Following is the August 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be found here, and
previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links: January,
February, March, April, May, June, and July. A full background and analysis of
ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the methodology used to collect this
data, can also be explored here, here, and here.





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2022



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2022 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In August 2022

By Gregory Waters



Following is the August 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be foundhere
<[link removed]>,
and previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:January
<[link removed]>
,February
<[link removed]>
,March
<[link removed]>
,April
<[link removed]>
,May
<[link removed]>
,June
<[link removed]>
, andJuly
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
<[link removed]>, here
<[link removed]>
, andhere
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS militants carried out at least seven confirmed attacks in August in the
Raqqa, Aleppo, Homs and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least
nine pro-Assad regime soldiers and wounded 11 more. There was one high quality*
attack in August. August attacks climbed back to the spring average following
an unprecedently quiet July. Interestingly, August’s activity was concentrated
in the southwest Raqqa region, an area that has not witnessed much violent
activity for many months. It is worth noting, however, that regime forces began
new sweeping missions here in July following recurring reports of suspected
ISIS movement in the desert plains in the south of the governorate. ISIS also
claimed three attacks in southern Raqqa in August—the first attacks claimed in
the Badia since June 2022, and only the second, third, and fourth claims made
here since November 2021. These media announcements come on the heels of July’s
rare three-page editorial in the group’s weekly Naba magazine detailing the
activity of ISIS cells in central Syria.



ISIS attacks in southern Raqqa (4) and Aleppo (1) both rose, following a four
month lull in which only one attack was conducted in Raqqa. Attacks in Homs
(1), Deir Ez Zor (1), and east Hama (0) were consistent compared with July.
Comparatively, ISIS claimed 18 attacks in northeast Syria in August, roughly
consistent with July, and 38 attacks in Iraq, an increase from July. It should
be noted that these are only attacks claimed by ISIS, and in northeast Syria at
least, ISIS conducts additional, unclaimed violent activity, expecially in
eastern Deir Ez Zor.



Raqqa, Aleppo, and Hama



Three of the four confirmed attacks in Raqqa were reported only by ISIS—that
is, there was no public regime media acknowledging the attacks. This should not
necessarily come as a surprise, however, as attack reporting from Raqqa is very
difficult to pin down. The first claim was of a small arms ambush west of Tabqa
in which ISIS claims it killed four soldiers in a vehicle. The second claim was
of a mine planted on the road leading to the Tabqa Air Base—used by Russian air
assets supporting regime anti-ISIS operations—which allegedly killed one
soldier. The third attack was reported by pro-regime media. On August 21, local
Facebook pages reported that five soldiers were wounded by a mine near the
village of Kadir, in southern Raqqa. Kadir village sits on the southern edge of
the large Kadir Oil field, between Resafa and Kawm, Homs. Small arms ambushes
occurred in this area in both March and April of this year. The last attack was
claimed by ISIS on August 28 and again involved a mine along the Tabqa Air Base
road, allegedly killing two soldiers.



Pro-regime media reported a mine attack in southern Aleppo on August 23, the
first confirmed attack in the governorate since March 2022. The mine reportedly
wounded two soldiers at the “Zakia point,” an outpost along the Ithriya-Tabqa
highway that sits on the southern edge of the Ithriya Oil Field. ISIS captured
several checkpoints here in September 2020, and engaged in small arms clashes
with regime forces in this area in December 2020, January 2021, and October
2021.



There were no reported attacks or mine incidents in east Hama for the second
month in a row.



Map of ISIS attacks in southwest Raqqa and south Aleppo in 2021 and 2022.
August 2022 attacks are marked by the red pins.



Homs and Deir Ez Zor



On August 7, pro-regime media announced the death of a soldier somewhere in
the Deir Ez Zor governorate.



Pro-regime media also reported a mine attack on regime forces near the Uwayrid
Dam in southeast Homs on August 19, killing one and wounding four soldiers.
This remote dam sits close to the Iraq border and the US-controlled Tanf Zone.
In 2018, it was the site of several large ISIS ambushes against regime forces.



Looking Ahead



Several interesting ISIS attacks in central Syria took place in August, highly
reminiscent of the type of activity seen in 2020. While ISIS only carried out
seven confirmed attacks, the choice of targets may represent a shift in
strategy or the start of a new low-simmering campaign. At least five of the
attacks targeted regime infrastructure: The two mines in Kadir and Zakia
targeted forces operating around the respective oil fields, while the mines and
ambush claimed by ISIS near Tabqa targeted forces moving to and from the air
base. The Tabqa Air Base has proven critical for regime forces operating
against ISIS since 2021, with Russian helicopters frequently deployed there
providing air support for both convoys and patrols.



The Uwayrid Dam mine attack is also interesting. It is not clear to this
author if the regime maintains a permanent presence in this area, or if the
targeted soldiers were conducting new patrols. The region is quite remote and
its proximity to the Anbar desert in Iraq and the vast southern Homs desert has
likely made it a key spot in recent years where ISIS cells can move between the
two countries and run training camps.



It remains to be seen if both this level and type of activity is maintained in
September. There have already been several months in 2022 when spikes in ISIS
activity were followed by steep declines. Furthermore, three of the seven
confirmed attacks were only able to be documented due to ISIS claiming them.
This should again serve as a reminder that ISIS largely controls our (lack of)
understanding of the central Syria insurgency. The lack of reporting by
pro-regime media from the region—and a complete absence of reliable opposition
media—means that if ISIS does not publicize their attacks, then they will
likely go unknown to analysts and outside observers.



Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted pins) in August 2022. Not pictured
is one attack that occurred somewhere in Deir Ez Zor. To view an interactive
version of this map, please clickhere
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.



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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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