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Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Six months ago today, Russia started its invasion of Ukraine, and on this occasion Hudson Senior Fellows Peter Rough [[link removed]], Luke Coffey [[link removed]], Rebeccah Heinrichs [[link removed]], Can Kasapoğlu [[link removed]], and William Schneider [[link removed]] explain why the war matters and offer their policy recommendations [[link removed]] for what the United States and its allies should do now. Some highlights are below:

1. Ukraine Is Not a Borderland

Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule.

2. A Russian Victory Would Have Geopolitical and Economic Consequences

A Russian breakthrough in Ukraine would put military pressure on NATO. Russia’s economically more powerful partner, China, would also draft on Russia’s military success to increase its influence across Eurasia, leading countries to hedge in ways that go well beyond the recent friction over Huawei. Such a Sino-Russian advance would directly threaten the prosperity of the US. At well over $1.5 trillion in annual trade, the transatlantic economy is the largest in the world. Last year, 48 of the 50 US states exported more to Europe than to China, while European foreign direct investment in the US totaled nearly $3.2 trillion. Those exports and investments sustain millions of US jobs— and depend on the American-led order reigning supreme in Europe.

3. Ukraine Is Not Winning

The argument that Ukraine is winning is delusional. It may not be defeated, but it cannot liberate itself, either. Instead, it is condemned to perpetual warfare—and anguish. This is because the West employs a symmetrical strategy of weapons assistance in the hopes of establishing an equilibrium between Russia and Ukraine that leads to negotiations.

4. How Putin and the West Manage the Clock

Putin clearly isn’t interested in equilibrium. He is in it to win it. We can think of his strategy as guided by two ticking clocks: the first measures Russian military losses, and the second measures the West’s economic pain. Putin’s goal is to slow down the first clock and speed up the second. To that end, he has threatened nuclear war to deter Western military aid, switched to large-scale artillery offensives to preserve manpower, targeted civilians to kill Ukrainian morale, and shut down energy flows to weaken Europe’s resolve. The West has proven less adept at clock management. Of course, the current military assistance hurts the Russian military, as will the West’s export controls of high-end technologies. But these strategies encourage a slow-moving, grinding conflict that Ukraine can only win years down the road, if ever. Moreover, this approach presupposes that Western public opinion will strongly support Ukraine indefinitely.

5. Some Ways the West Should Respond

If the US removes its caveats and empowers Ukraine to strike Russian supplies deep behind enemy lines, the balance of power might change. Ukraine could then exploit such strikes through counteroffensives made possible by a menu of weapons yet to be delivered. For starters, Ukraine would benefit greatly from more of what is already working: HIMARS and M777 howitzers. Most of all, Ukraine needs an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability, which medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle and MQ-9 Reaper can provide.

Click here to read more policy recommendations for how the West can help Ukraine now. [[link removed]]

Go Deeper

In National Review, Hudson Senior Fellow Marshall Billingslea [[link removed]] and Victoria Coates explain [[link removed]] that the US and China cannot have real cooperation on Ukraine, and that defeating Putin in Ukraine will help contain Xi Jinping.

Luke Coffey [[link removed]] explains why the Russia-Ukraine War matters for Americans and gave nine policy recommendations [[link removed]] for how the United States and the West can prepare Ukraine for victory.

The West should not conclude that Putin’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his goals in Ukraine, argues Senior Fellow Can Kasapoğlu [[link removed]] in his policy memo [[link removed]]. He recommends how the West can thwart Putin’s strategy and safeguard Ukraine’s independence.

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