The Iranian regime’s second-most powerful leader was killed on Thursday by a US drone strike, ending the life of the man responsible for orchestrating widespread death and destruction through Iranian proxy militias in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq.

As Iran vows to avenge Major General Qassem Soleimani's death, will his absence bring about tectonic shifts in the world order? Below, Hudson experts examine the ramifications across the Middle East and beyond.

The Impact of Soleimani's Death

Michael Doran on Soleimani's significance in The New York Times:

More than any other American military operation since the invasion of Iraq, the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Soleimani is a seismic event. The killings of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leaders of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, were certainly meaningful, but they were also largely symbolic. Taking out the architect of the Islamic Republic’s decades-long active campaign of violence against the United States and its allies, especially Israel, represents a tectonic shift in Middle Eastern politics….

Such a response was long overdue. I know from my own experience, as a former senior official in the White House and the Defense Department, that the United States had several past opportunities to kill Mr. Soleimani but each time decided against it. This restraint did not make the world safer. It only gave Mr. Soleimani more time to build his empire, and, moreover, it enhanced his mystique as a man with an almost superhuman ability to evade detection.

Blaise Misztal on what US policymakers should focus on now:

The US has created opportunity to reverse over a decade of Iranian momentum. That opportunity will be wasted if these strikes are not followed by a political strategy to empower Iraqis (and Lebanese Kurds, etc.) who are willing to cast off Iranian tutelage and govern themselves.

John Lee on how China can take advantage of the strike:

China will exploit the assassination of Soleimani to paint the US – and the Trump administration in particular – as a disruptive and irresponsible power in global affairs. Bear in mind that this will occur in the context of China moving closer to US rivals such as Iran and Russia. Indeed, the three countries concluded their first joint naval drill on Monday that was held in the northern areas of the Indian Ocean. 

Even so, Beijing will be wary of being seen to be too close to Moscow and Tehran as the latter two are openly aggressive and revisionist nations - a label that would not serve Chinese interests even if that description is applicable.

Eric Brown on the hard truths of deterrence strategy:

America's civilian policymakers have re-learned that establishing deterrence against implacable foes requires not just greater investment in military power but turning the tables on them, attacking their strategies, and the acceptance of genuine risk.  Now, with the unraveling of the post-1991 geopolitical settlement, the U.S. and its allies need urgently to define our political objectives and red lines in not just the Middle East, but in Europe and Asia, and to set priorities and plans accordingly. 

Rebecca Heinrichs on the role of the Iraqi government:

The Iraqi government is responsible for providing security of the U.S. embassy, which it failed to do. That was a choice. Although the Iraqi government officially called on those within its borders not to attack Americans, it also denounced the U.S. retaliatory attacks against the Iran-backed militias and even described those killed as “martyrs.” The United States is lawfully in Iraq, but that situation is precarious. Since Obama withdrew the bulk of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, there has been no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) outlining the legal and diplomatic parameters for a long-term U.S. military presence in the country.

Douglas Feith on the Pentagon's message via the drone strike:

The Pentagon made an important statement when announcing Soleimani’s death: US forces killed him not in retaliation for past crimes, but in order to disrupt and prevent current Iranian plans to kill Americans. The goal of the US strike against Soleimani is not to start a war with Iran, but to persuade Iranian decision makers that they need to back down, deescalate and drop their plans to kill Americans. 

Until the Soleimani hit, the US administration responded mildly to a series of Iranian provocations. Now, it is showing that it is provoked. It is announcing that it will hit the Iranians hard if they target Americans. 

Michael Pregent on combating Iran's influence in Iraq:

The U.S. should threaten to halt training and equipment to an Iraqi security force that has been co-opted and infiltrated by militias tied to Iran. If those militias – only nominally under the control of the Iraqi government – and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Defense remain more loyal to the Iranian regime than Baghdad, we should no longer provide the Iraqi government with funds, training, equipment and intelligence. It makes no sense to train forces that will stand by while militias attack our troops – or worse,  participate in such attacks.

Jonas Parello-Plesner on European concerns:

Soleimani’s death increases short-term volatility—but it’s hardly the baneful event that is making "#WWIII" trend on Twitter. 

For Europeans, this adds to worries that the remains of the Nuclear Deal will fully falter. Iranians might use Soleimani’s death to push the needle on breakout time towards a nuclear capacity.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity

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