Following is the July 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in ce





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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2022



Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2022 by clicking here
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In July 2022

By Gregory Waters



Following is the July 2022 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. A review of developments throughout 2021 can be foundhere
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and previous editions in 2022 can be viewed through the following links:January
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,February
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,March
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,April
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,May
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, and June
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. A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
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, andhere
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.



ISIS militants carried out at least two confirmed attacks in July in the Homs
and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least three pro-Assad
regime soldiers. This is the fewest number of confirmed attacks and casualties
recorded by this author in at least three years. As stated in previous updates,
the reduced level of ISIS activity occurred despite no changes in the Syrian
regime’s security posture and was therefore likely a result of ISIS’s own
strategic decision-making. There were no high quality* attacks in July. The
first confirmed attack occurred on July 11 when a soldier was reported killed
somewhere in the Badia and the second, on July 18, when two soldiers were
reported killed by a mine in Deir Ez Zor.



It is unclear why there were virtually no reported ISIS attacks in central
Syria in July, as there were no major anti-ISIS operations carried out this
month (although Liwa al-Quds fighters began a new sweep in the Jabal Omour area
north of Palmyra, uncovering several ISIS caches in caves). It should be noted
that during July, claimed ISIS attacks remained steady in Iraq (33) compared to
June and more than doubled in northeast Syria (20). The latter region has also
seenconsistent
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reporting
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recently of continued ISIS recruitment among vulnerable youth, a reality
detailed in the recent International Crisis Groupreport
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on ISIS networks in northeast and central Syria.



Interestingly, ISIS released two significant media products from the Badia in
late July. First, the July 28 edition of its weeklyNaba magazine contained a
three-page interview with an alleged senior ISIS commander in the Badia. This
interview transcript was followed the next day by a rare series of official
pictures being shared on ISIS Telegram channels.



The July 28 interview covered a range of topics, from introducing ISIS
supporters to the geography of the Badia to discussing both ISIS’s and the
regime’s military campaigns in the region. A complete transcript of the Badia
interview can be foundonline
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and will not be reproduced here. However, there are several interesting
responses worth highlighting.



After describing the harsh geography of the desert, the interviewer asks how
the militants manage to survive. The interviewee (“military official”) does not
respond directly, instead extolling the high level of theological and
ideological devotion the fighters have for their cause. As has been reported by
this author, much of ISIS’s ability to survive in the desert in the past
depended on the ability to trade with local villagers—an ability that has been
significantly diminished in the past year as economic and security concerns
have driven communities to the urban centers in the east and west of the Badia.



The interviewer then asks about the day-to-day routine of the fighters. Here,
the official makes several important comments:



“The mujahid spends his daily life in the Badiya moving between preparation of
faith and physical and military preparation… so from ribat on the frontlines,
keeping a look out for the enemies of God, to helping the mujahideen in
fulfilling their needs, to making military preparations through participation
in assignments of rigging explosives, making IEDs and explosive belts, to
operations of observance of enemy movements, and from raids and assaults on
patrols and convoys of the Nusayris and their allies, to participating in
repelling campaigns and thwarting penetrations.”



The official references training camps and preparation hubs, where ISIS
militants can build IEDs and suicide belts. This is a crucial role the Badia
plays for the larger ISIS insurgency in Syria, providing a safer space for the
group to train new recruits, and a fallback area for preparing weapons and
supplies for attacks in northeast Syria. He also claims that the cells are on
‘ribat’ (here essentially meaning guard duty out remote outposts), which would
only make sense in an environment where ISIS was solidly in control of certain
territory, and refers to fighters conducting reconnaissance missions to observe
regime military movements. This latter concept is something this author has
emphasized throughout monthly updates this year. The renewed highway attacks on
lone regime buses in 2022 suggests that, while militants stopped attacking the
highways, they remained able to observe them, waiting to strike the most
vulnerable targets. In a later statement, the official cites these actions as
being crucial for the group’s ability to target Syrian and Russian military
leadership in the Badia.



The official expands on this concept in his response to the next question:



“Regarding the military and field situation, by the grace of God alone, vast
areas of the Badiya have been falling in a security sense into the hands of the
mujahideen. In them they attack the enemy at the time they define, and in the
way that they wish.”



Of course, there is a degree of exaggeration throughout this interview, and
the official makes no mention of the regime’s operations which have heavily
influenced the way in which ISIS chooses when and where to attack. But the
general concept asserted in his response is supported by the visible attack
trends. He also claims that IEDs and mines are heavily employed to limit the
regime’s movements, a claim that is also reflected in the documented attack
data.



Most interesting in this interview is the official’s response to the question
on media coverage of the Badia insurgency:



“We hear a lot about many attacks and the wiping out of convoys of the
apostates in the Badiya, so what is the truth of these reports? …



Yes true, by the grace of God Almighty, wiping out of convoys of the Nusayri
army and militias takes place, but also there is exaggeration in a lot of the
distorted news that the media of the apostate Sahwa forces deliberately publish
at specific times and for systematic malicious aims, among them: inciting
campaigns against the mujahideen in the Badiya, getting Crusader support, and
other malicious aims.”



Here the official explicitly calls out the anti-regime media outlets who
regularly write fake stories about ISIS attacks in the Badia. These stories
often involve regular, complex ISIS attacks against regime forces. It is quite
interesting that, rather than use these fake stories to boost the image of ISIS
operations in the Badia, the official denounces them. He goes on to urge
patience among ISIS supporters, saying that they should only follow official
ISIS claims which are “subject to the policy of publication that is subject to
specific military and security assessments, and all that goes within the
framework of the blazing media war that is no less dangerous than the military
war that their mujahideen brothers wage on the ground.” In other words, ISIS
media from the Badia is limited due to military and security concerns and
engaging in a full-blown media war with an emphasis on claiming every attack
would be dangerous to their activities. This claim supports the theory put
forth last year by this author and Dr. Charlie Winter in ananalysis
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of ISIS’s under-reporting phenomenon in the Badia.



The interview ends with the official highlighting several high-profile attacks
the group has carried out in 2022 and a discussion of the regime’s counter-ISIS
efforts, particularly the heavy use of drones, jets, and helicopters. Here the
officials admits that these efforts have had some impact on the group, saying
that “most of these campaigns have failed”—which means at least some have been
successful. Finally, the official addresses those supporters who might wish to
join them in the Badia, stating that the routes for foreigner fighters are
“cut” and that “mobilization to us is prevented,” so they should instead join
other ISIS wilayats outside Syria. This should not be surprising. The
preponderance of evidence suggests that the Syria insurgency is dominated by
Syrians and Iraqis, with some Russian-speaking veterans remaining from the
territorial days.



Looking Ahead



Simply put, July was a strange month for the ISIS insurgency in central Syria.
There were almost certainly additional attacks this author was not able to
confirm, but that holds true for previous months as well. The methodological
consistency of the attack tracking research over the past two years yields a
high degree of certainty that July was an extraordinarily quiet month for ISIS
in the Badia. This conclusion is supported by discussions this author had with
local pro-regime soldiers in July, who confirmed that the central Syrian desert
is currently very quiet. The Liwa al-Quds operation in Jabal Omour uncovered at
least one cave holding small arms and explosives, and the militia claims to
have destroyed two “ISIS vehicles” though it’s not clear if the vehicles
belonged to ISIS or were actively being used, as no bodies were present in the
pictures posted online. Thus, the same explanations for past lulls in activity
can be applied to July: fighters shifting to northeast Syria or Iraq (the
former saw an increase in attacks in July), fighters resting, or militants not
finding easy or opportune targets. The severity of the drop in activity is new,
however, and may suggest other factors that this author has yet to discover.



At the same time, July witnessed more official ISIS media from central Syria
than had been published in the past two years. One could argue that the lengthy
Naba interview was timed specifically to coincide with the unprecedented quiet
month. The long-term trajectory of the Badia insurgency remains a mystery. It
is entirely possible that the region will continue to experience very few
attacks as long as ISIS finds it easy to operate in northeast Syria.

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*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, those that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, involve coordinated attacks
on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or
attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs.



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