A Ukrainian soldier fires a US-made MK-19 automatic grenade launcher near the front lines of the conflict in the Donetsk region on October 12, 2022. (Dave Clark/AFP via Getty Images)

Even though the United States correctly predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine, President Joe Biden has followed a mistaken strategic mindset. Writing in the National Interest, Hudson Senior Fellows Peter Rough and Can Kasapoğlu argue that the president's approach, which they dub the “strategy of confinement,” has run its course. The White House needs to adopt a new strategy that makes Ukrainian victory the chief objective.

Key Insights

1. Biden sought to confine the war in Ukraine and achieve a negotiated settlement.

Well before the first Russian soldiers poured into Ukraine, the US assumed that a Russian military victory was inevitable. Instead of contesting Russia, the Biden administration prioritized minimizing US war commitments. The message to the Kremlin was clear: the president intended to confine Vladimir Putin’s aggression to Ukraine but not stop it. But then Ukraine did something that stunned the world: it began to win. Surprised, the Biden team adjusted its tactics but maintained the same strategic concept. It pledged to support Ukraine (after all, how could it not) but structured its assistance to keep the war confined within Ukraine’s borders. The tell was in the pattern of US military aid. When Ukraine suffered setbacks, the US rushed new weapons to Kyiv. But once the conflict stabilized, Washington slowed or denied Ukraine’s requests for still more systems. This attempt to carefully manage the war, dialing up and turning down assistance as the front line ebbed and flowed, remains the essence of American strategy. If Russia wasn’t going to steamroll Ukraine, then the American role would be to forge a military balance in Ukraine that would eventually lead to a negotiated settlement. But the strategy of confinement was never intended to deliver victory for Ukraine.

2. Moscow is not interested in a negotiated settlement.

On September 30, Putin chose to escalate the conflict by annexing four Ukrainian regions: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Once incorporated, Putin could no more return the regions to Ukraine than President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could accept their loss to Russia. Then in the span of less than a month, Putin mobilized the Russian population, threatened nuclear strikes, and instructed his defense minister to suggest the use of weapons of mass destruction. The message he is signaling is simple: there will be no military balance leading to settlement, only victory or defeat. In retrospect, the strategy of confinement not only failed to prevent but likely even incentivized Putin’s escalation. The West’s failure to deter Russia from invading Ukraine has been compounded by Biden’s unwillingness once the war began to endorse Ukraine’s goal of national liberation. As seen from the Kremlin, the Biden team’s fear of catastrophe suggests it would rather end the war than win it. By raising the stakes, Putin is slashing directly at what he believes is Biden’s Achilles’ heel.

3. The US can change its strategy to help Ukraine achieve victory.

It is not too late for the Biden administration to choose a better way. By making clear that it intends to empower Ukraine to victory rather than manage the conflict, the Biden administration could demonstrate to Putin the futility of escalation. To be sure, Putin would snarl at the West in anger, but he could not escape the stark choice between withdrawal and defeat. His forces are simply too weak to face down the West. If the US aligns its posture with Ukraine’s, the war may still drag on, but its outcome would no longer be in doubt. If Biden publicly committed the US to support Ukraine for as long as it seeks to liberate its own territory, Putin could no longer hope for a Western diplomatic initiative to bail him out.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length. 

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