From Hudson Institute Weekend Reads <[email protected]>
Subject How China’s Nuclear Ambitions Will Change Deterrence
Date February 4, 2023 12:00 PM
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A formation of Dongfeng-41 nuclear missiles in a military parade celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing, China, October 1, 2019. (Photo by Xia Yifang/Xinhua via Getty Images)

China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, which is changing geopolitics. Writing in The Economist [[link removed]], Hudson Senior Fellow Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. [[link removed]] describes how the world is moving from a bipolar to a tripolar nuclear system.

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Key Insights

1. China’s nuclear buildup risks creating an arms race.

One pillar of deterrence, “parity”—a rough equivalence in nuclear forces—has been a cornerstone of all arms agreements between America and Russia over the past half-century. It is rooted in the belief that if neither power enjoys a significant advantage, each is less likely to use its nuclear weapons. As a senior Russian official declared in 2021, parity “stabilizes the entire system of international relations.” China’s decision to “superpower-size” its nuclear arsenal suggests Beijing seeks nuclear parity with America and Russia. Parity can be enjoyed by both rivals in a bipolar system. But it cannot be achieved in a tripolar system, because it is not possible for each member to match the combined arsenals of its two rivals. Any attempt to do so risks triggering an arms race with no possible end state, or winner.

2. The bipolar system’s “assured destruction” is changing.

A similar problem exists with respect to another pillar of the bipolar system, known as “assured destruction.” It holds that deterrence is strengthened when a country’s nuclear forces can survive an all-out surprise attack and still retain enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on its opponent’s society in a retaliatory strike. But what about maintaining an assured-destruction capability against both Russia and China? America will need a substantially larger cache of weapons so that a surviving force could provide an assured destruction capability in a tripolar system. As with maintaining parity, this state of affairs could cause Moscow and Beijing to build up their arsenals too, resulting in an open-ended arms race.

3. America needs to modernize its triad of nuclear delivery systems.

America should keep its options open and its powder dry. This means energetically pursuing the Biden administration’s plans to modernize the country’s triad of nuclear delivery systems until America has a clearer picture of how best to ensure its security in a tripolar system. Modernization creates the possibility for serious negotiations with the Chinese and the Russians, who are already modernizing their nuclear forces. They will have far less incentive to negotiate if America allows its triad to age into obsolescence. Proceeding with triad modernization will also enable America to expand its arsenal should China and Russia blow past the New START treaty’s 1,550-warhead limit.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.

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Deterrence and Indo-Pacific Security [[link removed]]

North Korea’s continuing nuclear and missile programs pose new challenges to maintaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and across the Indo-Pacific region. During a Hudson event [[link removed]], Senior Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs [[link removed]], Asia-Pacific Security Chair Patrick M. Cronin [[link removed]], Lt. Gen. In-Bum Chun of the Republic of Korea Army (ret.), and Soo Kim of RAND addressed the security threats facing the region.

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Deter Conventional Wars to Avoid Nuclear Precipice [[link removed]]

The threat of nuclear war is back on the table thanks to America’s greatest deterrence failure since the Cold War. In Providence [[link removed]], Hudson Senior Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs [[link removed]] explains how to end the crisis in Ukraine—and avoid the next one.

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New Nuclear Threats Require Homeland Civil Preparedness [[link removed]]

In this policy memo [[link removed]], Hudson Adjunct Fellow Thomas DiNanno [[link removed]], Brian Cavanaugh of American Global Strategies, and Christopher Yeaw of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Programs at the National Strategic Research Institute explain why and how the US needs to prepare for the threat of modern tactical nuclear weapons.

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