Following is the November 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be found here, and
previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links: January,
February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, and October.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2022



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2022 by clicking here

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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In November 2022

By Gregory Waters



Following is the November 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be foundhere
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and previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:January
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,February
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,March
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,April
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,May
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,June
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,July
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,August
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,September
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, andOctober
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
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, andhere
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.



ISIS militants carried out at least nine confirmed attacks in November in the
Raqqa, Hama, and Homs governorates. These attacks killed at least four
pro-Assad regime soldiers and wounded 10, as well as two civilians.
Additionally, there were two high quality* attacks in November. There were
fewer attacks, high quality attacks, and deaths compared to September and
October. Like October, confirmed activity in November was concentrated in Homs,
rather than in the southwest Raqqa region were ISIS activity in September and
August was focused. (It is worth noting that all but three of the confirmed
southwest Raqqa attacks since August have come via ISIS claims. ISIS made no
official Badia claims in November, so this perceived change in activity may
only reflect a change in ISIS media strategy, rather than a drop in actual
attacks.)



While ISIS cells in Deir Ez Zor, and possibly Raqqa, appear to have decreased
their activity in November, the cells in northeast Homs continued a serious
campaign against regime forces around the key village of Kawm this month. In
October, ISIS cells reportedly routed regime forces from the eastern Kawm
sector—the mountainous region between Jabal Bishri and Kawm. Then, over a
three-day period at the end of November, ISIS cells first cut off the northern
approach to the town and then, on November 30, forced a complete withdrawal of
pro-regime forces (which included members of the Russian Wagner Group). This is
the first time ISIS has seized the town from the regime since briefly doing so
in April 2021 and comes one month after the regime launched its first major
anti-ISIS operations of 2022.



ISIS attacks remained steady in Homs (6) following a three-month summer lull,,
continued their precipitous decline in Deir Ez Zor (0) following a spike in
September, and in Raqqa (1) after two months of elevated activity during August
and September. Confirmed ISIS activity remained steady in east Hama (2),
consisting of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines as has become the
norm.



Raqqa and Hama



ISIS has not claimed an attack in southern Raqqa since its October 30
announcement of a small arms attack on a regime barracks near Tabqa airbase. On
November 17, however, pro-regime media reported an ISIS ambush on the vehicle
of a regime lieutenant colonel traveling near Shuwayhan, just north of Resafa
and 10 miles east of Tabqa airbase. The attack left the officer “severely
wounded,” and killed two and wounded four in his escort.



As in October, there were two reported incidents in eastern Hama in November
that could be attributed to ISIS. Both incidents involved mines or IEDs and
therefore, it is unknown if the devices were recently placed or are only now
being discovered. The first occurred on November 19 when two civilians were
wounded after they drove over a mine east of Rahjan. The second incident
occurred on November 21 when three local militia men were wounded by a mine
while driving in the countryside near Sa’an. Both of these areas have witnessed
periodic mine explosions for years and were the sites of heavy clashes when
ISIS cells first infiltrated the region in 2020.



Map of ISIS attacks in southern Aleppo, south Raqqa and east Hama in 2021 and
2022. November 2022 attacks are highlighted (yellow pins).



Homs and Deir Ez Zor



There were no confirmed attacks in Deir Ez Zor in November.



As with October, Homs experienced the greatest number of ISIS attacks in
November. The most serious of these occurred around the village Kawm. Kawm is
the only major urban area along the highway connecting Sukhnah to Resafa –
i.e., the highway connecting the two main Badia highways—the Palmyra-Deir Ez
Zor highway and the Salamiya-Raqqa highway. The Kawm region also has several
oil and gas fields the regime and Russian forces have brought back online since
retaking the Badia from ISIS in 2017. This area saw intense fighting in 2020
when ISIS activity surged across the Badia, and was for much of that year
considered either no-man’s-land or in ISIS control. The major regime operation
at the start of 2021 heavily emphasized securing Kawm, with 4th Division
reinforcements deploying to support local National Defense Forces (NDF) and
Liwa al-Quds fighters, all backed by the Wagner Group and Syrian air support.
By May 2021, these forces had managed to create a security cordon around the
town and set up outposts across the countryside. After a few failed attacks in
the following months ISIS appeared to have largely left the sector alone,
instead focusing its efforts further north in the Kadir area along the
Homs-Raqqa administrative border. Fighting was concentrated therein the first
nine months of 2022.



However, in early September a group of ISIS fighters ambushed regime forces
north of Kawm, near the Kadir Oil Field, and on October 3 serious fighting
broke out east of Kawm between ISIS cells and regime militiamen from Liwa
al-Quds and the local NDF. Security forces were forced to abandon their
outlying positions despite the use of regime warplanes. On November 28, ISIS
cells were able to cut the northern approach to Kawm, forcing security forces,
which included Wagner members, back to the town. On November 30, pro-regime
sources reported that security forces were forced to completely withdraw from
Kawm for the first time since April 2021. On the same day ISIS pushed security
forces out of Kawm, another cell launched an attack on regime forces stationed
in the village of Kadir to the north.



At least three other attacks occurred elsewhere in Homs in November. On
November 2, pro-regime pages reported that army units “repelled” an ISIS attack
near the Tanf region with “only one wounded soldier.” This attack likely
occurred near the Iraq border. On November 13, two soldiers were killed on the
Homs-Palmyra highway. On November 22 a soldier was wounded by a mine in the
Palmyra countryside.



Map of ISIS attacks in eastern Homs and Deir Ez Zor in 2021 and 2022. November
2022 attacks are highlighted (yellow pins).



A Brief Look at ISIS Cells



On November 30, ISIS announced the death of its leader, Abu Hasan al-Hashimi
al-Qurashi. Following the announcement, which U.S. CENTCOM released astatement
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claiming the man was killed by ex-rebels in Dara’a in mid-October. In
announcing its leader’s death, ISIS named a new caliph and ISIS groups from
across the world have since released photosets of their fighters pledging
allegiance to the new leader. Several suchphotos
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cells across Syria were published on December 2. Among them were photos of
Badia-based fighters which appear to show numerous children and teenagers,
something which has not been seen in photosets of armed Badia cells before.
This author has frequently written about ISIS’s use of the Badia for training
camps for children it recruits or kidnaps, primarily in northeast Syria. These
photos would appear to confirm this, revealing the newest generation of ISIS
recruits which have recently begun to be integrated into active cells.



A group of ISIS fighters in the Badia with numerous apparent children and
teenagers.



Looking Ahead



Despite the rise in quantity and complexity of ISIS attacks in recent months,
the continued lack of consistency in complex attacks compared with 2020
suggests that either ISIS does not have a large number of active fighters in
central Syria or does not feel confident enough in its ability to maintain a
high tempo without taking significant losses. However, the recent series of
battles around southern Raqqa and Kawm mark a serious, continued emphasis by
ISIS cells on securing and expanding its area of operations along the southern
Raqqa front. These actions show that despite whatever resource constraint the
group is currently facing, it is still able to concentrate resources on at
least two fronts it views as strategically important.



The killing of the ISIS caliph in mid-October in Dara’a and the subsequent
revelation that he spent at least the last few months in southern Syria suggest
that the central Syrian insurgency is able to escalate and make strategic
decisions absent any direct oversight from the ISIS central command. These
Badia cells are likely more tied into sub-regional command structures
stretching between northeast and central Syria, with senior leaders
coordinating on resource and troop movement with sectors in Iraq.



The apparent teenagers in the photos released of ISIS cells across Syria
should serve as a stark reminder that the al-Hol prison camp is not the only
“ticking time bomb” in terms of future ISIS members. The Syrian regime and its
allies have done a decent job of securing critical infrastructure across
central Syria over the past two years, but their forces have proven incapable
of destroying the large ISIS camps that the group has used for years to rebuild
and refit. It is these camps that enable ISIS to train the next generation of
fighters and prepare for future surges across the country.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (yellow pins) in November 2022 alongside attacks
in 2022 and 2021. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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