This first monthly analytical report on open source observations of Jihadi
activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant events that
occurred in December 2022. Throughout the Sahel in December groups made pledges
of allegiance (bay’a) to the new Islamic State “Caliph” Abu al-Husayn
al-Husayni al-Qurashi. The bay’a pledges in the Sahel came from:





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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring December 2022



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring December 2022 by clicking here
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CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring December 2022

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This first monthly analytical report on open source observations of Jihadi
activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant events that
occurred in December 2022.



The Bay’a Campaign



Throughout the Sahel in December groups made pledges of allegiance (bay’a) to
the new Islamic State “Caliph” Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi. The bay’a
pledges in the Sahel came from:

* ISWAP - Sambisa, Nigeria
* ISWAP - al-Bahira, Lake Chad, Nigeria
* ISWAP - al-Faruq, Nigeria
* ISWAP - Banki, Nigeria
* ISWAP - Kirinoa, Nigeria
* ISGS - Mali
* ISGS - Anderamboukane, Mali
* ISWAP - Central Nigeria
* ISWAP – Nigeria (video)
* ISWAP – al-Faruq, Nigeria (video)
The massive output of this bay’a campaign mainly manifested itself through
pictures on social media outlets linked to ISIS-affiliates in the region that
displayed groups varying in membership numbers. Some pictures and videos
counted a few hundred of IS militants, in other cases only a handful of
fighters were shown pledging allegiance to the new Caliph.



The bay’a campaign dominated the general output of the groups and channels
that are monitored, especially during the first week of December when a massive
dataset was collected. This campaign demonstrates the continuing relevance of
the “ISIS brand” for groups in the region, which despite a continued
operational emphasis on local and regional conflict zones demonstrated that
they identify themselves as part of the global ISIS network.





(The original report including all these bay’a messages counted around 180
pictures.)



Attacks in the Sahel, December 2022



Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates claimed 38 attacks in the region during
the month of December 2022. The majority of these attacks were aimed at the
armed forces of Nigeria and Mali. ISIS affiliates claimed most of these attacks.



Number of attacks per country:



Nigeria: 21

Mali: 16

Burkina Faso: 1



Reported Attacks by the Islamic State



An-Naba’



The weekly an-Naba’ online newsletter is the central social media propaganda
outlet of ISIS. It featured a number of attacks in Nigeria and Mali:



The majority of these attacks were carried out in Nigeria and directed against
the Nigerian army. Convoys, patrol cars and army camps were the preferred
targets. The number of casualties remains unclear due to a lack of detailed
reports in the ISIS-linked propaganda messages.



All three of the attacks carried out by ISIS affiliates in Mali targeted
al-Qaeda. This is likely a reaction of al-Qaeda’s attempt to expand its
operational area into ISIS-controlled territory, creating friction points
between both terrorist networks in the region.



For example, already in December 2021, a breakaway faction of Boko Haram in
Nigeria, called Ansaru, declared its loyalty to the al-Qaeda regional coalition
Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), a pledge that the group
reconfirmed in January 2022
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. Ansaru operates in northern Nigeria and therefore is a competitor to ISWAP.
In Mali ISGS and JNIM begin to compete for operational control.



In one case ISIS-affiliates in Mali also targeted the Harakat Khalas Azawad
militia. The Azawad militia claims to be a secular, non-terrorist organization,
whose main objective is to defend the interests of the Arab community of
northern Mali.



Overall, the number of casualties seems rather low, with the exception of the
December 6 attack on al-Qaeda in Gao, Mali. According to ISIS-affiliated
propaganda outlets, dozens were killed and wounded in the attack.



ISWAP



An equal number of attacks was claimed by ISWAP. Two attacks were directed at
Christian villages in the region of Borno, all the other attacks targeted the
Nigerian army. The number of casualties from these attacks is relatively low.
No major incidents were claimed. It is notable all the claimed ISWAP operations
are concentrated around Borno Province, in North-Eastern Nigeria, the main
operational area of Ansaru.





ISGS



There was also one single claim by ISGS concerning clashes with al-Qaeda
forces in the area of Tessit, Mali. The number of casualties is unknown.
ISIS-linked propaganda outlets claim that about a dozen al-Qaeda fighters were
killed.



Reported Attacks by al-Qaeda (JNIM)



All but one of the attacks claimed by JNIM (al-Qaeda) occurred in Mali. The
majority of the attacks was directed at the Malian army, with attacks on
patrols, convoys and camps. The biggest operation was the attack on an army
convoy traveling between Guire and Boudjiguire on December 8. JNIM claimed that
it killed and wounded dozens of Malian soldiers during this attack.



An attack was also conducted on MINUSMA forces on December 1, which allegedly
wounded 3 soldiers. There was also an attack on an army camp in Soli, Burkina
Faso, which reportedly resulted in the death of five Burkinabe soldiers. JNIM
also published a video of a Burkinabe soldier held captive. This demonstrates
the continuously deteriorating security situation in the country. According to
data provided by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)only 60%
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of the country remained under (tenuous) government control in June 2022. Since
then, the situation seemsto have deteriorated
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.



Conclusion



In December, the number of attacks throughout the Sahel remained significant,
but the overall impact seems to have been comparatively low. Although there was
not a noticeable increase in the overall number and severity of attacks
compared to previous periods, the number of terrorism-related incidents in the
region has been increasing for a number of years already, demonstrating the
continuing volatility in the region.



The extent of the bay’a campaign conducted by various groups in the region,
published in pictures and videos indicates the continuing appeal of the global
“ISIS brand” and that this global terrorist networks continues to command a
broad base of followers and sympathisers within the region. Therefore, it is
likely that ISIS-affiliated operations will continue to increase and stability
within the region will continue to decline.



A worrying trend, not mentioned in previous reporting, are the activities of
the Russia-affiliated Wagner Group throughout several countries in the Sahel
and Central-Africa. At this point the activities of Wagner throughout Africa
are most likely more impactful on the overall decline of stability in the
region than the operations of Jihadi-terrorist groups. It is most likely that
Jihadi forces will clash with the Russian mercenaries in the foreseeable future.



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