Nearly four decades after President Ronald Reagan first proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), America has made great strides in defending against ballistic missile threats. We have interceptors against both isolated strategic missiles as well as against tactical, theater-range missiles. These are not infallible, but they assuredly do enhance deterrence against rogue threats, and even near-peer competitors.
Although Mutually Assured Destruction has not been eliminated, as Reagan wished, he would have appreciated this degree of progress we have made on defensive capabilities.
President Reagan’s intent embodied in the SDI was clear: leverage technological advancements to develop missile defenses to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles targeting the American homeland. Research and development into such systems started following his historic speech to the Nation on March 23, 1983. But the end of the Cold War brought progress to a screeching halt. The next two decades were marked by the Global War on Terror and resulting progress in regional missile defense, followed by a reawakening to the value of homeland missile defense in the early 2000s as the North Korean nuclear threat became more prevalent.
Today, the missile threat environment is far more complicated and perilous than at any other time in history. China, Russia, North Korea, and potentially Iran are deliberately developing strategies to threaten the U.S. homeland. China and Russia are pursuing capabilities with global ranges, such as China’s hypersonic missile with fractional orbital bombardment capabilities. North Korea has launched more missiles in 2022 than in the last four years combined, many of which are reportedly able to reach the American homeland.
Today, the missile threat environment is far more complicated and perilous than at any other time in history. China, Russia, North Korea, and potentially Iran are deliberately developing strategies to threaten the U.S. homeland.
The Biden Administration unfortunately is not building on the progress of administrations of both parties that began in the 2000s. Despite recognizing these threats and repeatedly proclaiming that the defense of the American homeland is their number-one priority, the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review (MDR) puts forth a “business as usual” approach. The lack of urgency reflected in the MDR and the multiple components it misses deserve greater public scrutiny and debate. The Biden MDR has at least three major problems.
First is whether the United States will stay ahead of the rapidly increasing North Korean missile threat to the homeland. A vague “missile defeat including whole-of-government activities” strategy is simply insufficient. This nebulous plan fails to consider a significant debate underlying this concept: the future composition of our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the House version of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), measures are incorporated to question whether 20 or 64 Next-Generation Interceptors are required, reenergize the long-neglected East Coast missile defense site, and force the Pentagon’s hand on cruise missile defense of the homeland.
Despite recognizing these threats and repeatedly proclaiming that the defense of the American homeland is their number one priority, the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review puts forth a “business as usual” approach.
A second problem in the MDR is the absence of a serious discussion on the value of new and emerging technologies in future missile defense architecture. The document does not mention directed energy, high-powered microwaves, or any other advanced kinetic capability. Cutting-edge technologies like these have the potential to change how we deter and defend – exactly how President Reagan believed missile defense would change the course of human history. We must increase funding for research, development, and integration of these emerging technologies into future missile defense programs to see if there are solutions that enhance deterrence, achieve cost savings, and provide a more sophisticated defense of our homeland – including space-based solutions. A provision I included in the House version of the FY23 NDAA to use new technologies to defeat hypersonic capabilities is one step in addressing this gap left by the Biden MDR.
Third and perhaps most alarming is the disconnect between the stated top priority of homeland defense and the lack of concrete commitment to missile defense in this MDR. The Obama and Trump MDR’s included a statement of not accepting limitations on homeland missile defense, which is notably absent from the Biden review. This points to a deeper flaw in the Biden Administration’s approach – a legacy view that missile defense of our homeland is somehow destabilizing – even as China and Russia rapidly build their homeland missile defense systems, some of which are nuclear-tipped. This mentality likely has prevented the Biden Administration from producing a more robust MDR, even as recent wars in Israel and Ukraine prove that missile defenses are inherently stabilizing by providing decision space and reducing the risk of coercion.
President Reagan’s vision for the defense of the homeland has not yet been realized. We must abandon evolutionary reactions to improved and expanded homeland missile defense in favor of revolutionary solutions that achieve the vision set out for us 40 years ago. It is incumbent on us to convey to our citizens, allies, and adversaries that we intend to stay ahead of advancing missile threats.
We will do so by improving and expanding the numbers of our existing missile defense platforms, pursuing advanced and cutting-edge concepts for future development, and maintaining our right to defend ourselves.
It would be a dereliction of duty to do anything less.
Doug Lamborn represents the 5th District of Colorado in the U.S. House of Representatives. He serves as Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
