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Will Russia Attack from Belarus?

More Russian troops and equipment have been arriving in Belarus, which may indicate that the Kremlin plans to reopen a northern front against Ukraine. Below Hudson Senior Fellow Can Kasapoğlu [[link removed]] analyzes the situation.

1. Russia Deploys More Equipment and Troops to Belarus

In recent days, open-source intelligence has revealed [[link removed]] that 15 Russian Tor-M2 low-to-medium altitude air defense systems are in Belarus. These represent how Russia is moving more equipment and troops into Belarus. Most notably, the Kremlin deployed MiG-31 interceptor aircraft, likely carrying Kinzhal missiles, to Belarus in October. The Kinzhal missile is an aeroballistic, Iskander-derivative, air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile with dual-use conventional and nuclear payload delivery capability. Normally, traditional air defense systems cannot intercept a Kinzhal strike. The missile saw its combat debut in Ukraine back in March 2022.

A careful assessment of the Russian military’s rare Kinzhal employments suggests that the Kremlin considers the missile to be a political signaling tool, similar to Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship. By deploying Kinzhal-certified MiG-31s to Belarus, Moscow is probably implying that the conflict could spread in the region and include tactical nuclear weapons. The Kremlin may also be signaling that it could drag NATO into an escalatory conflict.

Furthermore, the head of Russia’s main operations directorate, General Sergey Rudsky, traveled to Belarus in late November to oversee the training of Russian reservists in the country. At least some of Russia’s recently mobilized personnel [[link removed]] are in Belarus.

If Russia did reopen a northern front in Ukraine from Belarus, Russian President Vladimir Putin may pressure the Belarusian military to play a more direct role in an attack now than it did in February. The sudden, mysterious death last weekend of Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, who maintained ties to the West and Ukraine, has rattled Minsk. The takeaway for Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko is to think twice before defying Putin.

2. Why Russia May Attack from Belarus

The new Russian commander in charge of the war, General Sergey Surovikin, is unlikely to launch an all-out offensive to take Kyiv, given the failures last winter and spring. However, he may choose a maneuver from Belarus that falls somewhere between a “holding attack” and a “delaying action.” The main effort of such an offensive would be a barrage of drone and missile attacks aimed at critical infrastructure as ground forces launched a limited campaign. The recent Russian attacks on the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant demonstrated the potential of such an approach by disrupting the Ukrainian energy grid in the north for nearly a week.

Surovikin would likely complement such attacks with a considerable buildup inside—and even a limited incursion from—Belarus, thereby distracting the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and drawing their troops away from other critical sectors. Previous efforts would allow Russia to integrate Belarusian troops into an incursion. The Belarusian Ground Forces’ wartime doctrinal order of battle [[link removed]] places them under the Russian Western Military District (via Joint Strategic Command-West). During the Zapad 2017 drills, Belarusian units were subordinated to the Russian First Guards Tank Army, which was a telltale indicator of wartime planning. Thus, should Lukashenko take the risky path, Belarusian combat formations could easily operate under Russian patronage. In fact, except for the three spetsnaz brigades, the Belarusian military can hardly make a difference in Ukraine. However, the Belarusian frontier’s military-geostrategic value goes well beyond the country’s poor warfighting capacity.

Surovikin’s goal is to upset Ukraine’s economy of force, a key pillar of operational planning. Moving elite units to protect Kyiv would stretch the UAF as it gears up for an attack across the Dnipro to liberate the rest of Kherson Oblast. Ukraine will need every single battalion if it pushes across the Dnipro, as river-crossings are a daunting task for any military. The objective of Russia’s offensive at Bakhmut in Donetsk is to draw off Ukrainian forces, but Russian advances there have proven marginal. Thus, reopening the Belarusian front to stretch the Ukrainians, with the bonus of threatening the capital Kyiv, constitutes a logical next step for Moscow.

3. How Ukraine and the West Should Respond

A Russian attack from Belarus would not surprise Ukraine because Ukrainian officials are focused on this possibility. For many, it’s not a matter of if but when another attack occurs. In anticipation, Ukraine has been deploying antitank barriers and laying minefields along much of the border. At the same time, Ukraine has not allowed Russia’s buildup in Belarus to draw key troops away from frontline positions in the east and south.

NATO capitals need to understand that sanctions or diplomatic pressure will not stop Lukashenko, not this time. Before the war, independent statehood gave the country’s corrupt nomenklatura lucrative benefits. In the good old times for Lukashenko [[link removed]], Minsk could arrange favorable customs deals with Moscow while still trading with Europe. Revenues from two large Belarusian oil refineries (Mozyr and Novopolotsk) funded almost one-third of the national budget. Besides, the country’s vast potassium riches enabled the state-owned company Belaruskali to supply 15 percent of the global potassium exports, which made Belarus a leading nation in fertilizer trade. Now, with the European and Ukrainian markets gone, Belarus has lost almost all the advantages of independent statehood. Worse, since the country is technically independent, critical Belarusian industries cannot benefit from Moscow’s wartime subsidies for the Russian economy, either. More than ever, Lukashenko’s throne now relies on his marriage to the Kremlin. More sanctions from the world’s democracies cannot make Minsk’s situation worse than it already is.

Because economic and diplomatic instruments are currently ineffective against Minsk, the West should consider countering the Belarusian threat by exercising on the Poland-Belarus border, backed by a heavy military buildup. This would freeze Belarus’s military in place, or at least give Lukashenko an argument to tell Putin for why he cannot join a renewed attack.

Go Deeper

Hudson Senior Fellow Luke Coffey [[link removed]] appeared on The Telegraph's podcast Ukraine: The Latest [[link removed]] to discuss why the US should continue to support Ukraine. He also addressed misinformation surrounding Ukraine aid.

Speaking before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee [[link removed]], Hudson Senior Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs [[link removed]] discussed Russia’s waning global influence.

Hudson Europe and Eurasia Center Director Peter Rough [[link removed]] spoke with Senator Joni Ernst about the importance of US alliances in Europe [[link removed]].

Did a friend forward you this newsletter? Sign up to receive Re: Ukraine here. [[link removed]]

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