[ Military contracting "obscures where and how taxpayer money
flows," and "makes it difficult to know how many people are employed,
injured, and killed," said the Costs of War Project reports author.]
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PENTAGON CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN POCKETED $108 BILLION OVER 20
YEARS  
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Jessica Corbett
August 9, 2022
Common Dreams
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_ Military contracting "obscures where and how taxpayer money flows,"
and "makes it difficult to know how many people are employed, injured,
and killed," said the Costs of War Project report's author. _

Contractors from the Bagram Air Field Retrosort Yard load a water
tank onto a contracted transportation truck. , Photo: 1st Lt. Henry
Chan, 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion Public Affairs/U.S.
Army // Common Dreams

 

Pentagon contractors operating in Afghanistan over the past two
decades raked in nearly $108 billion—funds that "were distributed
and spent with a significant lack of transparency," according to a
report published Tuesday.

"These contracts show the shadowy 'camo economy' at work in
Afghanistan."

"These contracts show the shadowy 'camo economy' at work in
Afghanistan," said report author Heidi Peltier, director of programs
for the Costs of War Project at Brown Univesity's Watson Institute for
International and Public Affairs.

"Military contracting obscures where and how taxpayer money flows, who
profits, and how much is lost to waste, fraud, and abuse," she added.
"It also makes it difficult to know how many people are employed,
injured, and killed through military contracting."

Based on Peltier's review of public contracting
databases—USASpending.gov and the Federal Procurement Data
System—just over a dozen U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
contractors got more than $44 billion, or about 41% of the almost $108
billion, from 2002 to this year.

As the document details:

In addition, thousands of smaller companies earned billions in
contract spending, and about one-third of the contracts (in dollar
terms) went to companies that are listed as "undisclosed" or
"miscellaneous" in the data. These designations result from the
contracts being given to foreign companies without a "DUNS" number, or
they are undisclosed with national security or protection as a claimed
rationale for secrecy. Whatever the reason, this creates an opacity
that makes it impossible to know who exactly received U.S. taxpayer
funds, what work was performed, how much profit was earned, and
whether the intended purposes of the contracts were served.

Inadequate oversight, coupled with the issue of sub-contracting,
results in a system in which the U.S. government pays contractors who
then leave a trail of spending that is nearly impossible to follow.

"A number of companies performed services in Afghanistan under
multiple different business names," the analysis notes. "A generous
interpretation of this is that the businesses pursuing such practices
were in fact performing different services. A less generous
interpretation is that businesses can obscure how many contracts they
are receiving as well as circumvent issues of ineligibility by
operating under different names."

The report emphasizes that the almost $108 billion that Peltier
focused on is "in addition to the trillions of dollars spent on DOD
contracts performed in the U.S. over that period."

The contractors examined by Peltier were paid for construction,
lodging, office supplies, refrigeration equipment, transportation,
waste disposal, and weapons maintenance in the war-torn country. They
operated various facilities—such as dining and troop housing—and
were contracted for accounting, fuel, food, guard, and surveillance
services.

During the nearly two-decade U.S. occupation, the analysis states,
"contractors provided all types of goods and services that were
essential to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, including
services (such as weapons maintenance and fuel supply) that made the
U.S. military dependent on and arguably vulnerable to the performance
of contractors."

"Most contracts for work in Afghanistan ended or were rescinded by
August 31, 2021, when U.S. troops fully withdrew," the report says.
"Some contractor presence may remain, though it is difficult to know
which companies and how many employees could still be working in
service of the U.S. government in that country."

Transparency is a major focus of the document, which highlights that
"lack of oversight by the Department of Defense, combined with waste,
fraud, and abuse on the part of both contractors and government
employees, resulted in billions of misallocated and misspent taxpayer
dollars."

The analysis cites reports by the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) and
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In
one case involving insufficient voucher reviews for a major contract
from 2015 to 2017, the new report notes, "one-fifth of them had
questionable or undocumented expenses, totaling over $536 million."

In another case, SIGAR found that "a subcontractor of Lockheed Martin
submitted fraudulent invoices that resulted in overbilling the
Department of Defense millions of dollars."

Peltier's report also points to government watchdogs' findings of
"incomplete and shoddy construction of school buildings, warehouses,
and other facilities" as well as "bribery of U.S. officials to secure
contracts."

SIGAR, in its quarterly report to Congress this past January,
"conservatively estimated nearly 30% of U.S. appropriations for
Afghanistan reconstruction from 2009 to 2019 was lost to waste, fraud,
and abuse." The Pentagon was responsible for the bulk of that
spending.

The Brown analysis explains that "the overpayment of illegitimate
expenses, and the lack of oversight of contracts by DOD was compounded
by yet another problem: In some cases, contractors were hired to
perform oversight of other contractors, in lieu of the oversight that
should have been performed by DOD."

Peltier told Responsible Statecraft—which exclusively reported on
the new document—that the DODIG "also found oversight by the DOD
itself to be insufficient or poorly executed, so really the oversight
problems are both 'the fox guarding the hen house' as well as internal
issues (which in some cases are because of corruption, and in other
cases just poor execution)."

The researcher suggested that to help prevent abuse, "there should be
a committee or other body to make determinations of whether certain
contracts can legitimately be labeled as 'undisclosed.'"

"I would recommend the DOD reduce its contracting overall and return
to providing more services in-house," Peltier added, referencing
"services like weapons maintenance and security, but also things like
food services and lodging, in order to have more command in fulfilling
its own needs and reduce the use of contracts and the opportunities
for waste, fraud, and abuse."

In a statement Tuesday, Stephanie Savell, co-director of the Costs of
War Project, put Peltier's findings about Pentagon contractor spending
into a broader context.

"One hundred billion is an enormous amount of money, but it's also
just a drop in the bucket when it comes to the full costs of the
post-9/11 wars," Savell noted. "Nearly a million people ha

PENTAGON CONTRACTORS OPERATING IN Afghanistan over the past two
decades raked in nearly $108 billion—funds that "were distributed
and spent with a significant lack of transparency," according to
a report
[[link removed]] published
Tuesday.

"These contracts show the shadowy 'camo economy' at work in
Afghanistan."

"These contracts show the shadowy 'camo economy' at work in
Afghanistan," said report author Heidi Peltier, director of programs
for the Costs of War Project at Brown Univesity's Watson Institute for
International and Public Affairs.

"Military contracting obscures where and how taxpayer money flows, who
profits, and how much is lost to waste, fraud, and abuse," she added.
"It also makes it difficult to know how many people are employed,
injured, and killed through military contracting."

Based on Peltier's review of public contracting
databases—USASpending.gov and the Federal Procurement Data
System—just over a dozen U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
contractors got more than $44 billion, or about 41% of the almost $108
billion, from 2002 to this year.

As the document details:

In addition, thousands of smaller companies earned billions in
contract spending, and about one-third of the contracts (in dollar
terms) went to companies that are listed as "undisclosed" or
"miscellaneous" in the data. These designations result from the
contracts being given to foreign companies without a "DUNS" number, or
they are undisclosed with national security or protection as a claimed
rationale for secrecy. Whatever the reason, this creates an opacity
that makes it impossible to know who exactly received U.S. taxpayer
funds, what work was performed, how much profit was earned, and
whether the intended purposes of the contracts were served.

Inadequate oversight, coupled with the issue of sub-contracting,
results in a system in which the U.S. government pays contractors who
then leave a trail of spending that is nearly impossible to follow.

"A number of companies performed services in Afghanistan under
multiple different business names," the analysis notes. "A generous
interpretation of this is that the businesses pursuing such practices
were in fact performing different services. A less generous
interpretation is that businesses can obscure how many contracts they
are receiving as well as circumvent issues of ineligibility by
operating under different names."

The report emphasizes that the almost $108 billion that Peltier
focused on is "in addition to the trillions of dollars spent on DOD
contracts performed in the U.S. over that period."

The contractors examined by Peltier were paid for construction,
lodging, office supplies, refrigeration equipment, transportation,
waste disposal, and weapons maintenance in the war-torn country. They
operated various facilities—such as dining and troop housing—and
were contracted for accounting, fuel, food, guard, and surveillance
services.

During the nearly two-decade U.S. occupation
[[link removed]],
the analysis states, "contractors provided all types of goods and
services that were essential to the U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan, including services (such as weapons maintenance and fuel
supply) that made the U.S. military dependent on and arguably
vulnerable to the performance of contractors."

"Most contracts for work in Afghanistan ended or were rescinded by
August 31, 2021, when U.S. troops fully withdrew," the report says.
"Some contractor presence may remain, though it is difficult to know
which companies and how many employees could still be working in
service of the U.S. government in that country."

Transparency is a major focus of the document, which highlights that
"lack of oversight by the Department of Defense, combined with waste,
fraud, and abuse on the part of both contractors and government
employees, resulted in billions of misallocated and misspent taxpayer
dollars."

The analysis cites reports by the DOD Inspector General (DODIG) and
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In
one case involving insufficient voucher reviews for a major contract
from 2015 to 2017, the new report notes, "one-fifth of them had
questionable or undocumented expenses, totaling over $536 million."

In another case, SIGAR found that "a subcontractor of Lockheed Martin
submitted fraudulent invoices that resulted in overbilling the
Department of Defense millions of dollars."

Peltier's report also points to government watchdogs' findings of
"incomplete and shoddy construction of school buildings, warehouses,
and other facilities" as well as "bribery of U.S. officials to secure
contracts."

SIGAR, in its quarterly report to Congress this past January,
"conservatively estimated nearly 30% of U.S. appropriations for
Afghanistan reconstruction from 2009 to 2019 was lost to waste, fraud,
and abuse." The Pentagon was responsible for the bulk of that
spending.

The Brown analysis explains that "the overpayment of illegitimate
expenses, and the lack of oversight of contracts by DOD was compounded
by yet another problem: In some cases, contractors were hired to
perform oversight of other contractors, in lieu of the oversight that
should have been performed by DOD."

Peltier told
[[link removed]] _Responsible
Statecraft_—which exclusively reported on the new document—that
the DODIG "also found oversight by the DOD itself to be insufficient
or poorly executed, so really the oversight problems are both 'the fox
guarding the hen house' as well as internal issues (which in some
cases are because of corruption, and in other cases just poor
execution)."

The researcher suggested that to help prevent abuse, "there should be
a committee or other body to make determinations of whether certain
contracts can legitimately be labeled as 'undisclosed.'"

"I would recommend the DOD reduce its contracting overall and return
to providing more services in-house," Peltier added, referencing
"services like weapons maintenance and security, but also things like
food services and lodging, in order to have more command in fulfilling
its own needs and reduce the use of contracts and the opportunities
for waste, fraud, and abuse."

In a statement Tuesday, Stephanie Savell, co-director of the Costs of
War Project, put Peltier's findings about Pentagon contractor spending
into a broader context.

"One hundred billion is an enormous amount of money, but it's also
just a drop in the bucket when it comes to the full costs of the
post-9/11 wars," Savell noted. "Nearly a million people have lost
their lives in these wars and U.S. taxpayers have paid over $2.3
trillion for the war in Afghanistan alone—and over $8 trillion total
for the post-9/11 wars in other places as well."

"It's shocking," she said, "that the U.S. government hasn't had a
serious reckoning with the U.S. militarized counterterrorism model and
its human and financial costs over the past two decades."

ve lost their lives in these wars and U.S. taxpayers have paid over
$2.3 trillion for the war in Afghanistan alone—and over $8 trillion
total for the post-9/11 wars in other places as well."

"It's shocking," she said, "that the U.S. government hasn't had a
serious reckoning with the U.S. militarized counterterrorism model and
its human and financial costs over the past two decades."

_[Jessica Corbett is a staff writer for Common Dreams.]_

_Licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to
republish and share widely._

* military spending
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* US Military Spending
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* Afghanistan
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* Afghanistan War
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* Pentagon
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* Pentagon Budget
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* defense spending
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* defense contractors
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* military weapons
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* military-industrial complex
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* War on Terror
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