Raqqa
ISIS began its revamped Badia media strategy in August with a string of southern Raqqa claims. ISIS cells carried out at least 16 attacks in southern Raqqa between August and December 2022, compared to just seven attacks in the first seven months of the year. Activity here continued in January, though apparently at a much-reduced rate (it is important to remember that southern Raqqa is one of the most difficult places to find accurate information on ISIS activity). On January 23, some local anti- and pro-regime pages reported an ISIS small arms attack on a regime position near the Tabqa Airport, allegedly leaving three soldiers dead. Unlike in December, ISIS did not claim any attacks in southern Raqqa this month.
Homs and Deir Ez Zor
ISIS activity in Deir Ez Zor surged in December following no confirmed attacks in November. However, activity dropped again in January. The first attack occurred on January 8, when a soldier was reported killed in the southwest part of the province near the Deir Ez Zor-Homs-Iraq border. The second attack came on January 15, when local pro-regime pages reported an ISIS attack on an army point in the Kharita area, leaving at least one National Defense Forces (NDF) soldier dead.
January saw the same low level of ISIS activity in Homs as in December, with only two IED or mine incidents being reported. On January 16, one soldier was killed and several wounded by an IED or mine while driving near Sukhnah. On January 30, a soldier was reported killed somewhere in the province by another IED or mine.
Regime Operations
No major ground operations were confirmed to have occurred in January. However, on January 23, pro-regime sources reported a new anti-ISIS air campaign was to begin from the Tiyas and al-Seen airbases on the western edge of the Badia, presumably to provide support to patrols and enable to the regime to quickly target any suspected ISIS hideouts. Additionally, regime sources in Deir Ez Zor reported the arrival of several thousand Iraqi militiamen under the command of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) throughout January. It is not clear if these fighters are intended to use in anti-ISIS patrols, man checkpoints in Iranian-controlled areas, or simply conduct training exercises alongside their Syrian counterparts.
Looking Ahead
ISIS activity in central Syria was quite lackluster in January, especially in comparison to the high tempo December and following a general increase in activity during the last five months of 2022. Yet, this mirrors a general lull in self-reported ISIS activity both across Syria and globally. ISIS claimed only eight attacks in Syria—all in the northeast—and only 13 in Iraq throughout January. In this context, the five incidents in central Syria actually constitute a larger proportion of ISIS activity in the region than usual, a trend in line with the last few months of 2022. All this is to say that, as usual, it is not clear whether the drop in activity in central Syria is due to any Badia-specific counter-ISIS pressure from the regime, versus internal ISIS decision-making or some broader global pressure/influence.
