A destroyed Russian tank stands by the road in front of an orthodox temple in the liberated town of Sviatohirsk, Ukraine, on November 30, 2022. (Andriy Andriyenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has changed the security situation in the North Atlantic region in a way not seen since World War II. In a recent Hudson policy memo, Senior Fellow Luke Coffey analyzes how this war is part of a process that has been occurring since at least 1989. Some highlights are below.

Key Insights

1. The Soviet Union's Collapse Did Not End in 1991

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today.

2. The Russia-Ukraine War is Part of the USSR’s Ongoing Collapse

Future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass.

3. Policymakers Need to Learn Lessons from the 1990s

As policymakers plan for this new geopolitical reality, they should learn the lessons from the 1990s when Western decision-makers naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia that never materialized. If Moscow’s behavior on the world stage since 1991 has shown anything, it is that Russia is unlikely to become a responsible global actor in the foreseeable future. Instead of focusing on the unachievable, American decision-makers should pursue pragmatic and realistic policies that advance the national interest of the US.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length. 

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