama in February, two of which involved
small arms for the first time since September 2021. It should be remembered
that ISIS’s original push into east Hama in early 2021 coincided with its
massive Badia expansion. This is not to say that ISIS is on the verge of
another large surge in activity in central Syria, simply that eastern Hama has
always been a peripheral front for its insurgency and a return to more
aggressive activity here may indicate that ISIS has re-stabilized and
strengthened its ‘core’ Badia fronts and can now dedicate more resources to
‘frontline’ regions like Hama.



On February 10, a local teenager was wounded by a mine near Ithriyah while
searching for truffles. On February 14, local pages reported a truffle hunter
was shot and a second man was kidnapped near Duwayzin, southeast of Uqayribat.
The next day, three more truffle hunters were shot to death near Tel Salamah,
east of Uqayribat. On February 27, a large group of truffle hunters drove over
two mines near Tel Salamah, leaving 10 dead and nine wounded. Finally, on March
2, local pages reported that the bodies of four truffle hunters who had gone
missing “several days earlier” were found southeast of Tel Salamah. The posts
did not mention if the people were killed by a mine, likely meaning they were
killed by small arms, similar to the February 10 and 14 incidents.



ISIS began its revamped Badia media strategy in August with a string of
southern Raqqa claims. ISIS cells carried out at least 16 attacks in southern
Raqqa between August and December 2022, compared to just seven attacks in the
first seven months of the year. Activity in Raqqa continued at a reduced rate
in January, and no confirmed attacks could be confirmed in February. (It is
important to remember that southern Raqqa is one of the most difficult places
to find accurate information on ISIS activity.) However, one regime soldier
with long-time contacts in Tabqa told this author on February 25 that ISIS
cells were still actively attempting to conduct IED attacks in the area.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks in February 2023 alongside attacks in 2022. Note
that the author does not know the exact location of Tel Salamah, only that it
is east of Uqayribat, and therefore the three Tel Salamah attacks have been
placed around the town of Uqayribat.



Looking Ahead



Despite the record low in attacks in January, ISIS activity in central Syria
surged in February, consistent with the otherwise general trend of both
increased quantity and aggressiveness of attacks that began in August 2022.
However, it is important to remember that while the Badia insurgency is
intricately tied to the northeast insurgency, much of the week-to-week kinetic
activity is locally driven. Nine of February’s 20 confirmed attacks targeted
truffle hunters—as happens every year around this time. Truffle picking is one
of the most lucrative activities for the people struggling to scrape by in
central Syria, and so many civilians venture deep into the countryside in areas
not under full control by the regime. They thus present easy targets for ISIS
cells that are often based or transiting nearby. Some civilians and shepherds
in central Syria play key intelligence gathering roles for both the regime and
ISIS, and civilians are therefore frequently targeted by ISIS to dissuade
others from reporting on their activities to security forces.



Therefore, it is unlikely that the following months will see the same number
of attacks or casualties as in February. As civilian movement into the deep
Badia is reduced, ISIS cells will return to their more standard set of targets.
The past year has also shown a high degree of fluctuation in ISIS activity,
with cells seeming to engage in one- to two-week bursts, following by several
weeks of reduced attack frequency. The apparent expansion back into, or
re-activation of cells in eastern Hama is unlikely to precipitate any sort of
large surge similar to early 2021. Rather, ISIS is likely to maintain a
fluctuating level of five to 15 attacks per month. The key is that, per
consistent reporting from regime security services over the past year, ISIS
cells are constantly monitoring regime outposts and movement. ISIS does not
appear willing to risk significant human or materiel losses at this time, and
so it has adopted a more cautious strategy of waiting for weaker targets, such
as small convoys, undermanned outposts, or patrol routes that can be mined. We
are therefore likely to see the occasional high profile attack—like those on
February 17—but should be wary of interpreting them as signs of a new,
sustained ISIS offensive.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in February 2023 alongside January
2023 (green, not highlighted) and attacks in 2022. Note that it does not
include one attack conducted somewhere in “the Badia” and one in the Deir Ez
Zor countryside. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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.



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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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