Following is the October 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be found here, and
previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In October 2022



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In October 2022 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In October 2022

By Gregory Waters



Following is the October 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be foundhere
<[link removed]>,
and previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:January
<[link removed]>
,February
<[link removed]>
,March
<[link removed]>
,April
<[link removed]>
,May
<[link removed]>
,June
<[link removed]>
,July
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,August
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, andSeptember
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
<[link removed]>, here
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, andhere
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.



ISIS militants carried out at least 12 confirmed attacks in October in the
Raqqa, Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed
at least nine pro-Assad regime soldiers and two civilians and wounded 11 more.
Additionally, there were three high quality* attacks in October. Attacks, high
quality attacks, and deaths remained consistent with the recent increase in
ISIS activity following a historic low point reached in July. However, unlike
August and September, October’s confirmed activity was concentrated in Homs,
rather than in the southwest Raqqa region. (It is worth noting that all but two
of the confirmed southwest Raqqa attacks since August have come via ISIS
claims, so this perceived change in activity may only reflect a change in ISIS
media strategy, rather than a drop in actual attacks.)



ISIS continued the trend it began in August of claiming some Badia attacks,
claiming in October one attack in southern Aleppo and two in southwest Raqqa.
These media announcements come on the heels of July’s rare three-page editorial
in the group’s weekly Naba magazine detailing the activity of ISIS cells in
central Syria, which coincided with reports shared with this author of a
restructuring of ISIS’s Badia command. October also saw the launching of the
first major anti-ISIS operations of the year by regime forces, focused
primarily in eastern Hama, Homs, and Deir Ez Zor.



ISIS attacks increased sharply in Homs (6) following a three-month lull in the
province, dropped sharply in Deir Ez Zor (1) after a spike in confirmed
activity in September, and in Raqqa (2) after two months of elevated activity.
Confirmed ISIS activity remained steady in east Hama (2) and in southern Aleppo
(1). The sharp increase in Homs attacks is partially attributable to the
regime’s new anti-ISIS operations, which have encountered many mines and
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across the region.



Raqqa, Aleppo, and Hama



ISIS claimed all three of the attacks documented attacks in Aleppo and Raqqa
in October (none of which were reported on by regime media, which is standard
for these areas). The first occurred on October 5, when ISIS claimed an IED
attack on a regime military truck west of Khanasir, Aleppo. The second claim
was for a similar IED attack on a regime truck west of Tabqa, Raqqa, on October
24. Lastly, ISIS claimed a small arms attack on a regime barracks near the
Tabqa Airbase on October 30, which is confirmed to have killed at least one
soldier. These are the ninth, 10th, and 11th ISIS claims in central Syria since
the Naba magazine editorial in late July. Prior to that, ISIS had only claimed
one attack in central Syria in 2022.



There were two reported incidents in eastern Hama in October that could be
attributed to ISIS. The first occurred on October 6, when local Facebook pages
reported that unknown men on a motorbike had killed two civilians and wounded a
third in a drive-by shooting while the civilians were fishing in the
countryside. The attack reportedly occurred “near Abu Huwadid, in the northeast
Salamiyah countryside.” This author found two villages referred to as Abu
Huwadid on online maps, one southeast of Salamiyah, near Uqayribat, and one in
the far northeast, between Sa’an and Wadi Azeeb, that is also referred to as
Rasm Ahmar. Both of these areas are near previous ISIS hotspots. Furthermore,
the second Hama incident occurred on October 17 when a mine or IED destroyed a
regime National Defense Forces (NDF) truck near Wadi Azeeb, potentially linking
the October 6 assailants with the nearby mine attack a week later. The October
17 attack killed three regime fighters, including the commander of the unit,
and wounded six others.



Map of ISIS attacks in southern Aleppo, southwest Raqqa, and east Hama in 2021
and 2022. October 2022 attacks are highlighted.



Homs and Deir Ez Zor



There was one confirmed attack in Deir Ez Zor in October. Two local members of
the regime’s 4th Division were killed on October 3 in the village of Toub, next
to Bouleel, on the Euphrates River between the cities of Mayadin and Deir Ez
Zor. If the two men were killed by ISIS it would mark a rare attack deep in the
urban belt controlled by the regime, and along the critical smuggling routes
across the Euphrates. However, local journalistZain al-Abidin
<[link removed]> told this author that, according to his
sources, it is believed the men were killed alongside three other
Iranian-backed militiamen due to an internal conflict over control of the
smuggling route. Al-Abidin said a similar incident occurred nearby in Salihiyah
on October 6 when 4th Division soldiers killed six others in a smuggling
dispute. This author could not verify the alleged October 3 incident, and an
NDF member he spoke to denied that there was infighting in Deir Ez Zor.
However, with the continuing crash of the Syrian economy, controlling smuggling
has become exceedingly important for armed groups to maintain funding, so it
would not be surprising if battles broke out over the issue. However, even if
the killing was a bout of regime infighting rather than an ISIS attack, such
incidents only weaken regime security and play into ISIS’s hands.



Homs experienced the most ISIS attacks in October. The first attack was
reported on October 3, when serious fighting broke out east of al-Kawm between
ISIS cells and regime militiamen from Liwa al-Quds and the local NDF. Security
forces were forced to abandon their outlying positions despite the use of
regime warplanes. It is worth noting that just three weeks earlier, a group of
ISIS fighters had ambushed regime forces north of al-Kawm, near the Kadir Oil
Field.



On October 9, a soldier from the 4th Division’s Security Office was reported
killed somewhere on the Palmyra-Deir Ez Zor highway, likely by a mine or IED.
On October 12, a regime source reported that three 17th Division soldiers had
recently disappeared while on patrol east of the Tanf zone, likely either
kidnapped or had deserted to ISIS (ISIS cells entering from Iraq had ambushed
17th Division soldiers in this area on September 1 as well). On October 18, a
member of the Russian Wagner PMC was reportedly injured by a mine while
assisting Liwa al-Quds fighters in an anti-ISIS clearing mission around the
Jazal Field area of Homs. Local pro-regime media pages reported the death of a
soldier somewhere in Homs on October 29, and on October 31, a mine or IED
destroyed a regime military truck near Palmyra, killing one soldier and
wounding four.



Map of ISIS attacks in eastern Homs and Deir Ez Zor in 2021 and 2022. October
2022 attacks are highlighted. Missing from the map is one attack that occurred
somewhere in eastern Homs.



Regime Operations



The Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies launched new, widespread
anti-ISIS operations at the start of October, the first serious operations of
2022. Russian military officials traveled to southern Raqqa to meet with
leaders of the local al-Ajil Tribe early in the month in an attempt secure
local assistance in rooting out the cells targeting Tabqa Airbase. Meanwhile,
Iranian-commanded Afghans from Liwa Fatemiyoun deployed to the T3 Pumping
Station southwest of Palmyra in order to conduct new sweeping operations
northeast towards the Wadi Doubayat area, which has long been an ISIS safe
zone. Elsewhere in Homs, Syrian Army units from the 17th and 18th Divisions
continued patrols which began in September east of al-Tanf along the Iraq
border. The regime believes this area is being used by ISIS cells to infiltrate
Syria from Iraq. In Deir Ez Zor, NDF, tribal militias, and 4th Division
fighters have been conducting sweeps in the Mayadin region. NDF fighters have
also been conducting de-mining operations in east Hama throughout October.



These operations, which are focused on a mix of demining (particularly in east
Hama and east Homs) and rooting out ISIS caches and hideouts (mostly in
southeast Homs and Deir Ez Zor) have led to the discovery and destruction of
several ISIS caches, particularly by Liwa al-Quds fighters in the mountains
north of Palmyra.



Looking Ahead



October’s recorded incidents somewhat bucked the more high-tempo trend set in
August and September. While ISIS cells managed to conduct at least four serious
attacks—the fighting in Kawm, which seized regime positions, and the IEDs and
small arms attack in Khanasir and Tabqa, deep within regime territory—the
largescale regime operation is clearly pressuring the group across the Badia.
At least six of October’s attacks can in some way be attributed to the
anti-ISIS operations—units either encountering old mines or being hit by new
mines/IEDs while venturing into ISIS hotspots.



The continued absence of more regular, complex attacks (i.e., the October 3
Kawm attack) compared with 2020 suggests that ISIS does not have a large number
of fighters in central Syria, or at least they are not active at any one time.
It could be that ISIS is still focusing its forces on northeast Syria (the
group claimed 15 attacks here in October), or simply it does not have enough
men to risk carrying out more brazen attacks since the regime flooded the Badia
with more soldiers in 2021. As with northeast Syria, the group seems to have
settled on a longer term, methodical approach, unwilling to risk too many
assets at a time when they have no hope of returning to territorial control,
but still working to keep pressure on local security forces while they recruit,
train, and fundraise for the next generation of fighters. However, the
continued activity around the Tabqa airbase should not go unheeded by
policymakers, as such brazen attacks against a key regime and Russian security
node suggests that ISIS believes its Raqqa cells are in a strong position,
which could ultimately lead to increased security threats in SDF-held areas of
Raqqa.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (yellow pins) in October 2022 alongside attacks
in 2022 and 2021. Not pictured is one attack that occurred somewhere in east
Homs. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
<[link removed]>
.



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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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