Almost a decade after the onset of Mali’s Islamist insurgency, Bamako has yet
to see a cessation of the conflict. According to the Armed Conflict Location
and Event Data Project (ACLED), Mali has witnessed some of its highest casualty
figures in the past year since the start of the crisis in early 2012, when
Islamist groups took control of the country’s north until being forced out by
French troops.





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Mali’s Deepening Extremist Crisis: Stability In The Sahel Falters As Russian
Influence Increases



Read Mali’s Deepening Extremist Crisis: Stability In The Sahel Falters As
Russian Influence Increases by clickinghere
<[link removed]>
.



Mali’s Deepening Extremist Crisis: Stability In The Sahel Falters As Russian
Influences Increases

By Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler and Riza Kumar



Almost a decade after the onset of Mali’s Islamist insurgency, Bamako has yet
to see a cessation of the conflict. According to theArmed Conflict Location and
Event Data Project <[link removed]> (ACLED), Mali has witnessed some of
its highest casualty figures in the past year since the start of the crisis in
early 2012, when Islamist groups took control of the country’s north until
being forced out by French troops. The crisis has only intensified since Mali’s
coup leaders partnered with mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group, a
controversial paramilitary organization that has already been accused of a
string of civilian massacres. Already grappling with terrorist violence from
groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS, the Sahel—and particularly Mali’s neighbors
such as Burkina Faso and Niger—face new degrees of violent spillover if Mali
does not contain the jihadist insurgency and curtail the growing influence of
Russia.



Across the Sahel, 13 million people
<[link removed]>
in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger require humanitarian assistance, and as of
May 2022, almost363,000 Malians <[link removed]> have
been displaced by ongoing jihadist violence and political instability. Mali has
been central to the violence across the Sahel. The Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara (ISGS)operates
<[link removed]>
in the northeast of Mali andcooperates
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with the much largerIslamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
<[link removed]>, which
is operating from Nigeria into the Lake Chad Basin. With the establishment of
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)
<[link removed]>
in 2017, al-Qaeda was able to combine various local affiliates and
significantly increase its operational capabilities across Mali and the greater
Sahel. Several groups that are part of JNIM, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and Katiba Macina, are especially active in Mali and terrorize
the north of the country on an almost daily basis.



Mali has undergone two military coups since 2020. Relations between Mali and
France deteriorated dramatically given the Malian regime’s reluctance to
transition to civilian rule. The already weak security landscape was further
compromised when France announced plans to completely withdraw their troops
from Mali by 2022. Once a force of 5,000 soldiers, the last French army unit
withdrew from Mali on August 15. Although France also spearheaded the Takuba
Taskforce—a European military force that advised, assisted, and accompanied
Malian Armed forces in the Sahel—on February 17, 2022, European leaders
announced that Takuba forces would also withdraw from Mali due to Bamako’s
increasing alignment with Russia.



In addition to breaking ties with Europe, Mali has also chosen to endorse a
counterterrorism strategy independent of its neighbors. Following a military
coup in May 2021, Bamako’s new regime had its sights on asserting dominance
throughout the region. On May 15, 2022, Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel, a West
African military force fighting terrorists across the region. Mali announced
its withdrawal from the group—which also includes Mauritania, Chad, Burkina
Faso, and Niger—in protest after its campaign to head the force was rejected.
Although Mali’s military government claimed the force’s lack of progress in
defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda ultimately determined Bamako’s decision, their
departure from the force has further weakened cross-border coordination. As
France transferred control of military bases to the Malian armed forces, its
neighbors’ borders are becoming more at risk from Islamist groups seeking to
expand their range of operations. JNIM has begun to operate in Burkina Faso and
Niger, and ISGS is also competing with JNIM for greater control throughout
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In March 2022, ISGS stepped upattacks
<[link removed]>
on the border between Mali and Niger due to the lack of air support from
France and others.



Furthermore, the military government in Mali also takes a very critical stand
towards the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA), established in 2013 to stabilize the country. Since the summer
of 2022, the government regularlysuspended
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troop rotations of MINUSMA forces, significantly hampering the ability of
MINUSMA to fulfill its mandate. In July 2022, the regime alsoexpelled the
spokesperson
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of the mission, after he publicly criticized the arrest of a contingent of
soldiers from the Ivory Coast in Mali that were enroute to serve with MINUSMA.
Most of these soldiersremain in Malian custody
<[link removed].>
and are charged withundermining state security
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.



Mali’s refusal to continue its relationship with Western and regional partners
as well as its relationship with U.N. peacekeeping forces has created a
security vacuum throughout the Sahel that is being swiftly exploited by Russia.
The mercenaries of the Wagner Group do little to avoid civilian casualties—as
made evident by their partnership with the Malian armed forces in theexecution
of 300 civilians
<[link removed]> in
March 2022—and evensupported
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Burkina Faso’s September 2022 violent coup. Russia is also known for peddling
disinformation campaigns. In theCentral African Republic
<[link removed]>
, movies portrayed Russians as heroes, and inMali
<[link removed]>,
coordinated campaigns across Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and other platforms
disseminated anti-French, anti-U.N., and pro-Russian propaganda. Communication
and cooperation across the Sahel will prove more difficult as Russia actively
supports increasingly authoritarian leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso.



As some countries in the Sahel shift their partnership away from Western
countries and towards Russia, the Kremlin has its eyes fixed on furthering its
own interests in the region. In the Central African Republic, Russian
mercenaries reportedly led counterinsurgency operations, and in the process,
also obtained natural resource contracts. Similarly, Mali and Burkina Faso have
deep reserves of gold and other precious minerals.



If the countries of the Sahel seek sustainable regional security, the Kremlin
cannot be a key player in determining the region’s counterterrorism response.
Defeating insurgent networks will require far greater regional collaboration
and coordination that goes beyond kinetic operations. Stabilization efforts
will require political, developmental, and humanitarian instruments to offset
the destruction caused by the constantly evolving extremist threat. By
partnering with forces responsible for brutalizing its own population, Mali’s
counterterrorism strategy is hardly more than indiscriminate violence in the
name of fighting terrorists, which has always proven to be a losing strategy.



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